arXiv subjects

Zain Naboulsi

Publications and source records attributed to Zain Naboulsi.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Does a Toehold Make a Bidder Bolder? Preemption and Multiplicity in Multi-Round Takeover Auctions

A bidder can quietly buy a stake in a company before making an offer for it. That stake, a toehold, is supposed to pay for itself twice: it makes the bidder willing to bid harder, and it frightens rivals into staying out of the fight. The first effect is arithmetic. The second is what would justify the cost and exposure of taking one at all. Yet toeholds are rare in practice, a standing puzzle. We ask whether that second effect is there once the contest is modelled as several rounds of escalating offers rather than the single exchange classical models assume. We turn it into a game a computer can solve, and certify the answers to an accuracy a referee can check. Three findings. The auction fixes what the toehold-holder earns but not how it bids: the same contest supports a bidder who opens aggressively against a rival who folds, and one who opens cheaply against a rival who does not, with the same profit either way. Aggressive preemptive bidding still appears when the toehold is removed entirely, so it comes from bidding in public and in turns, not from owning the stake. And the tidy "bigger toehold, more deterrence" relationship holds only in a contest cut short after one round; give it a real second round and it stops responding. So the two reasons to buy a toehold do not fare alike. The profit reason holds up; the deterrence reason does not, which suggests why toeholds may be rarer than theory predicts, alongside the procedural costs of disclosure and price impact that this model omits. A warning follows for anyone computing economics from a game solver: solve this auction once and it returns a confident figure for what a preemptive bid is worth; solve it again from a different start and it returns a different one, equally converged. We also report which solvers cope with contests of this shape, including versions too large to enumerate. Code is released.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

How Much Due Diligence Before You Bid? Learning in Intractable Takeover Auctions

When two companies bid to buy the same target, no one knows exactly what the target is worth. Each bidder pays for due diligence: costly, imperfect homework that sharpens its own private estimate before it bids. How much of that homework is worth buying? We build a simple computer model of the bidding contest and let it teach itself to bid well by playing against itself, the way a game engine learns chess. The economic question, how much diligence pays for itself, and the computational question, when the contest becomes too complex to solve exactly, are both controlled by a single thing: how many pieces of private information a bidder carries. Our main finding is that the right amount of diligence is modest and finite. It falls as diligence gets more expensive, and it falls further when both sides are doing their homework, because competition erodes the value of knowing more. We also test a recent claim from AI research: that simple, general self-play methods can rival the specialized, expensive algorithms usually built for games like these. Running on an ordinary laptop with no costly frontier AI, we find the simple methods are the best of the self-learning approaches, though purpose-built exact methods still win whenever the game is small enough to solve outright. The simple methods earn their keep only once the game grows too large to solve exactly, which is the regime real deals live in, and there we show they still find strong bidding strategies. The contribution is threefold: a cheap, reproducible way to study deal-making under uncertainty; a concrete, model-based answer to how much due diligence is worth buying; and evidence about when lightweight, general-purpose AI is good enough to replace specialized methods. We release all the games, code, and experiments.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Agentic Education: Using Claude Code to Teach Claude Code

AI coding assistants have proliferated rapidly, yet structured pedagogical frameworks for learning these tools remain scarce. Developers face a gap between tool documentation and practical mastery, relying on fragmented resources such as blog posts, video tutorials, and trial-and-error. We present cc-self-train, a modular interactive curriculum for learning Claude Code, an agentic AI coding tool, through hands-on project construction. The system introduces five contributions: (1) a persona progression model that adapts instructor tone across four stages (Guide, Collaborator, Peer, Launcher), operationalizing Gradual Release of Responsibility for AI-mediated instruction; (2) an adaptive learning system that observes engagement quality through hook-based heuristics and adjusts scaffolding at two timescales, using streak detection for mid-module intervention and aggregate metrics for module-boundary persona changes; (3) a cross-domain unified curriculum in which five distinct project domains share identical feature sequencing, enabling transfer learning; (4) a step-pacing mechanism with explicit pause primitives to manage information overload in an AI-as-instructor context; and (5) an auto-updating curriculum design in which the onboarding agent detects upstream tool changes and updates teaching materials before instruction begins. A parametrized test suite enforces structural consistency as a proxy for pedagogical invariants across all 50 modules. A pilot evaluation with 27 participants shows statistically significant reported self-efficacy gains across all 10 assessed skill areas (p < 0.001), with the largest effects on advanced features such as hooks and custom skills. We discuss implications for the design of auto-updating educational systems.

cs.CY↗