arXiv subjects

Zafaryab Haider

Publications and source records attributed to Zafaryab Haider.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

(A)iSpy: Parasitic Trojans for Machine Learning Infrastructure

Modern machine learning (ML) pipelines depend heavily on third party libraries for graph compilation and hardware acceleration. While current practices audit data and model artifacts or rely on file integrity checks, the execution environment remains implicitly trusted. This blind spot enables active threats where a malicious runtime module interacts directly with live training and inference dynamics: exploiting this interaction allows the Trojan to support complex objectives that are challenging for static code or binary modifications, achieving manipulations impossible for standard data and model level attacks. We expose this vulnerability by presenting (A)iSpy, a parasitic infrastructure Trojan that subverts ML systems through an active observe and execute paradigm. Operating within the computation graph, (A)iSpy monitors transient tensor states to perform targeted, stealthy manipulations with negligible overhead. To violate confidentiality, the Trojan identifies all critical training hyperparameters and covertly exfiltrates them via model weights or output logits. To break integrity, it acts as a gradient amplifier: by observing steganographic triggers, it transforms otherwise weak data poisoning into effective backdoor attacks, increasing success rates from near zero to 100%. We further demonstrate broad extensibility across the machine learning lifecycle by validating auxiliary attacks in the appendix, including subpopulation label flipping, availability disruptions, and inference stage manipulations. Importantly, the (A)iSpy module easily evades standard malware scanners, while the associated poisoned inputs and resulting compromised models bypass typical inspection tools. We demonstrate the practicality of this threat with an implementation in the ONNX Runtime training and inference engines.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

HARP: Measuring Harm Amplification in Multi-Agent LLM Systems

Multi-agent LLM systems decompose workflows across agents, tools, shared context, memory, and decision gates. This modularity improves interpretability, but creates a propagation risk: a bounded perturbation to one component can be reused by other agents and amplified into system-level harm. We introduce HARP (Harm Amplification through Role Perturbation), a trace-first methodology for studying local-to-global harm amplification in multi-agent LLM systems. HARP compares paired clean and perturbed executions and records specialist outputs, tool calls, memory reads/writes, guard events, oracle logs, latency, token cost, and decisions. We define local harm as deviation from targeted agents or corrupted channels, global harm as deviation over the full trace, and harm amplification as (H_global/H_local). This complements attack success rate with a measure of how strongly orchestration spreads harm beyond the attack point. We instantiate HARP in a finance-oriented seven-agent system with a deterministic decision gate and configurable attack harness for specialist compromise, collusion, shared-context corruption, and temporal or memory-persistent attacks. Across five defenses, prompt-only defenses preserve benign utility but leave high success and stealth; pre-tool and step-level guards reduce some failures with utility or latency costs; and IntegrityGuard, a trace-consistency defense, achieves the lowest attack success and global harm but introduces utility/cost trade-offs. Results show that single-specialist compromise produces the strongest amplification, shared-context corruption yields the highest attack success, and temporal persistence produces the largest malicious impact. HARP argues that secure multi-agent evaluation must measure not only bypass, but propagation.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

DASH: A Meta-Attack Framework for Synthesizing Effective and Stealthy Adversarial Examples

Numerous techniques have been proposed for generating adversarial examples in white-box settings under strict Lp-norm constraints. However, such norm-bounded examples often fail to align well with human perception, and only a few methods specifically explore perceptually aligned adversarial examples. Moreover, it remains unclear whether insights from Lp-constrained attacks can be effectively leveraged to improve perceptual efficacy. In this paper, we introduce DASH, a fully differentiable meta-attack framework that generates effective and perceptually aligned adversarial examples by strategically composing existing Lp-based attack methods. DASH operates in a multi-stage fashion: at each stage, it aggregates candidate adversarial examples from multiple base attacks using learned, adaptive weights and propagates the result to the next stage. A novel meta-loss function guides this process by jointly minimizing misclassification loss and perceptual distortion, enabling the framework to dynamically modulate the contribution of each base attack throughout the stages. We evaluate DASH on adversarially trained models across CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet. Despite relying solely on Lp-constrained based methods, DASH significantly outperforms state-of-the-art perceptual attacks such as AdvAD, achieving higher attack success rates (e.g., 20.63% improvement) and superior visual quality, as measured by SSIM, LPIPS, and FID (improvements $\approx$ of 11, 0.015, and 5.7, respectively). Furthermore, DASH generalizes well to unseen defenses, making it a practical and strong baseline for evaluating robustness without requiring handcrafted adaptive attacks for each new defense.

cs.CV↗

arXiv2025

How a Bit Becomes a Story: Semantic Steering via Differentiable Fault Injection

Hard-to-detect hardware bit flips, from either malicious circuitry or bugs, have already been shown to make transformers vulnerable in non-generative tasks. This work, for the first time, investigates how low-level, bitwise perturbations (fault injection) to the weights of a large language model (LLM) used for image captioning can influence the semantic meaning of its generated descriptions while preserving grammatical structure. While prior fault analysis methods have shown that flipping a few bits can crash classifiers or degrade accuracy, these approaches overlook the semantic and linguistic dimensions of generative systems. In image captioning models, a single flipped bit might subtly alter how visual features map to words, shifting the entire narrative an AI tells about the world. We hypothesize that such semantic drifts are not random but differentiably estimable. That is, the model's own gradients can predict which bits, if perturbed, will most strongly influence meaning while leaving syntax and fluency intact. We design a differentiable fault analysis framework, BLADE (Bit-level Fault Analysis via Differentiable Estimation), that uses gradient-based sensitivity estimation to locate semantically critical bits and then refines their selection through a caption-level semantic-fluency objective. Our goal is not merely to corrupt captions, but to understand how meaning itself is encoded, distributed, and alterable at the bit level, revealing that even imperceptible low-level changes can steer the high-level semantics of generative vision-language models. It also opens pathways for robustness testing, adversarial defense, and explainable AI, by exposing how structured bit-level faults can reshape a model's semantic output.

cs.LG↗