arXiv subjects

Yixiong Hao

Publications and source records attributed to Yixiong Hao.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Evaluation-Conditioned Training: Teaching Models to Generalize to Stronger Oversight Regimes

Feedback signals used to train Large Language Models (LLMs) are the primary driver of their behavior and our main lever for instilling alignment with human values and objectives. However, a key limitation of current post-training methods is the inability of human annotators and automated reward functions to faithfully capture the feedback we would like to give. We introduce Evaluation-Conditioned Training (ECT), a post-training framework that uses natural language to condition each training sample on the fidelity of the feedback we provide and then elicits the desired behavior by conditioning the LLM on a high-fidelity monitor in deployment. ECT is aimed at improving performance under imperfect feedback and works as an add-on to existing algorithms such as SFT and PPO. We first provide a conceptual framework for ECT and discuss its potential to address persistent sources of reward mis-specification. Then we motivate ECT in the context of the eliciting latent knowledge (ELK) problem. Finally, we evaluate ECT on two proof-of-concept experiments: increasing even-handedness in news article generation and reducing sycophancy on an arithmetic task. In each setting, we utilize imperfect feedback, rewarding bias and agreement with the user, respectively. In both settings, ECT improves the targeted behavior relative to direct training.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Shall We Play a Game? Language Models for Open-ended Wargames

LLM-based social simulations can make a generated transcript look like a single behavioral signal, but the model behind that transcript may be doing several different jobs: choosing what an actor says or does, deciding what happens after an action, or both. The difference matters especially in open-ended wargames, where models are prized for handling unusual actions and ambiguous consequences. We report a scoping review of 223 de-duplicated AI-in-wargames and strategic-simulation papers retrieved through May 1, 2026, describing each simulation by its model-control profile: whether the language model has open-ended control over player actions, adjudication, or both. Only 20 of 223 studies (~9%) give language models both roles. Before treating LM outputs as social simulations, researchers need to know how much creative control the model has over actions and consequences. For open-ended simulations, fidelity depends not only on whether agents behave plausibly, but also on whether language models can reliably act as adjudicators or world models.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Evaluation Cards: An Interpretive Layer for AI Evaluation Reporting

AI evaluation results are produced at scale but reported inconsistently across leaderboards, model cards, benchmark papers, and company blogs. The cost is interpretive: readers cannot reliably compare results across sources, identify what a report omits, or trace an aggregate claim to its underlying evidence. Recent efforts address isolated components but leave three gaps: they cover only narrow slices of the evaluation lifecycle and do not compose into a single interpretable record; they specify static representations that do not differentiate the questions different stakeholders bring to the same evidence; and they remain proposals on paper, lacking the extraction infrastructure required for adoption at scale. We present \EvalCards{}, an operational reporting layer that composes benchmark metadata, evaluation run data, and model metadata into a unified record. We (1) derive a reporting schema from a structured review of 52 papers and 10 stakeholder interviews, (2) implement four interpretive signals (reproducibility, documentation completeness, provenance and risk, and score comparability), rendered through reader modes calibrated to research and non-research audiences, and (3) deploy a monitoring tool that applies \EvalCards{} across 5,816 models, 635 benchmarks, and 101,843 results, surfacing systematic gaps in current reporting practice.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Prioritization of Risks from Artificial Intelligence: A Delphi Study of 272 International Experts

Artificial intelligence poses many risks, ranging from familiar present-day harms to unprecedented and potentially catastrophic ones. Effective risk management requires prioritization: we must understand which risks are most severe, who is most vulnerable, and who is most responsible for addressing them. We report results from a three-round Delphi study conducted late 2025 with 272 international AI experts. Experts rated 24 AI risks on harm probability and severity, sector and actor vulnerability, actor responsibility, and overall concern. Experts estimated the five most severe harms in the next 5 years were likely to come from dangerous capabilities, competitive dynamics, weapons & cyberattacks (including CBRNE), power centralization, and false information. In a business-as-usual scenario, experts judged 18 of 24 risks as having a more than 10% probability of catastrophic outcomes (e.g., more than 1 million deaths or more than USD 100B in financial loss) in the next 5 years (2025-2030). In a scenario where pragmatic mitigations are implemented, experts still judged five risks as having a more than 10% probability of catastrophic outcomes: dangerous capabilities, weapons & cyberattacks, environmental harm, inequality & unemployment, and power centralization. All 24 risks were judged as being more than 5% likely to cause catastrophic outcomes. AI users and the general public were judged the most vulnerable to these risks, but experts assigned the highest responsibility for addressing them to general-purpose AI developers and governance actors (including governments, regulators, and standards bodies). Across most risks, experts identified information, finance, and national security as the most vulnerable sectors. These findings can guide AI risk prioritization and clarify expert expectations about who should bear responsibility for mitigation.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

Interpreting Large Text-to-Image Diffusion Models with Dictionary Learning

Sparse autoencoders are a promising new approach for decomposing language model activations for interpretation and control. They have been applied successfully to vision transformer image encoders and to small-scale diffusion models. Inference-Time Decomposition of Activations (ITDA) is a recently proposed variant of dictionary learning that takes the dictionary to be a set of data points from the activation distribution and reconstructs them with gradient pursuit. We apply Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) and ITDA to a large text-to-image diffusion model, Flux 1, and consider the interpretability of embeddings of both by introducing a visual automated interpretation pipeline. We find that SAEs accurately reconstruct residual stream embeddings and beat MLP neurons on interpretability. We are able to use SAE features to steer image generation through activation addition. We find that ITDA has comparable interpretability to SAEs.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Patterns and Mechanisms of Contrastive Activation Engineering

Controlling the behavior of Large Language Models (LLMs) remains a significant challenge due to their inherent complexity and opacity. While techniques like fine-tuning can modify model behavior, they typically require extensive computational resources. Recent work has introduced a class of contrastive activation engineering (CAE) techniques as promising approaches for steering LLM outputs through targeted modifications to their internal representations. Applied at inference-time with zero cost, CAE has the potential to introduce a new paradigm of flexible, task-specific LLM behavior tuning. We analyze the performance of CAE in in-distribution, out-of-distribution settings, evaluate drawbacks, and begin to develop comprehensive guidelines for its effective deployment. We find that 1. CAE is only reliably effective when applied to in-distribution contexts. 2. Increasing the number of samples used to generate steering vectors has diminishing returns at around 80 samples. 3. Steering vectors are susceptible to adversarial inputs that reverses the behavior that is steered for. 4. Steering vectors harm the overall model perplexity. 5. Larger models are more resistant to steering-induced degradation.

cs.AI↗