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Yuhan Meng

Publications and source records attributed to Yuhan Meng.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

SysEvolve: An AI-native, safe, autonomous adversarial attack-defense co-evolutionary system

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has created a growing asymmetry in cybersecurity, where attack accelerates toward autonomous execution while defense remains predominantly human-intensive. Despite substantial prior work across cyber ranges, AI-driven attack, and AI-driven defense, this asymmetry persists. We trace it to a deeper root cause, that evolution itself has stalled on both sides at three layers. To overcome this, we propose co-evolution as the integrating insight, where attack and defense AI agents autonomously and safely drive each other's evolution through adversarial confrontation. Based on this insight, we present \sysevolve, comprising three co-designed components, \sysfield, \sysspear, and \sysarmor. \sysfield constructs realistic multi-host ranges. \sysspear generates efficient, safe attack schemes. \sysarmor performs real-time, interpretable defense. Together they form a self-driven adversarial loop restoring evolution at all three layers. In evaluation, \sysfield achieves zero-loss collection at 2.1\% overhead and orchestrates 257 CVEs into 1,148 ranges, \sysspear improves attack success by over 25\% over baseline LLMs, and \sysarmor achieves 10--1000$\times$ greater precision than prior systems and detects real APT attacks in production at Huawei and Sangfor. Our evaluation also reveals three findings about LLM agent capabilities. First, multi-step composition and larger topologies expose agent capability gaps hidden by single-step evaluations. Second, the bottleneck lies after initial access in post-compromise state utilization. Third, LLM agents are susceptible to environmental interference. When decoy endpoints are deployed in the range, agent timeouts triple and downstream completion disappears despite the success rates of initial accesses are unchanged.

cs.CR

Self-induced crystalline fluctuation spin-glass state in Mn7C3 binary compounds

Crystalline spin glasses are attractive compounds owing to their unique nature and applications. Here, we synthesised a bulk Pnma-type Mn7C3 spin glass by a high-temperature, high-pressure method. Experimental characterisation including X-ray diffraction and magnetic susceptibility measurements demonstrated that the compound has a triangular Ising-model-based structure, high freezing temperature of 37.4 K, and novel competition mechanism. Theoretical calculations and simulations revealed that the triangular Mn units are spontaneously frustrated and bridge neighbouring Mn units via polarised C atoms and messenger Mn atoms. Triangular C units each share one electron within a three-pronged electron cloud. This electron is the direct cause of frustration and competition in Mn7C3. The competition within the triangular Mn units suggests that the possible magnetic configurations are highly degenerate and that the Mn7C3 spin glass has high robustness. This work introduces a new family of spin glasses with ordered microgeometries that drive electronic structure disorder, and an application-friendly spin-glass material for use in fields like high-efficiency hardware and algorithm design in artificial intelligence.

cond-mat.mtrl-sci

Trustworthy and Controllable Professional Knowledge Utilization in Large Language Models with TEE-GPU Execution

Future improvements in large language model (LLM) services increasingly hinge on access to high-value professional knowledge rather than more generic web data. However, the data providers of this knowledge face a skewed tradeoff between income and risk: they receive little share of downstream value yet retain copyright and privacy liability, making them reluctant to contribute their assets to LLM services. Existing techniques do not offer a trustworthy and controllable way to use professional knowledge, because they keep providers in the dark and combine knowledge parameters with the underlying LLM backbone. In this paper, we present PKUS, the Professional Knowledge Utilization System, which treats professional knowledge as a first-class, separable artifact. PKUS keeps the backbone model on GPUs and encodes each provider's contribution as a compact adapter that executes only inside an attested Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). A hardware-rooted lifecycle protocol, adapter pruning, multi-provider aggregation, and split-execution scheduling together make this design practical at serving time. On SST-2, MNLI, and SQuAD with GPT-2 Large and Llama-3.2-1B, PKUS preserves model utility, matching the accuracy and F1 of full fine-tuning and plain LoRA, while achieving the lowest per-request latency with 8.1-11.9x speedup over CPU-only TEE inference and naive CPU-GPU co-execution.

cs.OS

KnowHow: Automatically Applying High-Level CTI Knowledge for Interpretable and Accurate Provenance Analysis

High-level natural language knowledge in CTI reports, such as the ATT&CK framework, is beneficial to counter APT attacks. However, how to automatically apply the high-level knowledge in CTI reports in realistic attack detection systems, such as provenance analysis systems, is still an open problem. The challenge stems from the semantic gap between the knowledge and the low-level security logs: while the knowledge in CTI reports is written in natural language, attack detection systems can only process low-level system events like file accesses or network IP manipulations. Manual approaches can be labor-intensive and error-prone. In this paper, we propose KnowHow, a CTI-knowledge-driven online provenance analysis approach that can automatically apply high-level attack knowledge from CTI reports written in natural languages to detect low-level system events. The core of KnowHow is a novel attack knowledge representation, gIoC, that represents the subject, object, and actions of attacks. By lifting system identifiers, such as file paths, in system events to natural language terms, KnowHow can match system events to gIoC and further match them to techniques described in natural languages. Finally, based on the techniques matched to system events, KnowHow reasons about the temporal logic of attack steps and detects potential APT attacks in system events. Our evaluation shows that KnowHow can accurately detect all 16 APT campaigns in the open-source and industrial datasets, while existing approaches all introduce large numbers of false positives. Meanwhile, our evaluation also shows that KnowHow reduces at most 90% of node-level false positives while having a higher node-level recall and is robust against several unknown attacks and mimicry attacks.

cs.CR