arXiv subjects

Yoram Bachrach

Publications and source records attributed to Yoram Bachrach.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2025

Evaluating Agents using Social Choice Theory

We argue that many general evaluation problems can be viewed through the lens of voting theory. Each task is interpreted as a separate voter, which requires only ordinal rankings or pairwise comparisons of agents to produce an overall evaluation. By viewing the aggregator as a social welfare function, we are able to leverage centuries of research in social choice theory to derive principled evaluation frameworks with axiomatic foundations. These evaluations are interpretable and flexible, while avoiding many of the problems currently facing cross-task evaluation. We apply this Voting-as-Evaluation (VasE) framework across multiple settings, including reinforcement learning, large language models, and humans. In practice, we observe that VasE can be more robust than popular evaluation frameworks (Elo and Nash averaging), discovers properties in the evaluation data not evident from scores alone, and can predict outcomes better than Elo in a complex seven-player game. We identify one particular approach, maximal lotteries, that satisfies important consistency properties relevant to evaluation, is computationally efficient (polynomial in the size of the evaluation data), and identifies game-theoretic cycles.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Soft Condorcet Optimization for Ranking of General Agents

Driving progress of AI models and agents requires comparing their performance on standardized benchmarks; for general agents, individual performances must be aggregated across a potentially wide variety of different tasks. In this paper, we describe a novel ranking scheme inspired by social choice frameworks, called Soft Condorcet Optimization (SCO), to compute the optimal ranking of agents: the one that makes the fewest mistakes in predicting the agent comparisons in the evaluation data. This optimal ranking is the maximum likelihood estimate when evaluation data (which we view as votes) are interpreted as noisy samples from a ground truth ranking, a solution to Condorcet's original voting system criteria. SCO ratings are maximal for Condorcet winners when they exist, which we show is not necessarily true for the classical rating system Elo. We propose three optimization algorithms to compute SCO ratings and evaluate their empirical performance. When serving as an approximation to the Kemeny-Young voting method, SCO rankings are on average 0 to 0.043 away from the optimal ranking in normalized Kendall-tau distance across 865 preference profiles from the PrefLib open ranking archive. In a simulated noisy tournament setting, SCO achieves accurate approximations to the ground truth ranking and the best among several baselines when 59\% or more of the preference data is missing. Finally, SCO ranking provides the best approximation to the optimal ranking, measured on held-out test sets, in a problem containing 52,958 human players across 31,049 games of the classic seven-player game of Diplomacy.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2025

MLGym: A New Framework and Benchmark for Advancing AI Research Agents

We introduce Meta MLGym and MLGym-Bench, a new framework and benchmark for evaluating and developing LLM agents on AI research tasks. This is the first Gym environment for machine learning (ML) tasks, enabling research on reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms for training such agents. MLGym-bench consists of 13 diverse and open-ended AI research tasks from diverse domains such as computer vision, natural language processing, reinforcement learning, and game theory. Solving these tasks requires real-world AI research skills such as generating new ideas and hypotheses, creating and processing data, implementing ML methods, training models, running experiments, analyzing the results, and iterating through this process to improve on a given task. We evaluate a number of frontier large language models (LLMs) on our benchmarks such as Claude-3.5-Sonnet, Llama-3.1 405B, GPT-4o, o1-preview, and Gemini-1.5 Pro. Our MLGym framework makes it easy to add new tasks, integrate and evaluate models or agents, generate synthetic data at scale, as well as develop new learning algorithms for training agents on AI research tasks. We find that current frontier models can improve on the given baselines, usually by finding better hyperparameters, but do not generate novel hypotheses, algorithms, architectures, or substantial improvements. We open-source our framework and benchmark to facilitate future research in advancing the AI research capabilities of LLM agents.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

Modelling Chemical Reaction Networks using Neural Ordinary Differential Equations

In chemical reaction network theory, ordinary differential equations are used to model the temporal change of chemical species concentration. As the functional form of these ordinary differential equations systems is derived from an empirical model of the reaction network, it may be incomplete. Our approach aims to elucidate these hidden insights in the reaction network by combining dynamic modelling with deep learning in the form of neural ordinary differential equations. Our contributions not only help to identify the shortcomings of existing empirical models but also assist the design of future reaction networks.

q-bio.MN↗

arXiv2024

Steering Language Models with Game-Theoretic Solvers

Mathematical models of interactions among rational agents have long been studied in game theory. However these interactions are often over a small set of discrete game actions which is very different from how humans communicate in natural language. To bridge this gap, we introduce a framework that allows equilibrium solvers to work over the space of natural language dialogue generated by large language models (LLMs). Specifically, by modelling the players, strategies and payoffs in a "game" of dialogue, we create a binding from natural language interactions to the conventional symbolic logic of game theory. Given this binding, we can ask existing game-theoretic algorithms to provide us with strategic solutions (e.g., what string an LLM should generate to maximize payoff in the face of strategic partners or opponents), giving us predictors of stable, rational conversational strategies. We focus on three domains that require different negotiation strategies: scheduling meetings, trading fruit and debate, and evaluate an LLM's generated language when guided by solvers. We see that LLMs that follow game-theory solvers result in dialogue generations that are less exploitable than the control (no guidance from solvers), and the language generated results in higher rewards, in all negotiation domains. We discuss future implications of this work, and how game-theoretic solvers that can leverage the expressivity of natural language can open up a new avenue of guiding language research.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2024

Crowd IQ -- Aggregating Opinions to Boost Performance

We show how the quality of decisions based on the aggregated opinions of the crowd can be conveniently studied using a sample of individual responses to a standard IQ questionnaire. We aggregated the responses to the IQ questionnaire using simple majority voting and a machine learning approach based on a probabilistic graphical model. The score for the aggregated questionnaire, Crowd IQ, serves as a quality measure of decisions based on aggregating opinions, which also allows quantifying individual and crowd performance on the same scale. We show that Crowd IQ grows quickly with the size of the crowd but saturates, and that for small homogeneous crowds the Crowd IQ significantly exceeds the IQ of even their most intelligent member. We investigate alternative ways of aggregating the responses and the impact of the aggregation method on the resulting Crowd IQ. We also discuss Contextual IQ, a method of quantifying the individual participant's contribution to the Crowd IQ based on the Shapley value from cooperative game theory.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2024

Feature Likelihood Divergence: Evaluating the Generalization of Generative Models Using Samples

The past few years have seen impressive progress in the development of deep generative models capable of producing high-dimensional, complex, and photo-realistic data. However, current methods for evaluating such models remain incomplete: standard likelihood-based metrics do not always apply and rarely correlate with perceptual fidelity, while sample-based metrics, such as FID, are insensitive to overfitting, i.e., inability to generalize beyond the training set. To address these limitations, we propose a new metric called the Feature Likelihood Divergence (FLD), a parametric sample-based metric that uses density estimation to provide a comprehensive trichotomic evaluation accounting for novelty (i.e., different from the training samples), fidelity, and diversity of generated samples. We empirically demonstrate the ability of FLD to identify overfitting problem cases, even when previously proposed metrics fail. We also extensively evaluate FLD on various image datasets and model classes, demonstrating its ability to match intuitions of previous metrics like FID while offering a more comprehensive evaluation of generative models. Code is available at https://github.com/marcojira/fld.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Approximating the Core via Iterative Coalition Sampling

The core is a central solution concept in cooperative game theory, defined as the set of feasible allocations or payments such that no subset of agents has incentive to break away and form their own subgroup or coalition. However, it has long been known that the core (and approximations, such as the least-core) are hard to compute. This limits our ability to analyze cooperative games in general, and to fully embrace cooperative game theory contributions in domains such as explainable AI (XAI), where the core can complement the Shapley values to identify influential features or instances supporting predictions by black-box models. We propose novel iterative algorithms for computing variants of the core, which avoid the computational bottleneck of many other approaches; namely solving large linear programs. As such, they scale better to very large problems as we demonstrate across different classes of cooperative games, including weighted voting games, induced subgraph games, and marginal contribution networks. We also explore our algorithms in the context of XAI, providing further evidence of the power of the core for such applications.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Using Cooperative Game Theory to Prune Neural Networks

We show how solution concepts from cooperative game theory can be used to tackle the problem of pruning neural networks. The ever-growing size of deep neural networks (DNNs) increases their performance, but also their computational requirements. We introduce a method called Game Theory Assisted Pruning (GTAP), which reduces the neural network's size while preserving its predictive accuracy. GTAP is based on eliminating neurons in the network based on an estimation of their joint impact on the prediction quality through game theoretic solutions. Specifically, we use a power index akin to the Shapley value or Banzhaf index, tailored using a procedure similar to Dropout (commonly used to tackle overfitting problems in machine learning). Empirical evaluation of both feedforward networks and convolutional neural networks shows that this method outperforms existing approaches in the achieved tradeoff between the number of parameters and model accuracy.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

TacticAI: an AI assistant for football tactics

Identifying key patterns of tactics implemented by rival teams, and developing effective responses, lies at the heart of modern football. However, doing so algorithmically remains an open research challenge. To address this unmet need, we propose TacticAI, an AI football tactics assistant developed and evaluated in close collaboration with domain experts from Liverpool FC. We focus on analysing corner kicks, as they offer coaches the most direct opportunities for interventions and improvements. TacticAI incorporates both a predictive and a generative component, allowing the coaches to effectively sample and explore alternative player setups for each corner kick routine and to select those with the highest predicted likelihood of success. We validate TacticAI on a number of relevant benchmark tasks: predicting receivers and shot attempts and recommending player position adjustments. The utility of TacticAI is validated by a qualitative study conducted with football domain experts at Liverpool FC. We show that TacticAI's model suggestions are not only indistinguishable from real tactics, but also favoured over existing tactics 90% of the time, and that TacticAI offers an effective corner kick retrieval system. TacticAI achieves these results despite the limited availability of gold-standard data, achieving data efficiency through geometric deep learning.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

Explainability Techniques for Chemical Language Models

Explainability techniques are crucial in gaining insights into the reasons behind the predictions of deep learning models, which have not yet been applied to chemical language models. We propose an explainable AI technique that attributes the importance of individual atoms towards the predictions made by these models. Our method backpropagates the relevance information towards the chemical input string and visualizes the importance of individual atoms. We focus on self-attention Transformers operating on molecular string representations and leverage a pretrained encoder for finetuning. We showcase the method by predicting and visualizing solubility in water and organic solvents. We achieve competitive model performance while obtaining interpretable predictions, which we use to inspect the pretrained model.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

Learning Truthful, Efficient, and Welfare Maximizing Auction Rules

From social networks to supply chains, more and more aspects of how humans, firms and organizations interact is mediated by artificial learning agents. As the influence of machine learning systems grows, it is paramount that we study how to imbue our modern institutions with our own values and principles. Here we consider the problem of allocating goods to buyers who have preferences over them in settings where the seller's aim is not to maximize their monetary gains, but rather to advance some notion of social welfare (e.g. the government trying to award construction licenses for hospitals or schools). This problem has a long history in economics, and solutions take the form of auction rules. Researchers have proposed reliable auction rules that work in extremely general settings, and in the presence of information asymmetry and strategic buyers. However, these protocols require significant payments from participants resulting in low aggregate welfare. Here we address this shortcoming by casting auction rule design as a statistical learning problem, and trade generality for participant welfare effectively and automatically with a novel deep learning network architecture and auction representation. Our analysis shows that our auction rules outperform state-of-the art approaches in terms of participants welfare, applicability, robustness.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2022

Developing, Evaluating and Scaling Learning Agents in Multi-Agent Environments

The Game Theory & Multi-Agent team at DeepMind studies several aspects of multi-agent learning ranging from computing approximations to fundamental concepts in game theory to simulating social dilemmas in rich spatial environments and training 3-d humanoids in difficult team coordination tasks. A signature aim of our group is to use the resources and expertise made available to us at DeepMind in deep reinforcement learning to explore multi-agent systems in complex environments and use these benchmarks to advance our understanding. Here, we summarise the recent work of our team and present a taxonomy that we feel highlights many important open challenges in multi-agent research.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2022

Neural Payoff Machines: Predicting Fair and Stable Payoff Allocations Among Team Members

In many multi-agent settings, participants can form teams to achieve collective outcomes that may far surpass their individual capabilities. Measuring the relative contributions of agents and allocating them shares of the reward that promote long-lasting cooperation are difficult tasks. Cooperative game theory offers solution concepts identifying distribution schemes, such as the Shapley value, that fairly reflect the contribution of individuals to the performance of the team or the Core, which reduces the incentive of agents to abandon their team. Applications of such methods include identifying influential features and sharing the costs of joint ventures or team formation. Unfortunately, using these solutions requires tackling a computational barrier as they are hard to compute, even in restricted settings. In this work, we show how cooperative game-theoretic solutions can be distilled into a learned model by training neural networks to propose fair and stable payoff allocations. We show that our approach creates models that can generalize to games far from the training distribution and can predict solutions for more players than observed during training. An important application of our framework is Explainable AI: our approach can be used to speed-up Shapley value computations on many instances.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

Stochastic Parallelizable Eigengap Dilation for Large Graph Clustering

Large graphs commonly appear in social networks, knowledge graphs, recommender systems, life sciences, and decision making problems. Summarizing large graphs by their high level properties is helpful in solving problems in these settings. In spectral clustering, we aim to identify clusters of nodes where most edges fall within clusters and only few edges fall between clusters. This task is important for many downstream applications and exploratory analysis. A core step of spectral clustering is performing an eigendecomposition of the corresponding graph Laplacian matrix (or equivalently, a singular value decomposition, SVD, of the incidence matrix). The convergence of iterative singular value decomposition approaches depends on the eigengaps of the spectrum of the given matrix, i.e., the difference between consecutive eigenvalues. For a graph Laplacian corresponding to a well-clustered graph, the eigenvalues will be non-negative but very small (much less than $1$) slowing convergence. This paper introduces a parallelizable approach to dilating the spectrum in order to accelerate SVD solvers and in turn, spectral clustering. This is accomplished via polynomial approximations to matrix operations that favorably transform the spectrum of a matrix without changing its eigenvectors. Experiments demonstrate that this approach significantly accelerates convergence, and we explain how this transformation can be parallelized and stochastically approximated to scale with available compute.

stat.ML↗

arXiv2022

Role of Human-AI Interaction in Selective Prediction

Recent work has shown the potential benefit of selective prediction systems that can learn to defer to a human when the predictions of the AI are unreliable, particularly to improve the reliability of AI systems in high-stakes applications like healthcare or conservation. However, most prior work assumes that human behavior remains unchanged when they solve a prediction task as part of a human-AI team as opposed to by themselves. We show that this is not the case by performing experiments to quantify human-AI interaction in the context of selective prediction. In particular, we study the impact of communicating different types of information to humans about the AI system's decision to defer. Using real-world conservation data and a selective prediction system that improves expected accuracy over that of the human or AI system working individually, we show that this messaging has a significant impact on the accuracy of human judgements. Our results study two components of the messaging strategy: 1) Whether humans are informed about the prediction of the AI system and 2) Whether they are informed about the decision of the selective prediction system to defer. By manipulating these messaging components, we show that it is possible to significantly boost human performance by informing the human of the decision to defer, but not revealing the prediction of the AI. We therefore show that it is vital to consider how the decision to defer is communicated to a human when designing selective prediction systems, and that the composite accuracy of a human-AI team must be carefully evaluated using a human-in-the-loop framework.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2022

D3C: Reducing the Price of Anarchy in Multi-Agent Learning

In multiagent systems, the complex interaction of fixed incentives can lead agents to outcomes that are poor (inefficient) not only for the group, but also for each individual. Price of anarchy is a technical, game-theoretic definition that quantifies the inefficiency arising in these scenarios -- it compares the welfare that can be achieved through perfect coordination against that achieved by self-interested agents at a Nash equilibrium. We derive a differentiable, upper bound on a price of anarchy that agents can cheaply estimate during learning. Equipped with this estimator, agents can adjust their incentives in a way that improves the efficiency incurred at a Nash equilibrium. Agents do so by learning to mix their reward (equiv. negative loss) with that of other agents by following the gradient of our derived upper bound. We refer to this approach as D3C. In the case where agent incentives are differentiable, D3C resembles the celebrated Win-Stay, Lose-Shift strategy from behavioral game theory, thereby establishing a connection between the global goal of maximum welfare and an established agent-centric learning rule. In the non-differentiable setting, as is common in multiagent reinforcement learning, we show the upper bound can be reduced via evolutionary strategies, until a compromise is reached in a distributed fashion. We demonstrate that D3C improves outcomes for each agent and the group as a whole on several social dilemmas including a traffic network exhibiting Braess's paradox, a prisoner's dilemma, and several multiagent domains.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2022

Sample-based Approximation of Nash in Large Many-Player Games via Gradient Descent

Nash equilibrium is a central concept in game theory. Several Nash solvers exist, yet none scale to normal-form games with many actions and many players, especially those with payoff tensors too big to be stored in memory. In this work, we propose an approach that iteratively improves an approximation to a Nash equilibrium through joint play. It accomplishes this by tracing a previously established homotopy that defines a continuum of equilibria for the game regularized with decaying levels of entropy. This continuum asymptotically approaches the limiting logit equilibrium, proven by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) to be unique in almost all games, thereby partially circumventing the well-known equilibrium selection problem of many-player games. To encourage iterates to remain near this path, we efficiently minimize average deviation incentive via stochastic gradient descent, intelligently sampling entries in the payoff tensor as needed. Monte Carlo estimates of the stochastic gradient from joint play are biased due to the appearance of a nonlinear max operator in the objective, so we introduce additional innovations to the algorithm to alleviate gradient bias. The descent process can also be viewed as repeatedly constructing and reacting to a polymatrix approximation to the game. In these ways, our proposed approach, average deviation incentive descent with adaptive sampling (ADIDAS), is most similar to three classical approaches, namely homotopy-type, Lyapunov, and iterative polymatrix solvers. The lack of local convergence guarantees for biased gradient descent prevents guaranteed convergence to Nash, however, we demonstrate through extensive experiments the ability of this approach to approximate a unique Nash in normal-form games with as many as seven players and twenty one actions (several billion outcomes) that are orders of magnitude larger than those possible with prior algorithms.

cs.GT↗