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Zahra Seyedi

Publications and source records attributed to Zahra Seyedi.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

Plausible Deniability in Fully Homomorphic Computation

We introduce \emph{Plausible Deniability in Fully Homomorphic Computation} (PD-FHC), a framework enabling users to outsource Boolean computations to an untrusted cloud while maintaining both computational privacy against honest-but-curious providers and plausible deniability against coercive adversaries. We define the notion of a \emph{Deniable Computation Medium} (DCM) and a \emph{Deniable Computation Scheme} (DCS) as medium-independent abstractions, then instantiate them using RGB images with Fredkin-gate circuits. One real circuit and several decoys share a single fixed Fredkin-gate wiring. Embedded control bits decide what each gate computes at each pixel, so the same wiring evaluates the real function at the real positions and decoy functions elsewhere. The cloud applies this one wiring to every pixel identically, processing all circuits in a single pass. Under coercion, the user reveals a decoy with verifiable results while the real circuit stays hidden. We formalize multi-round coercion games with existence and circuit-discovery advantages. For the image instantiation, we prove \emph{information-theoretic position privacy} under a \emph{matched-marginal condition}: when the real, decoy, and fill bits are drawn from a common per-position law and placed at random, the embedded LSB plane is exchangeable, so an honest-but-curious provider gains no advantage over guessing at locating the real positions, for any such law and not only the uniform one. We are explicit that this is a condition Alice enforces, that it is distinct from steganalytic undetectability, and that the latter requires the embedded law to match the declared service's legitimate-input law.

cs.CR↗

Decentralized Edge Caching under Budget and Storage Constraints: A Game-Theoretic Approach

The rapid growth of mobile social networks (MSNs) has significantly increased the demand for low-latency and reliable content delivery, motivating the deployment of edge caching systems. In practice, multiple content providers (CPs) compete for the limited storage resources of edge devices (EDs), while facing heterogeneous budgets and operational costs. This paper investigates a decentralized multi-CP edge caching framework that jointly accounts for CP budget constraints, ED storage limitations, and strategic interactions among all entities. We formulate the interaction between CPs and EDs as a hierarchical game, combining a Stackelberg model for CP-ED interactions with a non-cooperative game among competing CPs. Under light storage constraints, we show that CP competition constitutes an exact potential game, ensuring the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and enabling decentralized convergence. When storage constraints are binding, the resulting game loses this structure; nevertheless, extensive simulations demonstrate stable and efficient convergence in practice. Through a comprehensive numerical evaluation, we show that convergence behavior is primarily driven by CP competition rather than the scale of edge infrastructure. We further reveal that storage scarcity fundamentally alters economic outcomes, amplifying inequality among CPs while increasing the relative bargaining power of EDs. The proposed framework provides a scalable and economically grounded solution for decentralized resource allocation in multi-provider edge caching systems.

cs.GT↗

A Stackelberg Model for Hybridization in Cryptography

Similar to a strategic interaction between rational and intelligent agents, cryptography problems can be examined through the prism of game theory. In this setting, the agent aiming to protect a message is called the defender, while the one attempting to decrypt it, generally for malicious purposes, is the attacker. To strengthen security in cryptography, various strategies have been developed, among which hybridization stands out as a key concept in modern cryptographic design. This strategy allows the defender to select among different encryption algorithms (classical, post-quantum, or hybrid) while carefully balancing security and operational costs. On the other side, the attacker, limited by available resources, chooses cryptanalysis methods capable of breaching the selected algorithm. We model this interaction as a Stackelberg cryptographic hybridization problem under resource constraints. Here, the defender randomizes over encryption algorithms, and the attacker observes the choice before selecting suitable cryptanalysis methods. The attacker's decision is framed as a conditional optimization problem, which we refer to as the ``attacker subgame''. We then propose a dynamic programming approach for the attacker's subgame, while the defender's Stackelberg optimization is formulated as a linear program.

cs.CR↗

Post-Quantum Sanitizable Signatures from McEliece-Based Chameleon Hashing

We introduce a novel post-quantum sanitizable signature scheme constructed upon a chameleon hash function derived from the McEliece cryptosystem. In this design, the designated sanitizer possesses the inherent trapdoor of a Goppa code, which facilitates controlled collision-finding via Patterson decoding. This mechanism enables authorized modification of specific message blocks while ensuring all other content remains immutably bound. We provide formal security definitions and rigorous proofs of existential unforgeability and immutability, grounded in the hardness of syndrome decoding in the random-oracle model, where a robust random oracle thwarts trivial linear hash collisions. A key innovation lies in our precise characterization of the transparency property: by imposing a specific weight constraint on the randomizers generated by the signer, we achieve perfect transparency, rendering sanitized signatures indistinguishable from freshly signed ones. This work establishes the first transparent, code-based, post-quantum sanitizable signature scheme, offering strong theoretical guarantees and a pathway for practical deployment in long-term secure applications.

cs.CR↗

A fully decentralized auditing approach for edge computing: A Game-Theoretic Perspective

Edge storage presents a viable data storage alternative for application vendors (AV), offering benefits such as reduced bandwidth overhead and latency compared to cloud storage. However, data cached in edge computing systems is susceptible to intentional or accidental disturbances. This paper proposes a decentralized integrity auditing scheme to safeguard data integrity and counter the traditional reliance on centralized third-party auditors (TPA), which are unfit for distributed systems. Our novel approach employs edge servers (ES) as mutual auditors, eliminating the need for a centralized entity. This decentralization minimizes potential collusion with malicious auditors and biases in audit outcomes. Using a strategic game model, we demonstrate that ESs are more motivated to audit each other than TPAs. The auditing process is addressed as a Nash Equilibrium problem, assuring accurate integrity proof through incentives for ESs. Our scheme's security and performance are rigorously assessed, showing it is secure within the random oracle model, offers improved speed, and is cost-effective compared to existing methods.

cs.CR↗