arXiv subjects

Yu-Sung Tu

Publications and source records attributed to Yu-Sung Tu.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2018

Evolutionarily Stable Preferences Against Multiple Mutations in Multi-player Games

We use the indirect evolutionary approach to study evolutionarily stable preferences against multiple mutations in single- and multi-population matching settings, respectively. Players choose strategies to maximize their subjective preferences, which may be inconsistent with the material payoff function giving them the actual fitness values. In each of the two settings, $n$-player games are played, and we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for multi-mutation stability. These results definitely reveal the connection between the order of stability and the level of efficiency.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2018

Evolution of Preferences in Multiple Populations

We study the evolution of preferences in multi-population settings that allow matches across distinct populations. Each individual has subjective preferences over potential outcomes, and chooses a best response based on his preferences and the information about the opponents' preferences. Individuals' realized fitnesses are given by material payoff functions. Following Dekel et al. (2007), we assume that individuals observe their opponents' preferences with probability $p$. We first derive necessary and sufficient conditions for stability for $p=1$ and $p=0$, and then check the robustness of our results against small perturbations on observability for the case of pure-strategy outcomes.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2017

The Payoff Region of a Strategic Game and Its Extreme Points

The range of a payoff function for an $n$-player finite strategic game is investigated using a novel approach, the notion of extreme points of a non-convex set. The shape of a noncooperative payoff region can be estimated using extreme points and supporting hyperplanes of the cooperative payoff region. A basic structural characteristic of a noncooperative payoff region is that any of its subregions must be non-strictly convex if the subregion contains a relative neighborhood of a point on its boundary. Besides, applying the properties of extreme points of a noncooperative payoff region is a simple and effective way to prove some results about Pareto efficiency and social efficiency in game theory.

cs.GT↗