arXiv subjects

Yogev Bar-On

Publications and source records attributed to Yogev Bar-On.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

Proof of Work With External Utilities

Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus is traditionally analyzed under the assumption that all miners incur similar costs per unit of computational effort. In reality, costs vary due to factors such as regional electricity cost differences and access to specialized hardware. These variations in mining costs become even more pronounced in the emerging paradigm of \emph{Proof-of-Useful-Work} (PoUW), where miners can earn additional \emph{external} rewards by performing beneficial computations, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) training and inference workloads. Continuing the work of Fiat et al., who investigate equilibrium dynamics of PoW consensus under heterogeneous cost structures due to varying energy costs, we expand their model to also consider external rewards. We develop a theoretical framework to model miner behavior in such conditions and analyze the resulting equilibrium. Our findings suggest that in some cases, miners with access to external incentives will optimize profitability by concentrating their useful tasks in a single block. We also explore the implications of external rewards for decentralization, modeling it as the Shannon entropy of computational effort distribution among participants. Empirical evidence supports many of our assumptions, indicating that AI training and inference workloads, when reused for consensus, can retain security comparable to Bitcoin while dramatically reducing computational costs and environmental waste.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Aegis: Tethering a Blockchain with Primary-Chain Stake

Blockchains implement decentralized monetary systems and applications. Recent advancements enable what we call tethering a blockchain to a primary blockchain, securing the tethered chain by nodes that post primary-chain tokens as collateral. The collateral ensures nodes behave as intended, until they withdraw it. Unlike a Proof of Stake blockchain which uses its own token as collateral, using primary-chain tokens shields the tethered chain from the volatility of its own token. State-of-the-art tethered blockchains either rely on centralization, or make extreme assumptions: that all communication is synchronous, that operators remain correct even post-withdrawal, or that withdrawals can be indefinitely delayed by tethered-chain failures. We prove that with partial synchrony, there is no solution to the problem. However, under the standard assumptions that communication with the primary chain is synchronous and communication among the tethered chain nodes is partially synchronous, there is a solution. We present a tethered-chain protocol called Aegis. Aegis uses references from its blocks to primary blocks to define committees, checkpoints on the primary chain to perpetuate decisions, and resets to establish new committees when previous ones become obsolete. It ensures safety at all times and rapid progress when latency among Aegis nodes is low.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2024

Non-stochastic Bandits With Evolving Observations

We introduce a novel online learning framework that unifies and generalizes pre-established models, such as delayed and corrupted feedback, to encompass adversarial environments where action feedback evolves over time. In this setting, the observed loss is arbitrary and may not correlate with the true loss incurred, with each round updating previous observations adversarially. We propose regret minimization algorithms for both the full-information and bandit settings, with regret bounds quantified by the average feedback accuracy relative to the true loss. Our algorithms match the known regret bounds across many special cases, while also introducing previously unknown bounds.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

Optimal Publishing Strategies on a Base Layer

A growing number of products use layer 2 solutions to expand the capabilities of primary blockchains like Ethereum, where computation is off-loaded from the root chain, and the results are published to it in bulk. Those include optimistic and zero-knowledge rollups, information oracles, and app-specific chains. This work presents an analysis of layer 2 blockchain strategies determining the optimal times for publishing transactions on the root chain. There is a trade-off between waiting for a better layer 1 gas price and the urgency to finalize layer 2 transactions. We present a model for the problem that captures this trade-off, generalizing previous works, and we analyze the properties of optimal publishing strategies. We show that such optimal strategies hold a computable simple form for a large class of cost functions.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Uniswap Liquidity Provision: An Online Learning Approach

Decentralized Exchanges (DEXs) are new types of marketplaces leveraging Blockchain technology. They allow users to trade assets with Automatic Market Makers (AMM), using funds provided by liquidity providers, removing the need for order books. One such DEX, Uniswap v3, allows liquidity providers to allocate funds more efficiently by specifying an active price interval for their funds. This introduces the problem of finding an optimal strategy for choosing price intervals. We formalize this problem as an online learning problem with non-stochastic rewards. We use regret-minimization methods to show a liquidity provision strategy that guarantees a lower bound on the reward. This is true even for non-stochastic changes to asset pricing, and we express this bound in terms of the trading volume.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Individual Regret in Cooperative Nonstochastic Multi-Armed Bandits

We study agents communicating over an underlying network by exchanging messages, in order to optimize their individual regret in a common nonstochastic multi-armed bandit problem. We derive regret minimization algorithms that guarantee for each agent $v$ an individual expected regret of $\widetilde{O}\left(\sqrt{\left(1+\frac{K}{\left|\mathcal{N}\left(v\right)\right|}\right)T}\right)$, where $T$ is the number of time steps, $K$ is the number of actions and $\mathcal{N}\left(v\right)$ is the set of neighbors of agent $v$ in the communication graph. We present algorithms both for the case that the communication graph is known to all the agents, and for the case that the graph is unknown. When the graph is unknown, each agent knows only the set of its neighbors and an upper bound on the total number of agents. The individual regret between the models differs only by a logarithmic factor. Our work resolves an open problem from [Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2019b].

cs.LG↗