Zeihui Xiong | Searcharxiv

arXiv2023

Straggler Mitigation and Latency Optimization in Blockchain-based Hierarchical Federated Learning

Cloud-edge-device hierarchical federated learning (HFL) has been recently proposed to achieve communication-efficient and privacy-preserving distributed learning. However, there exist several critical challenges, such as the single point of failure and potential stragglers in both edge servers and local devices. To resolve these issues, we propose a decentralized and straggler-tolerant blockchain-based HFL (BHFL) framework. Specifically, a Raft-based consortium blockchain is deployed on edge servers to provide a distributed and trusted computing environment for global model aggregation in BHFL. To mitigate the influence of stragglers on learning, we propose a novel aggregation method, HieAvg, which utilizes the historical weights of stragglers to estimate the missing submissions. Furthermore, we optimize the overall latency of BHFL by jointly considering the constraints of global model convergence and blockchain consensus delay. Theoretical analysis and experimental evaluation show that our proposed BHFL based on HieAvg can converge in the presence of stragglers, which performs better than the traditional methods even when the loss function is non-convex and the data on local devices are non-independent and identically distributed (non-IID).

cs.DC↗

arXiv2021

Nothing Wasted: Full Contribution Enforcement in Federated Edge Learning

The explosive amount of data generated at the network edge makes mobile edge computing an essential technology to support real-time applications, calling for powerful data processing and analysis provided by machine learning (ML) techniques. In particular, federated edge learning (FEL) becomes prominent in securing the privacy of data owners by keeping the data locally used to train ML models. Existing studies on FEL either utilize in-process optimization or remove unqualified participants in advance. In this paper, we enhance the collaboration from all edge devices in FEL to guarantee that the ML model is trained using all available local data to accelerate the learning process. To that aim, we propose a collective extortion (CE) strategy under the imperfect-information multi-player FEL game, which is proved to be effective in helping the server efficiently elicit the full contribution of all devices without worrying about suffering from any economic loss. Technically, our proposed CE strategy extends the classical extortion strategy in controlling the proportionate share of expected utilities for a single opponent to the swiftly homogeneous control over a group of players, which further presents an attractive trait of being impartial for all participants. Moreover, the CE strategy enriches the game theory hierarchy, facilitating a wider application scope of the extortion strategy. Both theoretical analysis and experimental evaluations validate the effectiveness and fairness of our proposed scheme.

cs.LG↗