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Yuri Pradkin

Publications and source records attributed to Yuri Pradkin.

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Understanding Partial Reachability in the Internet Core

Routing strives to connect all the Internet, but compete: political pressure threatens routing fragmentation; architectural changes such as private clouds, carrier-grade NAT, and firewalls make connectivity conditional; and commercial disputes create partial reachability for days or years. This paper suggests *persistent, partial reachability is fundamental to the Internet* and an underexplored problem. We first *derive a conceptual definition of the Internet core* based on connectivity, not authority. We identify *peninsulas*: persistent, partial connectivity; and *islands*: when computers are partitioned from the Internet core. Second, we develop algorithms to observe each across the Internet, and apply them to two existing measurement systems: Trinocular, where 6 locations observe 5M networks frequently, and RIPE Atlas, where 13k locations scan the DNS roots frequently. Cross-validation shows our findings are stable over *three years of data*, and consistent with as few as 3 geographically-distributed observers. We validate peninsulas and islands against CAIDA Ark, showing good recall (0.94) and bounding precision between 0.42 and 0.82. Finally, our work has broad practical impact: we show that *peninsulas are more common than Internet outages*. Factoring out peninsulas and islands as noise can *improve existing measurement systems*; their ``noise'' is $5\times$ to $9.7\times$ larger than the operational events in RIPE's DNSmon. We show that most peninsula events are routing transients (45\%), but most peninsula-time (90\%) is due to a few (7\%) long-lived events. Our work helps inform Internet policy and governance, with our neutral definition showing no single country or organization can unilaterally control the Internet core.

cs.NI

Measuring Partial Reachability in the Public Internet

The Internet provides global connectivity by virtue of a public core -- the routable public IP addresses that host services and to which cloud, enterprise, and home networks connect. Today the public core faces many challenges to uniform, global reachability: firewalls and access control lists, commercial disputes that stretch for days or years, and government-mandated sanctions. We define two algorithms to detect partial connectivity: Taitao detects peninsulas of persistent, partial connectivity, and Chiloe detects islands, when one or more computers are partitioned from the public core. These new algorithms apply to existing data collected by multiple long-lived measurement studies. We evaluate these algorithms with rigorous measurements from two platforms: Trinocular, where 6 locations observe 5M networks frequently, RIPE Atlas, where 10k locations scan the DNS root frequently, and validate adding a third: CAIDA Ark, where 171 locations traceroute to millions of networks daily. Root causes suggest that most peninsula events (45%) are routing transients, but most peninsula-time (90%) is due to long-lived events (7%). We show that the concept of peninsulas and islands can improve existing measurement systems. They identify measurement error and persistent problems in RIPE's DNSmon that are $5\times$ to $9.7\times$ larger than the operationally important changes of interest. They explain previously contradictory results in several outage detection systems. Peninsulas are at least as common as Internet outages, posing new research direction.

cs.NI

Reasoning About Internet Connectivity

Innovation in the Internet requires a global Internet core to enable communication between users in ISPs and services in the cloud. Today, this Internet core is challenged by partial reachability: political pressure threatens fragmentation by nationality, architectural changes such as carrier-grade NAT make connectivity conditional, and operational problems and commercial disputes make reachability incomplete for months. We assert that partial reachability is a fundamental part of the Internet core. While other studies address partial reachability, this paper is the first to provide a conceptual definition of the Internet core so we can reason about reachability from principles first. Following the Internet design, our definition is guided by reachability, not authority. Its corollaries are peninsulas: persistent regions of partial connectivity; and islands: when networks are partitioned from the Internet core. We show that the concept of peninsulas and islands can improve existing measurement systems. In one example, they show that RIPE's DNSmon suffers misconfiguration and persistent network problems that are important, but risk obscuring operationally important connectivity changes because they are $5\times$ to $9.7\times$ larger. Our evaluation also informs policy questions, showing no single country or organization can unilaterally control the Internet core.

cs.NI

What Is The Internet? Partial Connectivity in the Internet Core

"A collection of interconnected networks" defines what the Internet is, but not what it is not. Events threaten Internet fragmentation: politics suggest countries or ISPs may secede or be de-peered, disputes between ISPs result in persistent unreachability between their customers, and architectural changes risk breaking the "one" Internet. Understanding such threats benefits from a testable definition of what the Internet is and is not, enabling discussion and quantification of partial connectivity. We provide a conceptual definition giving an idealized asymptote of connectivity. It implies peninsulas of persistent, partial connectivity, and islands when one or more computers are partitioned from the main Internet. We provide algorithms to measure, operationally, the number, size, and duration of peninsulas and islands. We apply these algorithms in rigorous measurement from two complementary measurement systems, one observing 5M networks from a few locations, and the other a few destinations from 10k locations. Results show that peninsulas (partial connectivity) are about as common as Internet outages, quantifying this long-observed problem. Root causes show that most peninsula events (45%) are routing transients, but most peninsula-time (90%) is from a few long-lived events (7%). Our analysis helps interpret DNSmon, a system monitoring the DNS root, separating measurement error and persistent problems from underlying differences and operationally important transients. Finally, our definition confirms the international nature of the Internet: no single country can unilaterally claim to be "the Internet", but countries can choose to leave.

cs.NI