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Yuhang Fan

Publications and source records attributed to Yuhang Fan.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

Auditing Cascading Risks in Multi-Agent Systems via Semantic-Geometric Co-evolution

Large Language model (LLM)-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) are prone to cascading risks, where early-stage interactions remain semantically fluent and policy-compliant, yet the underlying interaction dynamics begin to distort in ways that amplify latent instability or misalignment. Traditional auditing methods that focus on per-message semantic content are inherently reactive and lagging, failing to capture these early structural precursors. In this paper, we propose a principled framework for cascading-risk detection grounded in semantic--geometric co-evolution. We model MAS interactions as dynamic graphs and introduce Ollivier--Ricci Curvature (ORC) -- a discrete geometric measure -- to characterize information redundancy and bottleneck formation in communication topologies. By coupling semantic flow signals with graph geometry, the framework learns the normal co-evolutionary dynamics of trusted collaboration and treats deviations from this coupled manifold as early-warning signals. Experiments on a suite of cascading-risk scenarios aligned with the risk category demonstrate that curvature anomalies systematically precede explicit semantic violations by several interaction turns, enabling proactive intervention. Furthermore, the local nature of Ricci curvature provides principled interpretability for root-cause attribution, identifying specific agents or links that precipitate the collapse of trustworthy collaboration.

cs.MA

AIAuditTrack: A Framework for AI Security system

The rapid expansion of AI-driven applications powered by large language models has led to a surge in AI interaction data, raising urgent challenges in security, accountability, and risk traceability. This paper presents AiAuditTrack (AAT), a blockchain-based framework for AI usage traffic recording and governance. AAT leverages decentralized identity (DID) and verifiable credentials (VC) to establish trusted and identifiable AI entities, and records inter-entity interaction trajectories on-chain to enable cross-system supervision and auditing. AI entities are modeled as nodes in a dynamic interaction graph, where edges represent time-specific behavioral trajectories. Based on this model, a risk diffusion algorithm is proposed to trace the origin of risky behaviors and propagate early warnings across involved entities. System performance is evaluated using blockchain Transactions Per Second (TPS) metrics, demonstrating the feasibility and stability of AAT under large-scale interaction recording. AAT provides a scalable and verifiable solution for AI auditing, risk management, and responsibility attribution in complex multi-agent environments.

cs.AI

Mitigating Congestion in Complex Transportation Networks via Maximum Entropy

In this paper, we reveal the relationship between entropy rate and the congestion in complex network and solve it analytically for special cases. Finding maximizing entropy rate will lead to an improvement of traffic efficiency, we propose a method to mitigate congestion by allocating limited traffic capacity to the nodes in network rationally. Different from former strategies, our method only requires local and observable information of network, and is low-cost and widely applicable in practice. In the simulation of the phase transition for various network models, our method performs well in mitigating congestion both locally and globally. By comparison, we also uncover the deficiency of former degree-biased approaches. Owing to the rapid development of transportation networks, our method may be helpful for modern society.

physics.soc-ph

Game among Interdependent Networks: The Impact of Rationality on System Robustness

Many real-world systems are composed of interdependent networks that rely on one another. Such networks are typically designed and operated by different entities, who aim at maximizing their own payoffs. There exists a game among these entities when designing their own networks. In this paper, we study the game investigating how the rational behaviors of entities impact the system robustness. We first introduce a mathematical model to quantify the interacting payoffs among varying entities. Then we study the Nash equilibrium of the game and compare it with the optimal social welfare. We reveal that the cooperation among different entities can be reached to maximize the social welfare in continuous game only when the average degree of each network is constant. Therefore, the huge gap between Nash equilibrium and optimal social welfare generally exists. The rationality of entities makes the system inherently deficient and even renders it extremely vulnerable in some cases. We analyze our model for two concrete systems with continuous strategy space and discrete strategy space, respectively. Furthermore, we uncover some factors (such as weakening coupled strength of interdependent networks, designing suitable topology dependency of the system) that help reduce the gap and the system vulnerability.

physics.soc-ph