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Yuyu Chen

Publications and source records attributed to Yuyu Chen.

20 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Ordering and Inequalities for Mixtures on Risk Aggregation

Aggregation sets, which represent model uncertainty due to unknown dependence, are an important object in the study of robust risk aggregation. In this paper, we investigate ordering relations between two aggregation sets for which the sets of marginals are related by two simple operations: distribution mixtures and quantile mixtures. Intuitively, these operations ``homogenize" marginal distributions by making them similar. As a general conclusion from our results, more ``homogeneous" marginals lead to a larger aggregation set, and thus more severe model uncertainty, although the situation for quantile mixtures is much more complicated than that for distribution mixtures. We proceed to study inequalities on the worst-case values of risk measures in risk aggregation, which represent conservative calculation of regulatory capital. Among other results, we obtain an order relation on VaR under quantile mixture for marginal distributions with monotone densities. Numerical results are presented to visualize the theoretical results and further inspire some conjectures. Finally, we provide applications on portfolio diversification under dependence uncertainty and merging p-values in multiple hypothesis testing, and discuss the connection of our results to joint mixability.

q-fin.RM↗

Optimal Bid Sequences for Multiple-Object Auctions with Unequal Budgets

In a multiple-object auction, every bidder tries to win as many objects as possible with a bidding algorithm. This paper studies position-randomized auctions, which form a special class of multiple-object auctions where a bidding algorithm consists of an initial bid sequence and an algorithm for randomly permuting the sequence. We are especially concerned with situations where some bidders know the bidding algorithms of others. For the case of only two bidders, we give an optimal bidding algorithm for the disadvantaged bidder. Our result generalizes previous work by allowing the bidders to have unequal budgets. One might naturally anticipate that the optimal expected numbers of objects won by the bidders would be proportional to their budgets. Surprisingly, this is not true. Our new algorithm runs in optimal O(n) time in a straightforward manner. The case with more than two bidders is open.

cs.CE↗