arXiv subjects

Yushi Cheng

Publications and source records attributed to Yushi Cheng.

8 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Expose Your Disguise: Recovering Source Speaker Identity From Voice Conversion

Voice conversion (VC) poses a significant threat to biometric security by allowing attackers to impersonate target speakers. In forensic contexts, recovering the source speaker's identity from converted audio is vital for narrowing the field of suspects. To address this, we propose TRIDENT, a retracing framework designed to restore a source speaker's original identity from a converted audio sample. TRIDENT utilizes a three-pronged architecture consisting of a primary extractor and two auxiliary branches. The first auxiliary branch identifies the underlying voice conversion mechanism. This design acknowledges that even if the exact conversion strategy is unknown, a high-performance model adopted by the attacker is typically a derivative or variant of established mainstream ones. The second auxiliary branch extracts a latent representation of the target speaker, facilitating the isolation of target-specific traits from the composite converted audio sample. Finally, the main extractor leverages insights from both auxiliary branches to decouple confounding factors and distill a highly discriminative representation of the source speaker's identity. Experimental results demonstrate that TRIDENT achieves an accuracy as high as 90.99% against 7 state-of-the-art voice conversion methods. Furthermore, TRIDENT maintains robust performance under challenging conditions, including telephony channels, unseen languages, and adaptive scenarios.

cs.SD↗

arXiv2026

PINA: Prompt Injection Attack against Navigation Agents

Navigation agents powered by large language models (LLMs) convert natural language instructions into executable plans and actions. Compared to text-based applications, their security is far more critical: a successful prompt injection attack does not just alter outputs but can directly misguide physical navigation, leading to unsafe routes, mission failure, or real-world harm. Despite this high-stakes setting, the vulnerability of navigation agents to prompt injection remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we propose PINA, an adaptive prompt optimization framework tailored to navigation agents under black-box, long-context, and action-executable constraints. Experiments on indoor and outdoor navigation agents show that PINA achieves high attack success rates with an average ASR of 87.5%, surpasses all baselines, and remains robust under ablation and adaptive-attack conditions. This work provides the first systematic investigation of prompt injection attacks in navigation and highlights their urgent security implications for embodied LLM agents.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Attention is All You Need to Defend Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks in LLMs

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been integrated into many applications (e.g., web agents) to perform more sophisticated tasks. However, LLM-empowered applications are vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks, where instructions are injected via untrustworthy external data sources. This paper presents Rennervate, a defense framework to detect and prevent IPI attacks. Rennervate leverages attention features to detect the covert injection at a fine-grained token level, enabling precise sanitization that neutralizes IPI attacks while maintaining LLM functionalities. Specifically, the token-level detector is materialized with a 2-step attentive pooling mechanism, which aggregates attention heads and response tokens for IPI detection and sanitization. Moreover, we establish a fine-grained IPI dataset, FIPI, to be open-sourced to support further research. Extensive experiments verify that Rennervate outperforms 15 commercial and academic IPI defense methods, achieving high precision on 5 LLMs and 6 datasets. We also demonstrate that Rennervate is transferable to unseen attacks and robust against adaptive adversaries.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Soft Weighted Machine Unlearning

Machine unlearning, as a post-hoc processing technique, has gained widespread adoption in addressing challenges like bias mitigation and robustness enhancement, colloquially, machine unlearning for fairness and robustness. However, existing non-privacy unlearning-based solutions persist in using binary data removal framework designed for privacy-driven motivation, leading to significant information loss, a phenomenon known as over-unlearning. While over-unlearning has been largely described in many studies as primarily causing utility degradation, we investigate its fundamental causes and provide deeper insights in this work through counterfactual leave-one-out analysis. In this paper, we introduce a weighted influence function that assigns tailored weights to each sample by solving a convex quadratic programming problem analytically. Building on this, we propose a soft-weighted framework enabling fine-grained model adjustments to address the over-unlearning challenge. We demonstrate that the proposed soft-weighted scheme is versatile and can be seamlessly integrated into most existing unlearning algorithms. Extensive experiments show that in fairness- and robustness-driven tasks, the soft-weighted scheme significantly outperforms hard-weighted schemes in fairness/robustness metrics and alleviates the decline in utility metric, thereby enhancing machine unlearning algorithm as an effective correction solution.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

TPatch: A Triggered Physical Adversarial Patch

Autonomous vehicles increasingly utilize the vision-based perception module to acquire information about driving environments and detect obstacles. Correct detection and classification are important to ensure safe driving decisions. Existing works have demonstrated the feasibility of fooling the perception models such as object detectors and image classifiers with printed adversarial patches. However, most of them are indiscriminately offensive to every passing autonomous vehicle. In this paper, we propose TPatch, a physical adversarial patch triggered by acoustic signals. Unlike other adversarial patches, TPatch remains benign under normal circumstances but can be triggered to launch a hiding, creating or altering attack by a designed distortion introduced by signal injection attacks towards cameras. To avoid the suspicion of human drivers and make the attack practical and robust in the real world, we propose a content-based camouflage method and an attack robustness enhancement method to strengthen it. Evaluations with three object detectors, YOLO V3/V5 and Faster R-CNN, and eight image classifiers demonstrate the effectiveness of TPatch in both the simulation and the real world. We also discuss possible defenses at the sensor, algorithm, and system levels.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2023

CamPro: Camera-based Anti-Facial Recognition

The proliferation of images captured from millions of cameras and the advancement of facial recognition (FR) technology have made the abuse of FR a severe privacy threat. Existing works typically rely on obfuscation, synthesis, or adversarial examples to modify faces in images to achieve anti-facial recognition (AFR). However, the unmodified images captured by camera modules that contain sensitive personally identifiable information (PII) could still be leaked. In this paper, we propose a novel approach, CamPro, to capture inborn AFR images. CamPro enables well-packed commodity camera modules to produce images that contain little PII and yet still contain enough information to support other non-sensitive vision applications, such as person detection. Specifically, CamPro tunes the configuration setup inside the camera image signal processor (ISP), i.e., color correction matrix and gamma correction, to achieve AFR, and designs an image enhancer to keep the image quality for possible human viewers. We implemented and validated CamPro on a proof-of-concept camera, and our experiments demonstrate its effectiveness on ten state-of-the-art black-box FR models. The results show that CamPro images can significantly reduce face identification accuracy to 0.3\% while having little impact on the targeted non-sensitive vision application. Furthermore, we find that CamPro is resilient to adaptive attackers who have re-trained their FR models using images generated by CamPro, even with full knowledge of privacy-preserving ISP parameters.

cs.CV↗

arXiv2023

Exploring Adversarial Robustness of LiDAR-Camera Fusion Model in Autonomous Driving

Our study assesses the adversarial robustness of LiDAR-camera fusion models in 3D object detection. We introduce an attack technique that, by simply adding a limited number of physically constrained adversarial points above a car, can make the car undetectable by the fusion model. Experimental results reveal that even without changes to the image data channel, the fusion model can be deceived solely by manipulating the LiDAR data channel. This finding raises safety concerns in the field of autonomous driving. Further, we explore how the quantity of adversarial points, the distance between the front-near car and the LiDAR-equipped car, and various angular factors affect the attack success rate. We believe our research can contribute to the understanding of multi-sensor robustness, offering insights and guidance to enhance the safety of autonomous driving.

cs.RO↗

arXiv2023

Enrollment-stage Backdoor Attacks on Speaker Recognition Systems via Adversarial Ultrasound

Automatic Speaker Recognition Systems (SRSs) have been widely used in voice applications for personal identification and access control. A typical SRS consists of three stages, i.e., training, enrollment, and recognition. Previous work has revealed that SRSs can be bypassed by backdoor attacks at the training stage or by adversarial example attacks at the recognition stage. In this paper, we propose Tuner, a new type of backdoor attack against the enrollment stage of SRS via adversarial ultrasound modulation, which is inaudible, synchronization-free, content-independent, and black-box. Our key idea is to first inject the backdoor into the SRS with modulated ultrasound when a legitimate user initiates the enrollment, and afterward, the polluted SRS will grant access to both the legitimate user and the adversary with high confidence. Our attack faces a major challenge of unpredictable user articulation at the enrollment stage. To overcome this challenge, we generate the ultrasonic backdoor by augmenting the optimization process with random speech content, vocalizing time, and volume of the user. Furthermore, to achieve real-world robustness, we improve the ultrasonic signal over traditional methods using sparse frequency points, pre-compensation, and single-sideband (SSB) modulation. We extensively evaluate Tuner on two common datasets and seven representative SRS models, as well as its robustness against seven kinds of defenses. Results show that our attack can successfully bypass speaker recognition systems while remaining effective to various speakers, speech content, etc. To mitigate this newly discovered threat, we also provide discussions on potential countermeasures, limitations, and future works of this new threat.

cs.SD↗