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Yipeng Pang

Publications and source records attributed to Yipeng Pang.

9 recordsLinked to original sources

Rethinking Remaining Useful Life Prediction with Scarce Time Series Data: Regression under Indirect Supervision

Supervised time series prediction relies on directly measured target variables, but real-world use cases such as predicting remaining useful life (RUL) involve indirect supervision, where the target variable is labeled as a function of another dependent variable. Trending temporal regression techniques rely on sequential time series inputs to capture temporal patterns, requiring interpolation when dealing with sparsely and irregularly sampled covariates along the timeline. However, interpolation can introduce significant biases, particularly with highly scarce data. In this paper, we address the RUL prediction problem with data scarcity as time series regression under indirect supervision. We introduce a unified framework called parameterized static regression, which takes single data points as inputs for regression of target values, inherently handling data scarcity without requiring interpolation. The time dependency under indirect supervision is captured via a parametrical rectification (PR) process, approximating a parametric function during inference with historical posteriori estimates, following the same underlying distribution used for labeling during training. Additionally, we propose a novel batch training technique for tasks in indirect supervision to prevent overfitting and enhance efficiency. We evaluate our model on public benchmarks for RUL prediction with simulated data scarcity. Our method demonstrates competitive performance in prediction accuracy when dealing with highly scarce time series data.

cs.LG

Social Profit Optimization with Demand Response Management in Electricity Market: A Multi-timescale Leader-following Approach

In the electricity market, it is quite common that the market participants make "selfish" strategies to harvest the maximum profits for themselves, which may cause the social benefit loss and impair the sustainability of the society in the long term. Regarding this issue, in this work, we will discuss how the social profit can be improved through strategic demand response (DR) management. Specifically, we explore two interaction mechanisms in the market: Nash equilibrium (NE) and Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) among utility companies (UCs) and user-UC interactions, respectively. At the user side, each user determines the optimal energy-purchasing strategy to maximize its own profit. At the UC side, a governmental UC (g-UC) is considered, who aims to optimize the social profit of the market. Meanwhile, normal UCs play games to maximize their own profits. As a result, a basic leader-following problem among the UCs is formulated under the coordination of the independent system operator (ISO). Moreover, by using our proposed demand function amelioration (DFA) strategy, a multi-timescale leader-following problem is formulated. In this case, the maximal market efficiency can be achieved without changing the "selfish instinct" of normal UCs. In addition, by considering the local constraints for the UCs, two projection-based pricing algorithms are proposed for UCs, which can provide approximate optimal solutions for the resulting non-convex social profit optimization problems. The feasibility of the proposed algorithms is verified by using the concept of price of anarchy (PoA) in a multi-UC multi-user market model in the simulation.

eess.SY

Gradient-Free Nash Equilibrium Seeking in N-Cluster Games with Uncoordinated Constant Step-Sizes

This work investigates a problem of simultaneous global cost minimization and Nash equilibrium seeking, which commonly exists in $N$-cluster non-cooperative games. Specifically, the agents in the same cluster collaborate to minimize a global cost function, being a summation of their individual cost functions, and jointly play a non-cooperative game with other clusters as players. For the problem settings, we suppose that the explicit analytical expressions of the agents' local cost functions are unknown, but the function values can be measured. We propose a gradient-free Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm by a synthesis of Gaussian smoothing techniques and gradient tracking. Furthermore, instead of using the uniform coordinated step-size, we allow the agents across different clusters to choose different constant step-sizes. When the largest step-size is sufficiently small, we prove a linear convergence of the agents' actions to a neighborhood of the unique Nash equilibrium under a strongly monotone game mapping condition, with the error gap being propotional to the largest step-size and the smoothing parameter. The performance of the proposed algorithm is validated by numerical simulations.

math.OC

Nash Equilibrium Seeking in N-Coalition Games via a Gradient-Free Method

This paper studies an $N$-coalition non-cooperative game problem, where the players in the same coalition cooperatively minimize the sum of their local cost functions under a directed communication graph, while collectively acting as a virtual player to play a non-cooperative game with other coalitions. Moreover, it is assumed that the players have no access to the explicit functional form but only the function value of their local costs. To solve the problem, a discrete-time gradient-free Nash equilibrium seeking strategy, based on the gradient tracking method, is proposed. Specifically, a gradient estimator is developed locally based on Gaussian smoothing to estimate the partial gradients, and a gradient tracker is constructed locally to trace the average sum of the partial gradients among the players within the coalition. With a sufficiently small constant step-size, we show that all players' actions approximately converge to the Nash equilibrium at a geometric rate under a strongly monotone game mapping condition. Numerical simulations are conducted to verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.

math.OC

Gradient-Free Distributed Optimization with Exact Convergence

In this paper, a gradient-free distributed algorithm is introduced to solve a set constrained optimization problem under a directed communication network. Specifically, at each time-step, the agents locally compute a so-called pseudo-gradient to guide the updates of the decision variables, which can be applied in the fields where the gradient information is unknown, not available or non-existent. A surplus-based method is adopted to remove the doubly stochastic requirement on the weighting matrix, which enables the implementation of the algorithm in graphs having no associated doubly stochastic weighting matrix. For the convergence results, the proposed algorithm is able to obtain the exact convergence to the optimal value with any positive, non-summable and non-increasing step-sizes. Furthermore, when the step-size is also square-summable, the proposed algorithm is guaranteed to achieve the exact convergence to an optimal solution. In addition to the standard convergence analysis, the convergence rate of the proposed algorithm is also investigated. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm is verified through numerical simulations.

math.OC

Randomized Gradient-Free Distributed Online Optimization via a Dynamic Regret Analysis

This work considered an online distributed optimization problem, with a group of agents whose local objective functions vary with time. Moreover, the value of the objective function is revealed to the corresponding agent after the decision is executed per time-step. Thus, each agent can only update the decision variable based on the revealed value and information collected from the neighbors, without the knowledge on the explicit expression of the objective function. To solve this problem, an online gradient-free distributed projected gradient descent (DPGD) algorithm is presented, where each agent locally approximates the gradient based on two point values. With some standard assumptions on the communication graph and the objective functions, we provide the bound for the dynamic regret as a function of the minimizer path length, step-size and smoothing parameter. Under appropriate selections of the step-size and smoothing parameter, we prove that the dynamic regret is sublinear with respect to the time duration $T$ if the minimizer path length also grows sublinearly. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm is illustrated through numerical simulations.

math.OC

A Gradient-Free Distributed Optimization Method for Convex Sum of Non-Convex Cost Functions

This paper presents a special type of distributed optimization problems, where the summation of agents' local cost functions (i.e., global cost function) is convex, but each individual can be non-convex. Unlike most distributed optimization algorithms by taking the advantages of gradient, the considered problem is allowed to be non-smooth, and the gradient information is unknown to the agents. To solve the problem, a Gaussian-smoothing technique is introduced and a gradient-free method is proposed. We prove that each agent's iterate approximately converges to the optimal solution both with probability 1 and in mean, and provide an upper bound on the optimality gap, characterized by the difference between the functional value of the iterate and the optimal value. The performance of the proposed algorithm is demonstrated by a numerical example and an application in privacy enhancement.

math.OC

Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking in N-Cluster Games with Fully Uncoordinated Constant Step-Sizes

Distributed optimization and Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problems have drawn much attention in the control community recently. This paper studies a class of non-cooperative games, known as N-cluster game, which subsumes both cooperative and non-cooperative nature among multiple agents in the two problems: solving distributed optimization problem within the cluster, while playing a non-cooperative game across the clusters. Moreover, we consider a partial-decision information game setup, i.e., the agents do not have direct access to other agents' decisions, and hence need to communicate with each other through a directed graph. To solve the N-cluster game problem, we propose a distributed NE seeking algorithm by a synthesis of consensus and gradient tracking. Unlike other existing discrete-time methods for N-cluster games where either a common step-size is publicly known by all agents or only known by agents from the same cluster, the proposed algorithm can work with fully uncoordinated constant step-sizes, which allows the agents (both within and across the clusters) to choose their own preferred step-sizes. We prove that all agents' decisions converge linearly to their corresponding NE so long as the largest step-size and the heterogeneity of the step-sizes are small. We verify the derived results through a numerical example in a Cournot competition game.

math.OC

Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking with Limited Cost Function Knowledge via A Consensus-Based Gradient-Free Method

This paper considers a distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem, where the players only have partial access to other players' actions, such as their neighbors' actions. Thus, the players are supposed to communicate with each other to estimate other players' actions. To solve the problem, a leader-following consensus gradient-free distributed Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm is proposed. This algorithm utilizes only the measurements of the player's local cost function without the knowledge of its explicit expression or the requirement on its smoothness. Hence, the algorithm is gradient-free during the entire updating process. Moreover, the analysis on the convergence of the Nash equilibrium is studied for the algorithm with both diminishing and constant step-sizes, respectively. Specifically, in the case of diminishing step-size, it is shown that the players' actions converge to the Nash equilibrium almost surely, while in the case of fixed step-size, the convergence to the neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium is achieved. The performance of the proposed algorithm is verified through numerical simulations.

math.OC