arXiv subjects

Yunus C. Aybas

Publications and source records attributed to Yunus C. Aybas.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Social Learning with Endogenous Information and the Countervailing Effects of Homophily

People learn about opportunities and actions by observing the experiences of their friends. We model how homophily -- the tendency to associate with similar others -- affects both the endogenous quality and diversity of the information accessible to decision makers. Homophily provides higher-quality information, since observing the payoffs of another person is more informative the more similar that person is to the decision maker. However, homophily can lead people to take actions that generate less information. We show how network connectivity influences the tradeoff between the endogenous quantity and quality of information. Although homophily hampers learning in sparse networks, it enhances learning in sufficiently dense networks.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Persuasion with Coarse Communication

In many expert-decision maker settings, information is richer than the language used to convey it. Motivated by this communication friction, we study Bayesian persuasion when the sender is constrained to use $k$ messages. We show that the sender's value is given by a $k$-point analogue of concavification, which we call $k$-concavification. An optimal information structure can be chosen with affinely independent posterior support, allowing the problem to be reduced to a lower-dimensional persuasion problem and then solved by standard concavification. We derive a tight bound on the value of communication capacity that applies to general persuasion games: the gain from a $(k+1)$-st message is at most $2/(k-1)$ times the value attainable with $k$ messages. Finally, we solve a class of belief-threshold games in which the receiver chooses between a safe default and several risky actions, the sender gets zero from the default and the same positive payoff from any risky action, and a risky action is taken only when the corresponding posterior probability exceeds a threshold. We characterize the optimal coarse information structure, derive comparative statics in the prior and the threshold, and extend the analysis to heterogeneous thresholds and heterogeneous sender values across risky actions.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Misrepresentation in District-Based Elections

State delegations are often chosen through single-member district elections, creating a tension between respecting district majorities and reflecting the statewide electorate. First-past-the-post (FPTP) follows each district's majority but can yield a delegation seat share far from the party's statewide vote share. In contrast, proportional representation (PR), which makes a party's seat share correspond to its statewide vote share, requires departing from local majorities in some districts. We measure misrepresentation as a weighted sum of within-district misrepresentation, measured by the share of voters locally represented by their non-preferred party, and statewide misrepresentation, measured by the deviation of a party's seat share from its statewide vote share. The misrepresentation-minimizing rule is a cutoff rule determined by the relative weight of statewide misrepresentation. As this weight rises, the cutoff continuously shifts from FPTP's 50% to the PR cutoff that aligns the delegation's seat share with statewide vote shares. This shift makes gerrymandering harder, offering an alternative lever to limit gerrymandering. Using a majorization-based metric of geographic concentration, we show that concentrating support reduces misrepresentation only under the misrepresentation-minimizing rule. Within this class, FPTP and PR are uniquely characterized by the absence of cross-district spillovers and by gerrymandering-proofness, respectively. Using U.S. House elections, we infer the weights that rationalize outcomes, offering a novel metric for evaluating representativeness of district boundaries and electoral reform proposals.

econ.TH↗