Yiqing Xing | Searcharxiv

arXiv2023

Degree-Weighted Social Learning

We study social learning in which agents weight neighbors' opinions differently based on their degrees, capturing situations in which agents place more trust in well-connected individuals or, conversely, discount their influence. We derive asymptotic properties of learning outcomes in large stochastic networks and analyze how the weighting rule affects societal wisdom and convergence speed. We find that assigning greater weight to higher-degree neighbors harms wisdom but has a non-monotonic effect on convergence speed, depending on the diversity of views within high- and low-degree groups, highlighting a potential trade-off between convergence speed and wisdom.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2020

Intermediated Implementation

We examine problems of ``intermediated implementation,'' in which a single principal can only regulate limited aspects of the consumption bundles traded between intermediaries and agents with hidden characteristics. An example is sales, in which retailers offer menus of consumption bundles to customers with hidden tastes, whereas a manufacturer with a potentially different goal from retailers' is limited to regulating sold consumption goods but not retail prices by legal barriers. We study how the principal can implement through intermediaries any social choice rule that is incentive compatible and individually rational for agents. We demonstrate the effectiveness of per-unit fee schedules and distribution regulations, which hinges on whether intermediaries have private or interdependent values. We give further applications to healthcare regulation and income redistribution.

econ.TH↗