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Youness Bouchari

Publications and source records attributed to Youness Bouchari.

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SkillSecurer: Detecting and Patching Prompt-Injection Vulnerabilities in AI Agent Skills

Agent skills extend AI agents with reusable instructions, scripts, and configuration, but are also open to new attacks to influence an agent's decisions and actions. To address these risks, we present SkillSecurer, a fully agentic framework for generating, detecting, localising, and remediating security risks in agent skills. Its red agent generates context-compatible injections across nine threat types while recording the exact modification; its blue agent analyses complete skill packages, produces grounded evidence, and proposes patches. For controlled instances, a verifier compares findings and patches with the recorded injection, enabling injection-level evaluation. We thoroughly evaluate SkillSecurer by selecting the best backend LLM, comparing it with competitors, and manually cross-validating each evaluation stage. With its best performing backend, SkillSecurer is the only scanner to achieve a 100% injection detection rate. Next, we analyse popular skills from skills.sh, finding latent vulnerabilities in more than 17% of the skills examined. Testing some of those skills, we trigger actual incidents, showing the risks of running unverified skills. Our results show that context-aware LLM analysis can provide reliable injection localisation and actionable remediation beyond skill-level flagging alone.

cs.CR

Autonomous LLM Agents & CTFs: A Second Look

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly proposed to automate offensive security tasks, with recent studies reporting near human-level success rates in Capture-the-Flag (CTF) challenges. We here revisit these results, providing a second look at these claims. We engineer different agent architectures of increasing complexity and modularity on 30 web-based CTFs challenges spanning 14 vulnerability classes. We instantiate these agents with multiple LLM backbones, and compare them with claude-code, a general-purpose agent that automatically determines its internal architecture. Our evaluation yields three main findings. First, claude-code achieves performance comparable to the engineered architectures (19/30 solved tasks), suggesting that general-purpose agents are strong baselines for offensive security tasks. Second, both our architectures and claude-code struggle in the same challenge categories, revealing persistent barriers that keep current agents below human-level capability. Third, by leveraging our manually designed architectures we can systematically measure the impact of additional components, finding that structured orchestration of specialized roles outperforms monolithic designs, improving run-to-run consistency, and reducing execution costs.

cs.CR