arXiv subjects

Yulong Tian

Publications and source records attributed to Yulong Tian.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

When the Aggregator Cheats: Data-Free Backdoors in Federated LLM-based QA Systems

Large Language Model (LLM)-based question-answering (QA) systems are increasingly deployed in sensitive domains such as healthcare, mental health counseling, and legal consultation. Federated learning (FL) enables collaborative training without sharing raw client data, for which locally trained models are aggregated at a central server (i.e., a cloud service provider) to obtain a global model. In this paper, we explore the potential vulnerability where a malicious aggregator, who may collude with a third-party vendor, stealthily implants advertisement-type backdoors into federated QA models, without ever accessing client data. The attacker's goals are twofold: (1) preserve clean QA fidelity (i.e., the poisoned model behaves like a clean model on non-triggered queries); and (2) generate highly natural, contextually relevant responses with target advertisements when a trigger appears. Achieving these two goals simultaneously is highly challenging, as naive backdoor injection without knowledge about private data may degrade model's clean performance or fail to inject the target. Motivated by this, we propose to leverage clients' uploaded gradients during training, and develop a two-stage framework for data-free and stealthy poisoning: (1) recover representative training samples from client gradients, and (2) construct poisoning datasets utilizing recovered samples and trigger phrases to inject backdoors into the global model. Experiments across representative QA datasets and LLM families under full fine-tuning and LoRA settings demonstrate that, our method achieves nearly 100% Attack Success Rate (ASR) while incurring negligible degradation on clean tasks. Crucially, reconstructing only 5-20% of gradients suffices to mount a reliable attack, exposing a practical blind spot in the pipeline of federated training of QA LLMs.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Enhancing All-to-X Backdoor Attacks with Optimized Target Class Mapping

Backdoor attacks pose severe threats to machine learning systems, prompting extensive research in this area. However, most existing work focuses on single-target All-to-One (A2O) attacks, overlooking the more complex All-to-X (A2X) attacks with multiple target classes, which are often assumed to have low attack success rates. In this paper, we first demonstrate that A2X attacks are robust against state-of-the-art defenses. We then propose a novel attack strategy that enhances the success rate of A2X attacks while maintaining robustness by optimizing grouping and target class assignment mechanisms. Our method improves the attack success rate by up to 28%, with average improvements of 6.7%, 16.4%, 14.1% on CIFAR10, CIFAR100, and Tiny-ImageNet, respectively. We anticipate that this study will raise awareness of A2X attacks and stimulate further research in this under-explored area. Our code is available at https://github.com/kazefjj/A2X-backdoor .

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

ConneX: Automatically Resolving Transaction Opacity of Cross-Chain Bridges for Security Analysis

As the Web3 ecosystem evolves toward a multi-chain architecture, cross-chain bridges have become critical infrastructure for enabling interoperability between diverse blockchain networks. However, while connecting isolated blockchains, the lack of cross-chain transaction pairing records introduces significant challenges for security analysis like cross-chain fund tracing, advanced vulnerability detection, and transaction graph-based analysis. To address this gap, we introduce ConneX, an automated and general-purpose system designed to accurately identify corresponding transaction pairs across both ends of cross-chain bridges. Our system leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) to efficiently prune the semantic search space by identifying semantically plausible key information candidates within complex transaction records. Further, it deploys a novel examiner module that refines these candidates by validating them against transaction values, effectively addressing semantic ambiguities and identifying the correct semantics. Extensive evaluations on a dataset of about 500,000 transactions from five major bridge platforms demonstrate that ConneX achieves an average F1 score of 0.9746, surpassing baselines by at least 20.05\%, with good efficiency that reduces the semantic search space by several orders of magnitude (1e10 to less than 100). Moreover, its successful application in tracing illicit funds (including a cross-chain transfer worth $1 million) in real-world hacking incidents underscores its practical utility for enhancing cross-chain security and transparency.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2023

Manipulating Transfer Learning for Property Inference

Transfer learning is a popular method for tuning pretrained (upstream) models for different downstream tasks using limited data and computational resources. We study how an adversary with control over an upstream model used in transfer learning can conduct property inference attacks on a victim's tuned downstream model. For example, to infer the presence of images of a specific individual in the downstream training set. We demonstrate attacks in which an adversary can manipulate the upstream model to conduct highly effective and specific property inference attacks (AUC score $> 0.9$), without incurring significant performance loss on the main task. The main idea of the manipulation is to make the upstream model generate activations (intermediate features) with different distributions for samples with and without a target property, thus enabling the adversary to distinguish easily between downstream models trained with and without training examples that have the target property. Our code is available at https://github.com/yulongt23/Transfer-Inference.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

Stealthy Backdoors as Compression Artifacts

In a backdoor attack on a machine learning model, an adversary produces a model that performs well on normal inputs but outputs targeted misclassifications on inputs containing a small trigger pattern. Model compression is a widely-used approach for reducing the size of deep learning models without much accuracy loss, enabling resource-hungry models to be compressed for use on resource-constrained devices. In this paper, we study the risk that model compression could provide an opportunity for adversaries to inject stealthy backdoors. We design stealthy backdoor attacks such that the full-sized model released by adversaries appears to be free from backdoors (even when tested using state-of-the-art techniques), but when the model is compressed it exhibits highly effective backdoors. We show this can be done for two common model compression techniques -- model pruning and model quantization. Our findings demonstrate how an adversary may be able to hide a backdoor as a compression artifact, and show the importance of performing security tests on the models that will actually be deployed not their precompressed version.

cs.CR↗