arXiv subjects

Zach Studdiford

Publications and source records attributed to Zach Studdiford.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

(V)LMs generalize beyond surface co-occurrence: Evidence from cross-modal number agreement

Language models learn about grammatical number primarily from co-occurrence, and show frequency effects as a result---sometimes taken to indicate that they do not learn abstract ``rules'', and are instead dependent on specific lexical items. Testing generalization with text stimuli alone cannot settle this debate, since distributional cues (is/are, this/these) easily give number away. We instead use cross-modal generalization as a tool to investigate abstractions in LMs that can also accept visual inputs (VLMs), restricting the evidence that diagnoses number to an extra-linguistic modality. We teach VLMs pairs of new nouns by adding new embeddings and only updating them during learning, comparing conditions where number is diagnosed by visual cues alone against ones where it is disambiguated by text. Across behavior, representational dynamics, and causal mechanisms, we find non-trivial evidence for cross-modal generalization across both exposure conditions, and that linguistic vs. extra-linguistic cue conditions are treated in similar ways in the internal mechanisms of the model. This suggests that statistical learners like VLMs can generalize beyond surface-level co-occurrence and show genuine abstraction-compatible behavior.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

Reasoning as Pattern Matching: Shared Mechanisms in Human and LLM Everyday Reasoning

When large language models (LLMs) fail to generalize or make haphazard errors in reasoning, it is often taken as evidence that LLMs are not truly reasoning, but rather performing a kind of pattern matching. The implication is that people's behavior does not exhibit the same types of failures because human reasoning uses principled and abstract world models. We evaluate human participants and 25 LLMs on their ability to engage in common-sense reasoning about a variety of everyday situations and observe similar patterns of errors in both people and models. We then identify the set of attention heads driving LLM responses and find that these heads implement a form of pattern-matching. These attention heads allow us to predict seemingly inexplicable reasoning errors in people caused by ostensibly irrelevant prompt details. Taken together, our results suggest that everyday causal reasoning in people and LLMs is more consistent with a form of pattern-matching than with abstract world models.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Uncovering the Computational Ingredients of Human-Like Representations in LLMs

The human ability to translate diverse perceptual and linguistic inputs into structured behavior has been thought to rest on learning robust representations of concepts. The rapid advancement of transformer-based large language models (LLMs) has surfaced a diversity of computational ingredients relevant for model building - architectures, fine-tuning methods, and training datasets among others - yet it remains unclear which are most crucial for developing human-like conceptual representations. Further, most current benchmarks are ill-suited to measuring representational alignment, making LLMs' scores on them unreliable for assessing whether they are progressing as cognitive models. We address these limitations by evaluating over 75 models on a triplet similarity task, a method well established in cognitive science for measuring conceptual representations, using concepts from the THINGS database. We find that instruction fine-tuning and larger attention head dimensionality are among the strongest predictors of human alignment, while activation function choice, multimodal pretraining, and parameter size have limited influence on alignment. Correlations between alignment scores and existing benchmark scores reveal that while some benchmarks (e.g., BigBenchHard) better capture representational alignment than others (e.g., MUSR), none fully accounts for the variance in human-model alignment, demonstrating their insufficiency. Taken together, our findings highlight key computational ingredients for advancing LLMs as models of human conceptual representation and address a key gap in LLM evaluation.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Evaluating Steering Techniques using Human Similarity Judgments

Current evaluations of Large Language Model (LLM) steering techniques focus on task-specific performance, overlooking how well steered representations align with human cognition. Using a well-established triadic similarity judgment task, we assessed steered LLMs on their ability to flexibly judge similarity between concepts based on size or kind, two central dimensions organizing human mental representations. We found that prompt-based steering methods outperformed other methods both in terms of steering accuracy and model-to-human alignment. We also found LLMs were biased towards `kind' similarity and struggled with `size' alignment. This evaluation approach, grounded in human cognition, adds further support to the efficacy of prompt-based steering and reveals privileged representational axes in LLMs prior to steering.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2024

Beyond Demographics: Aligning Role-playing LLM-based Agents Using Human Belief Networks

Creating human-like large language model (LLM) agents is crucial for faithful social simulation. Having LLMs role-play based on demographic information sometimes improves human likeness but often does not. This study assessed whether LLM alignment with human behavior can be improved by integrating information from empirically-derived human belief networks. Using data from a human survey, we estimated a belief network encompassing 64 topics loading on nine non-overlapping latent factors. We then seeded LLM-based agents with an opinion on one topic, and assessed the alignment of its expressed opinions on remaining test topics with corresponding human data. Role-playing based on demographic information alone did not align LLM and human opinions, but seeding the agent with a single belief greatly improved alignment for topics related in the belief network, and not for topics outside the network. These results suggest a novel path for human-LLM belief alignment in work seeking to simulate and understand patterns of belief distributions in society.

cs.CL↗