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Yujin Kwon

Publications and source records attributed to Yujin Kwon.

9 recordsLinked to original sources

LoMETab: Beyond Rank-1 Ensembles for Tabular Deep Learning

Recent tabular learning benchmarks increasingly show a tight performance cluster rather than a clear hierarchy among leading methods, spanning gradient boosted decision trees, attention-based architectures, and implicit ensembles such as TabM. As benchmark gains plateau, a complementary goal is to understand and control the mechanisms that make simple neural tabular models competitive. We propose LoMETab, a rank-$r$ generalization of multiplicative implicit ensembles. LoMETab lifts the rank-1 BatchEnsemble/TabM modulation to a rank-$r$ identity-residual Hadamard family by parameterizing each member weight as $W_k = W \odot (1 + A_kB_k^\top)$, where $W$ is shared and $(A_k, B_k)$ are member-specific low-rank factors. This exposes two practical diversity-control axes: the adapter rank $r$ and the initialization scale $\sigma_{\mathrm{init}}$, and we prove that for $r \ge 2$ this generalization strictly enlarges BatchEnsemble's hypothesis class. Empirically, we show that this added capacity manifests as measurable predictive diversity after training: on representative classification datasets, LoMETab sustains higher pairwise KL than an additive low-rank ablation, and $(r, \sigma_{\mathrm{init}})$ provides broad control over pairwise KL, varying by up to several orders of magnitude across configurations. The induced diversity is reflected in task-appropriate output-level measures: argmax disagreement for classification and ambiguity for regression, indicating that the control extends beyond pairwise KL to decision- and output-level member variation. Finally, experiments sweeping over adapter rank $r$ and initialization scale $\sigma_{\mathrm{init}}$ reveal that predictive performance is dataset-dependent over the $(r, \sigma_{\mathrm{init}})$ grid, supporting LoMETab as a controllable family of implicit ensembles rather than a fixed rank-1 construction.

cs.LG

What Drives the (In)stability of a Stablecoin?

In May 2022, an apparent speculative attack, followed by market panic, led to the precipitous downfall of UST, one of the most popular stablecoins at that time. However, UST is not the only stablecoin to have been depegged in the past. Designing resilient and long-term stable coins, therefore, appears to present a hard challenge. To further scrutinize existing stablecoin designs and ultimately lead to more robust systems, we need to understand where volatility emerges. Our work provides a game-theoretical model aiming to help identify why stablecoins suffer from a depeg. This game-theoretical model reveals that stablecoins have different price equilibria depending on the coin's architecture and mechanism to minimize volatility. Moreover, our theory is supported by extensive empirical data, spanning $1$ year. To that end, we collect daily prices for 22 stablecoins and on-chain data from five blockchains including the Ethereum and the Terra blockchain.

cs.GT

Unpacking How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) Work in Practice

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) have emerged as a novel way to coordinate a group of (pseudonymous) entities towards a shared vision (e.g., promoting sustainability), utilizing self-executing smart contracts on blockchains to support decentralized governance and decision-making. In just a few years, over 4,000 DAOs have been launched in various domains, such as investment, education, health, and research. Despite such rapid growth and diversity, it is unclear how these DAOs actually work in practice and to what extent they are effective in achieving their goals. Given this, we aim to unpack how (well) DAOs work in practice. We conducted an in-depth analysis of a diverse set of 10 DAOs of various categories and smart contracts, leveraging on-chain (e.g., voting results) and off-chain data (e.g., community discussions) as well as our interviews with DAO organizers/members. Specifically, we defined metrics to characterize key aspects of DAOs, such as the degrees of decentralization and autonomy. We observed CompoundDAO, AssangeDAO, Bankless, and Krausehouse having poor decentralization in voting, while decentralization has improved over time for one-person-one-vote DAOs (e.g., Proof of Humanity). Moreover, the degree of autonomy varies among DAOs, with some (e.g., Compound and Krausehouse) relying more on third parties than others. Lastly, we offer a set of design implications for future DAO systems based on our findings.

cs.CY

Analysis of LFT2

For a decentralized and transparent society, blockchain technology has been developed. Along with this, quite a few consensus algorithms that are one of core technologies in blockchain have been proposed. Among them, we analyze a consensus algorithm called LFT2, which is used by a blockchain system, ICON. We first formulate the LFT2 consensus algorithm and then analyze safety and liveness, which can be considered as the most important properties in distributed consensus system. We prove that LFT2 satisfies safety and liveness, where a certain assumption is required to prove liveness. In addition, we compare LFT2 with two similar consensus algorithms, and from the comparison, we show that a trade-off exist among the three consensus algorithms. Finally, we simulate LFT2 to measure a liveness quality.

cs.DC

An Eye for an Eye: Economics of Retaliation in Mining Pools

Currently, miners typically join mining pools to solve cryptographic puzzles together, and mining pools are in high competition. This has led to the development of several attack strategies such as block withholding (BWH) and fork after withholding (FAW) attacks that can weaken the health of PoW systems and but maximize mining pools' profits. In this paper, we present strategies called Adaptive Retaliation Strategies (ARS) to mitigate not only BWH attacks but also FAW attacks. In ARS, each pool cooperates with other pools in the normal situation, and adaptively executes either FAW or BWH attacks for the purpose of retaliation only when attacked. In addition, in order for rational pools to adopt ARS, ARS should strike to an adaptive balance between retaliation and selfishness because the pools consider their payoff even when they retaliate. We theoretically and numerically show that ARS would not only lead to the induction of a no-attack state among mining pools, but also achieve the adaptive balance between retaliation and selfishness.

cs.CR

Impossibility of Full Decentralization in Permissionless Blockchains

Bitcoin uses blockchain technology and proof-of-work (PoW) mechanism where nodes spend computing resources and earn rewards in return for spending these resources. This incentive system has caused power to be significantly biased towards a few nodes, called mining pools. In fact, poor decentralization appears not only in PoW-based coins but also in coins adopting other mechanisms such as proof-of-stake (PoS) and delegated proof-of-stake (DPoS). In this paper, we target this centralization issue. To this end, we first define (m, \varepsilon, \delta)-decentralization as a state that satisfies 1) there are at least m participants running a node and 2) the ratio between the total resource power of nodes run by the richest and \delta-th percentile participants is less than or equal to 1+\varepsilon. To see if it is possible to achieve good decentralization, we introduce sufficient conditions for the incentive system of a blockchain to reach (m, \varepsilon, \delta)-decentralization. When satisfying the conditions, a blockchain system can reach full decentralization with probability 1. However, to achieve this, the blockchain system should be able to assign a positive Sybil cost, where the Sybil cost is defined as the difference between the cost for one participant running multiple nodes and the total cost for multiple participants each running one node. On the other hand, we prove that when there is no Sybil cost, the probability of reaching (m, \varepsilon, \delta)-decentralization is upper bounded by a value close to 0, considering a large rich-poor gap. To determine the conditions that each system cannot satisfy, we also analyze protocols of all PoW, PoS, and DPoS coins in the top 100 coins according to our conditions. Finally, we conduct data analysis of these coins to validate our theory.

cs.CR

Is Stellar As Secure As You Think?

Stellar is one of the top ten cryptocurrencies in terms of market capitalization. It adopts a variant of Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT), named federated Byzantine agreement (FBA), which generalizes the traditional BFT algorithm to make it more suitable for open-membership blockchains. To this end, FBA introduces a quorum slice concept, which consists of a set of nodes. In FBA, a node can complete one consensus round when it receives specific messages from nodes in a quorum slice appointed by the node. In this study, we analyze FBA, whose security is highly dependent on the structure of quorum slices, and demonstrate that it is not superior to the traditional BFT algorithm in terms of safety and liveness. Then, to analyze the security of the Stellar consensus protocol (SCP), which is a construction for FBA, we investigate the current quorum slices in Stellar. We analyze the structure of quorum slices and measure the influence of each node quantitatively using two metrics, PageRank (PR) and the newly proposed NodeRank (NR). The results show that the Stellar system is significantly centralized. Thereafter, to determine how the centralized structure can have a negative impact on the Stellar system, we study the cascading failure caused by deleting only a few nodes (i.e., validators) in Stellar. We show that all of the nodes in Stellar cannot run SCP if only two nodes fail. To make matters worse, these two nodes are run and controlled by a single organization, the Stellar foundation.

cs.DC

Bitcoin vs. Bitcoin Cash: Coexistence or Downfall of Bitcoin Cash?

In Aug. 2017, Bitcoin was split into the original Bitcoin (BTC) and Bitcoin Cash (BCH). Since then, miners have had a choice between BTC and BCH mining because they have compatible proof-of-work algorithms. Therefore, they can freely choose which coin to mine for higher profit, where the profitability depends on both the coin price and mining difficulty. Some miners can immediately switch the coin to mine only when mining difficulty changes because the difficulty changes are more predictable than that for the coin price, and we call this behavior fickle mining. In this paper, we study the effects of fickle mining by modeling a game between two coins. To do this, we consider both fickle miners and some factions (e.g., BITMAIN for BCH mining) that stick to mining one coin to maintain that chain. In this model, we show that fickle mining leads to a Nash equilibrium in which only a faction sticking to its coin mining remains as a loyal miner to the less valued coin (e.g., BCH), where loyal miners refer to those who conduct mining even after coin mining difficulty increases. This situation would cause severe centralization, weakening the security of the coin system. To determine which equilibrium the competing coin systems (e.g., BTC vs. BCH) are moving toward, we traced the historical changes of mining power for BTC and BCH. In addition, we analyze the recent "hash war" between Bitcoin ABC and SV, which confirms our theoretical analysis. Finally, we note that our results can be applied to any competing cryptocurrency systems in which the same hardware (e.g., ASICs or GPUs) can be used for mining. Therefore, our study brings new and important angles in competitive coin markets: a coin can intentionally weaken the security and decentralization level of the other rival coin when mining hardware is shared between them, allowing for automatic mining.

cs.CR

Be Selfish and Avoid Dilemmas: Fork After Withholding (FAW) Attacks on Bitcoin

In the Bitcoin system, participants are rewarded for solving cryptographic puzzles. In order to receive more consistent rewards over time, some participants organize mining pools and split the rewards from the pool in proportion to each participant's contribution. However, several attacks threaten the ability to participate in pools. The block withholding (BWH) attack makes the pool reward system unfair by letting malicious participants receive unearned wages while only pretending to contribute work. When two pools launch BWH attacks against each other, they encounter the miner's dilemma: in a Nash equilibrium, the revenue of both pools is diminished. In another attack called selfish mining, an attacker can unfairly earn extra rewards by deliberately generating forks. In this paper, we propose a novel attack called a fork after withholding (FAW) attack. FAW is not just another attack. The reward for an FAW attacker is always equal to or greater than that for a BWH attacker, and it is usable up to four times more often per pool than in BWH attack. When considering multiple pools - the current state of the Bitcoin network - the extra reward for an FAW attack is about 56% more than that for a BWH attack. Furthermore, when two pools execute FAW attacks on each other, the miner's dilemma may not hold: under certain circumstances, the larger pool can consistently win. More importantly, an FAW attack, while using intentional forks, does not suffer from practicality issues, unlike selfish mining. We also discuss partial countermeasures against the FAW attack, but finding a cheap and efficient countermeasure remains an open problem. As a result, we expect to see FAW attacks among mining pools.

cs.CR