arXiv subjects

Yonatan Gizachew Achamyeleh

Publications and source records attributed to Yonatan Gizachew Achamyeleh.

8 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Out of Sight, Out of Track: Adversarial Attacks on Propagation-based Multi-Object Trackers via Query State Manipulation

Recent Tracking-by-Query-Propagation (TBP) methods have advanced Multi-Object Tracking (MOT) by enabling end-to-end (E2E) pipelines with long-range temporal modeling. However, this reliance on query propagation introduces unexplored architectural vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks. We present FADE, a novel attack framework designed to exploit these specific vulnerabilities. FADE employs two attack strategies targeting core TBP mechanisms: (i) Temporal Query Flooding: Generates spurious temporally consistent track queries to exhaust the tracker's limited query budget, forcing it to terminate valid tracks. (ii) Temporal Memory Corruption: Directly attacks the query updater's memory by severing temporal links via state de-correlation and erasing the learned feature identity of matched tracks. Furthermore, we introduce a differentiable pipeline to optimize these attacks for physical-world realizability by leveraging simulations of advanced perception sensor spoofing. Experiments on MOT17 and MOT20 benchmarks demonstrate that FADE is highly effective against state-of-the-art TBP trackers, causing significant identity switches and track terminations.

cs.CV↗

arXiv2026

HELIOS: Hierarchical Graph Abstraction for Structure-Aware LLM Decompilation

Large language models (LLMs) have recently been applied to binary decompilation, yet they still treat code as plain text and ignore the graphs that govern program control flow. This limitation often yields syntactically fragile and logically inconsistent output, especially for optimized binaries. This paper presents \textsc{HELIOS}, a framework that reframes LLM-based decompilation as a structured reasoning task. \textsc{HELIOS} summarizes a binary's control flow and function calls into a hierarchical text representation that spells out basic blocks, their successors, and high-level patterns such as loops and conditionals. This representation is supplied to a general-purpose LLM, along with raw decompiler output, optionally combined with a compiler-in-the-loop that returns error messages when the generated code fails to build. On HumanEval-Decompile for \texttt{x86\_64}, \textsc{HELIOS} raises average object file compilability from 45.0\% to 85.2\% for Gemini~2.0 and from 71.4\% to 89.6\% for GPT-4.1~Mini. With compiler feedback, compilability exceeds 94\% and functional correctness improves by up to 5.6 percentage points over text-only prompting. Across six architectures drawn from x86, ARM, and MIPS, \textsc{HELIOS} reduces the spread in functional correctness while keeping syntactic correctness consistently high, all without fine-tuning. These properties make \textsc{HELIOS} a practical building block for reverse engineering workflows in security settings where analysts need recompilable, semantically faithful code across diverse hardware targets.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2025

AGNOMIN -- Architecture Agnostic Multi-Label Function Name Prediction

Function name prediction is crucial for understanding stripped binaries in software reverse engineering, a key step for \textbf{enabling subsequent vulnerability analysis and patching}. However, existing approaches often struggle with architecture-specific limitations, data scarcity, and diverse naming conventions. We present AGNOMIN, a novel architecture-agnostic approach for multi-label function name prediction in stripped binaries. AGNOMIN builds Feature-Enriched Hierarchical Graphs (FEHGs), combining Control Flow Graphs, Function Call Graphs, and dynamically learned \texttt{PCode} features. A hierarchical graph neural network processes this enriched structure to generate consistent function representations across architectures, vital for \textbf{scalable security assessments}. For function name prediction, AGNOMIN employs a Renée-inspired decoder, enhanced with an attention-based head layer and algorithmic improvements. We evaluate AGNOMIN on a comprehensive dataset of 9,000 ELF executable binaries across three architectures, demonstrating its superior performance compared to state-of-the-art approaches, with improvements of up to 27.17\% in precision and 55.86\% in recall across the testing dataset. Moreover, AGNOMIN generalizes well to unseen architectures, achieving 5.89\% higher recall than the closest baseline. AGNOMIN's practical utility has been validated through security hackathons, where it successfully aided reverse engineers in analyzing and patching vulnerable binaries across different architectures.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2025

Environmental Rate Manipulation Attacks on Power Grid Security

The growing complexity of global supply chains has made hardware Trojans a significant threat in sensor-based power electronics. Traditional Trojan designs depend on digital triggers or fixed threshold conditions that can be detected during standard testing. In contrast, we introduce Environmental Rate Manipulation (ERM), a novel Trojan triggering mechanism that activates by monitoring the rate of change in environmental parameters rather than their absolute values. This approach allows the Trojan to remain inactive under normal conditions and evade redundancy and sensor-fusion defenses. We implement a compact 14~$μ$m$^2$ circuit that measures capacitor charging rates in standard sensor front-ends and disrupts inverter pulse-width modulation PWM signals when a rapid change is induced. Experiments on a commercial Texas Instruments solar inverter demonstrate that ERM can trigger catastrophic driver chip failure. Furthermore, ETAP simulations indicate that a single compromised 100~kW inverter may initiate cascading grid instabilities. The attack's significance extends beyond individual sensors to entire classes of environmental sensing systems common in power electronics, demonstrating fundamental challenges for hardware security.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Bridging the PLC Binary Analysis Gap: A Cross-Compiler Dataset and Neural Framework for Industrial Control Systems

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) rely heavily on Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) to manage critical infrastructure, yet analyzing PLC executables remains challenging due to diverse proprietary compilers and limited access to source code. To bridge this gap, we introduce PLC-BEAD, a comprehensive dataset containing 2431 compiled binaries from 700+ PLC programs across four major industrial compilers (CoDeSys, GEB, OpenPLC-V2, OpenPLC-V3). This novel dataset uniquely pairs each binary with its original Structured Text source code and standardized functionality labels, enabling both binary-level and source-level analysis. We demonstrate the dataset's utility through PLCEmbed, a transformer-based framework for binary code analysis that achieves 93\% accuracy in compiler provenance identification and 42\% accuracy in fine-grained functionality classification across 22 industrial control categories. Through comprehensive ablation studies, we analyze how compiler optimization levels, code patterns, and class distributions influence model performance. We provide detailed documentation of the dataset creation process, labeling taxonomy, and benchmark protocols to ensure reproducibility. Both PLC-BEAD and PLCEmbed are released as open-source resources to foster research in PLC security, reverse engineering, and ICS forensics, establishing new baselines for data-driven approaches to industrial cybersecurity.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2024

A Fly on the Wall -- Exploiting Acoustic Side-Channels in Differential Pressure Sensors

Differential Pressure Sensors are widely deployed to monitor critical environments. However, our research unveils a previously overlooked vulnerability: their high sensitivity to pressure variations makes them susceptible to acoustic side-channel attacks. We demonstrate that the pressure-sensing diaphragms in DPS can inadvertently capture subtle air vibrations caused by speech, which propagate through the sensor's components and affect the pressure readings. Exploiting this discovery, we introduce BaroVox, a novel attack that reconstructs speech from DPS readings, effectively turning DPS into a "fly on the wall." We model the effect of sound on DPS, exploring the limits and challenges of acoustic leakage. To overcome these challenges, we propose two solutions: a signal-processing approach using a unique spectral subtraction method and a deep learning-based approach for keyword classification. Evaluations under various conditions demonstrate BaroVox's effectiveness, achieving a word error rate of 0.29 for manual recognition and 90.51% accuracy for automatic recognition. Our findings highlight the significant privacy implications of this vulnerability. We also discuss potential defense strategies to mitigate the risks posed by BaroVox.

cs.SD↗

arXiv2023

CFG2VEC: Hierarchical Graph Neural Network for Cross-Architectural Software Reverse Engineering

Mission-critical embedded software is critical to our society's infrastructure but can be subject to new security vulnerabilities as technology advances. When security issues arise, Reverse Engineers (REs) use Software Reverse Engineering (SRE) tools to analyze vulnerable binaries. However, existing tools have limited support, and REs undergo a time-consuming, costly, and error-prone process that requires experience and expertise to understand the behaviors of software and vulnerabilities. To improve these tools, we propose $\textit{cfg2vec}$, a Hierarchical Graph Neural Network (GNN) based approach. To represent binary, we propose a novel Graph-of-Graph (GoG) representation, combining the information of control-flow and function-call graphs. Our $\textit{cfg2vec}$ learns how to represent each binary function compiled from various CPU architectures, utilizing hierarchical GNN and the siamese network-based supervised learning architecture. We evaluate $\textit{cfg2vec}$'s capability of predicting function names from stripped binaries. Our results show that $\textit{cfg2vec}$ outperforms the state-of-the-art by $24.54\%$ in predicting function names and can even achieve $51.84\%$ better given more training data. Additionally, $\textit{cfg2vec}$ consistently outperforms the state-of-the-art for all CPU architectures, while the baseline requires multiple training to achieve similar performance. More importantly, our results demonstrate that our $\textit{cfg2vec}$ could tackle binaries built from unseen CPU architectures, thus indicating that our approach can generalize the learned knowledge. Lastly, we demonstrate its practicability by implementing it as a Ghidra plugin used during resolving DARPA Assured MicroPatching (AMP) challenges.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2022

A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Spreading Deadly Pathogens Under the Disguise of Popular Music

A Negative Pressure Room (NPR) is an essential requirement by the Bio-Safety Levels (BSLs) in biolabs or infectious-control hospitals to prevent deadly pathogens from being leaked from the facility. An NPR maintains a negative pressure inside with respect to the outside reference space so that microbes are contained inside of an NPR. Nowadays, differential pressure sensors (DPSs) are utilized by the Building Management Systems (BMSs) to control and monitor the negative pressure in an NPR. This paper demonstrates a non-invasive and stealthy attack on NPRs by spoofing a DPS at its resonant frequency. Our contributions are: (1) We show that DPSs used in NPRs typically have resonant frequencies in the audible range. (2) We use this finding to design malicious music to create resonance in DPSs, resulting in an overshooting in the DPS's normal pressure readings. (3) We show how the resonance in DPSs can fool the BMSs so that the NPR turns its negative pressure to a positive one, causing a potential \textit{leak} of deadly microbes from NPRs. We do experiments on 8 DPSs from 5 different manufacturers to evaluate their resonant frequencies considering the sampling tube length and find resonance in 6 DPSs. We can achieve a 2.5 Pa change in negative pressure from a $\sim$7 cm distance when a sampling tube is not present and from a $\sim$2.5 cm distance for a 1 m sampling tube length. We also introduce an interval-time variation approach for an adversarial control over the negative pressure and show that the \textit{forged} pressure can be varied within 12 - 33 Pa. Our attack is also capable of attacking multiple NPRs simultaneously. Moreover, we demonstrate our attack at a real-world NPR located in an anonymous bioresearch facility, which is FDA approved and follows CDC guidelines. We also provide countermeasures to prevent the attack.

cs.CR↗