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Yishay Mansour

Publications and source records attributed to Yishay Mansour.

At least 181 records · Page 10Linked to original sources
arXiv2014

Local computation mechanism design

We introduce the notion of Local Computation Mechanism Design - designing game theoretic mechanisms which run in polylogarithmic time and space. Local computation mechanisms reply to each query in polylogarithmic time and space, and the replies to different queries are consistent with the same global feasible solution. In addition, the computation of the payments is also done in polylogarithmic time and space. Furthermore, the mechanisms need to maintain incentive compatibility with respect to the allocation and payments. We present local computation mechanisms for a variety of classical game-theoretical problems: 1. stable matching, 2. job scheduling, 3. combinatorial auctions for unit-demand and k-minded bidders, and 4. the housing allocation problem. For stable matching, some of our techniques may have general implications. Specifically, we show that when the men's preference lists are bounded, we can achieve an arbitrarily good approximation to the stable matching within a fixed number of iterations of the Gale-Shapley algorithm.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2013

Thompson Sampling for Complex Bandit Problems

We consider stochastic multi-armed bandit problems with complex actions over a set of basic arms, where the decision maker plays a complex action rather than a basic arm in each round. The reward of the complex action is some function of the basic arms' rewards, and the feedback observed may not necessarily be the reward per-arm. For instance, when the complex actions are subsets of the arms, we may only observe the maximum reward over the chosen subset. Thus, feedback across complex actions may be coupled due to the nature of the reward function. We prove a frequentist regret bound for Thompson sampling in a very general setting involving parameter, action and observation spaces and a likelihood function over them. The bound holds for discretely-supported priors over the parameter space and without additional structural properties such as closed-form posteriors, conjugate prior structure or independence across arms. The regret bound scales logarithmically with time but, more importantly, with an improved constant that non-trivially captures the coupling across complex actions due to the structure of the rewards. As applications, we derive improved regret bounds for classes of complex bandit problems involving selecting subsets of arms, including the first nontrivial regret bounds for nonlinear MAX reward feedback from subsets.

stat.ML↗
arXiv2013

From Bandits to Experts: A Tale of Domination and Independence

We consider the partial observability model for multi-armed bandits, introduced by Mannor and Shamir. Our main result is a characterization of regret in the directed observability model in terms of the dominating and independence numbers of the observability graph. We also show that in the undirected case, the learner can achieve optimal regret without even accessing the observability graph before selecting an action. Both results are shown using variants of the Exp3 algorithm operating on the observability graph in a time-efficient manner.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2013

An Information-Theoretic Analysis of Hard and Soft Assignment Methods for Clustering

Assignment methods are at the heart of many algorithms for unsupervised learning and clustering - in particular, the well-known K-means and Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithms. In this work, we study several different methods of assignment, including the "hard" assignments used by K-means and the ?soft' assignments used by EM. While it is known that K-means minimizes the distortion on the data and EM maximizes the likelihood, little is known about the systematic differences of behavior between the two algorithms. Here we shed light on these differences via an information-theoretic analysis. The cornerstone of our results is a simple decomposition of the expected distortion, showing that K-means (and its extension for inferring general parametric densities from unlabeled sample data) must implicitly manage a trade-off between how similar the data assigned to each cluster are, and how the data are balanced among the clusters. How well the data are balanced is measured by the entropy of the partition defined by the hard assignments. In addition to letting us predict and verify systematic differences between K-means and EM on specific examples, the decomposition allows us to give a rather general argument showing that K ?means will consistently find densities with less "overlap" than EM. We also study a third natural assignment method that we call posterior assignment, that is close in spirit to the soft assignments of EM, but leads to a surprisingly different algorithm.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2013

Exact Inference of Hidden Structure from Sample Data in Noisy-OR Networks

In the literature on graphical models, there has been increased attention paid to the problems of learning hidden structure (see Heckerman [H96] for survey) and causal mechanisms from sample data [H96, P88, S93, P95, F98]. In most settings we should expect the former to be difficult, and the latter potentially impossible without experimental intervention. In this work, we examine some restricted settings in which perfectly reconstruct the hidden structure solely on the basis of observed sample data.

cs.AI↗
arXiv2013

On the Complexity of Policy Iteration

Decision-making problems in uncertain or stochastic domains are often formulated as Markov decision processes (MDPs). Policy iteration (PI) is a popular algorithm for searching over policy-space, the size of which is exponential in the number of states. We are interested in bounds on the complexity of PI that do not depend on the value of the discount factor. In this paper we prove the first such non-trivial, worst-case, upper bounds on the number of iterations required by PI to converge to the optimal policy. Our analysis also sheds new light on the manner in which PI progresses through the space of policies.

cs.AI↗
arXiv2013

Fast Planning in Stochastic Games

Stochastic games generalize Markov decision processes (MDPs) to a multiagent setting by allowing the state transitions to depend jointly on all player actions, and having rewards determined by multiplayer matrix games at each state. We consider the problem of computing Nash equilibria in stochastic games, the analogue of planning in MDPs. We begin by providing a generalization of finite-horizon value iteration that computes a Nash strategy for each player in generalsum stochastic games. The algorithm takes an arbitrary Nash selection function as input, which allows the translation of local choices between multiple Nash equilibria into the selection of a single global Nash equilibrium. Our main technical result is an algorithm for computing near-Nash equilibria in large or infinite state spaces. This algorithm builds on our finite-horizon value iteration algorithm, and adapts the sparse sampling methods of Kearns, Mansour and Ng (1999) to stochastic games. We conclude by descrbing a counterexample showing that infinite-horizon discounted value iteration, which was shown by shaplely to converge in the zero-sum case (a result we give extend slightly here), does not converge in the general-sum case.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2013

Nash Convergence of Gradient Dynamics in Iterated General-Sum Games

Multi-agent games are becoming an increasing prevalent formalism for the study of electronic commerce and auctions. The speed at which transactions can take place and the growing complexity of electronic marketplaces makes the study of computationally simple agents an appealing direction. In this work, we analyze the behavior of agents that incrementally adapt their strategy through gradient ascent on expected payoff, in the simple setting of two-player, two-action, iterated general-sum games, and present a surprising result. We show that either the agents will converge to Nash equilibrium, or if the strategies themselves do not converge, then their average payoffs will nevertheless converge to the payoffs of a Nash equilibrium.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2012

Efficient Nash Computation in Large Population Games with Bounded Influence

We introduce a general representation of large-population games in which each player s influence ON the others IS centralized AND limited, but may otherwise be arbitrary.This representation significantly generalizes the class known AS congestion games IN a natural way.Our main results are provably correct AND efficient algorithms FOR computing AND learning approximate Nash equilibria IN this general framework.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2012

The AND-OR game: Equilibrium Characterization (Working Paper)

We consider a simple simultaneous first price auction for multiple items in a complete information setting. Our goal is to completely characterize the mixed equilibria in this setting, for a simple, yet highly interesting, {\tt AND}-{\tt OR} game, where one agent is single minded and the other is unit demand.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2012

Planning in POMDPs Using Multiplicity Automata

Planning and learning in Partially Observable MDPs (POMDPs) are among the most challenging tasks in both the AI and Operation Research communities. Although solutions to these problems are intractable in general, there might be special cases, such as structured POMDPs, which can be solved efficiently. A natural and possibly efficient way to represent a POMDP is through the predictive state representation (PSR) - a representation which recently has been receiving increasing attention. In this work, we relate POMDPs to multiplicity automata- showing that POMDPs can be represented by multiplicity automata with no increase in the representation size. Furthermore, we show that the size of the multiplicity automaton is equal to the rank of the predictive state representation. Therefore, we relate both the predictive state representation and POMDPs to the well-founded multiplicity automata literature. Based on the multiplicity automata representation, we provide a planning algorithm which is exponential only in the multiplicity automata rank rather than the number of states of the POMDP. As a result, whenever the predictive state representation is logarithmic in the standard POMDP representation, our planning algorithm is efficient.

cs.AI↗
arXiv2012

Distributed Learning, Communication Complexity and Privacy

We consider the problem of PAC-learning from distributed data and analyze fundamental communication complexity questions involved. We provide general upper and lower bounds on the amount of communication needed to learn well, showing that in addition to VC-dimension and covering number, quantities such as the teaching-dimension and mistake-bound of a class play an important role. We also present tight results for a number of common concept classes including conjunctions, parity functions, and decision lists. For linear separators, we show that for non-concentrated distributions, we can use a version of the Perceptron algorithm to learn with much less communication than the number of updates given by the usual margin bound. We also show how boosting can be performed in a generic manner in the distributed setting to achieve communication with only logarithmic dependence on 1/epsilon for any concept class, and demonstrate how recent work on agnostic learning from class-conditional queries can be used to achieve low communication in agnostic settings as well. We additionally present an analysis of privacy, considering both differential privacy and a notion of distributional privacy that is especially appealing in this context.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2012

Multiple Source Adaptation and the Renyi Divergence

This paper presents a novel theoretical study of the general problem of multiple source adaptation using the notion of Renyi divergence. Our results build on our previous work [12], but significantly broaden the scope of that work in several directions. We extend previous multiple source loss guarantees based on distribution weighted combinations to arbitrary target distributions P, not necessarily mixtures of the source distributions, analyze both known and unknown target distribution cases, and prove a lower bound. We further extend our bounds to deal with the case where the learner receives an approximate distribution for each source instead of the exact one, and show that similar loss guarantees can be achieved depending on the divergence between the approximate and true distributions. We also analyze the case where the labeling functions of the source domains are somewhat different. Finally, we report the results of experiments with both an artificial data set and a sentiment analysis task, showing the performance benefits of the distribution weighted combinations and the quality of our bounds based on the Renyi divergence.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2012

Converting online algorithms to local computation algorithms

We propose a general method for converting online algorithms to local computation algorithms by selecting a random permutation of the input, and simulating running the online algorithm. We bound the number of steps of the algorithm using a query tree, which models the dependencies between queries. We improve previous analyses of query trees on graphs of bounded degree, and extend the analysis to the cases where the degrees are distributed binomially, and to a special case of bipartite graphs. Using this method, we give a local computation algorithm for maximal matching in graphs of bounded degree, which runs in time and space O(log^3 n). We also show how to convert a large family of load balancing algorithms (related to balls and bins problems) to local computation algorithms. This gives several local load balancing algorithms which achieve the same approximation ratios as the online algorithms, but run in O(log n) time and space. Finally, we modify existing local computation algorithms for hypergraph 2-coloring and k-CNF and use our improved analysis to obtain better time and space bounds, of O(log^4 n), removing the dependency on the maximal degree of the graph from the exponent.

cs.DS↗
arXiv2012

Doubleclick Ad Exchange Auction

Display advertisements on the web are sold via ad exchanges that use real time auction. We describe the challenges of designing a suitable auction, and present a simple auction called the Optional Second Price (OSP) auction that is currently used in Doubleclick Ad Exchange.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2011

Welfare and Profit Maximization with Production Costs

Combinatorial Auctions are a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: pricing and allocating goods to buyers with complex preferences in order to maximize some desired objective (e.g., social welfare, revenue, or profit). The problem has been well-studied in the case of limited supply (one copy of each item), and in the case of digital goods (the seller can produce additional copies at no cost). Yet in the case of resources---oil, labor, computing cycles, etc.---neither of these abstractions is just right: additional supplies of these resources can be found, but at increasing difficulty (marginal cost) as resources are depleted. In this work, we initiate the study of the algorithmic mechanism design problem of combinatorial pricing under increasing marginal cost. The goal is to sell these goods to buyers with unknown and arbitrary combinatorial valuation functions to maximize either the social welfare, or the seller's profit; specifically we focus on the setting of \emph{posted item prices} with buyers arriving online. We give algorithms that achieve {\em constant factor} approximations for a class of natural cost functions---linear, low-degree polynomial, logarithmic---and that give logarithmic approximations for more general increasing marginal cost functions (along with a necessary additive loss). We show that these bounds are essentially best possible for these settings.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2011

Non-Price Equilibria in Markets of Discrete Goods

We study markets of indivisible items in which price-based (Walrasian) equilibria often do not exist due to the discrete non-convex setting. Instead we consider Nash equilibria of the market viewed as a game, where players bid for items, and where the highest bidder on an item wins it and pays his bid. We first observe that pure Nash-equilibria of this game excatly correspond to price-based equilibiria (and thus need not exist), but that mixed-Nash equilibria always do exist, and we analyze their structure in several simple cases where no price-based equilibrium exists. We also undertake an analysis of the welfare properties of these equilibria showing that while pure equilibria are always perfectly efficient ("first welfare theorem"), mixed equilibria need not be, and we provide upper and lower bounds on their amount of inefficiency.

cs.GT↗