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Zejun Xiang

Publications and source records attributed to Zejun Xiang.

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From Precise to Random: A Systematic Differential Fault Analysis of the Lightweight Block Cipher Lilliput

At SAC 2013, Berger et al. first proposed the Extended Generalized Feistel Networks (EGFN) structure for the design of block ciphers with efficient diffusion. Later, based on the Type-2 EGFN, they instantiated a new lightweight block cipher named Lilliput (published in IEEE Transactions on Computers, Vol. 65, Issue 7, 2016). According to published cryptanalysis results, Lilliput is sufficiently secure against theoretical attacks such as differential, linear, boomerang, and integral attacks, which rely on the statistical properties of plaintext and ciphertext. However, there is a lack of analysis regarding its resistance to physical attacks in real-world scenarios, such as fault attacks. In this paper, we present the first systematic differential fault analysis (DFA) of Lilliput under three nibble-oriented fault models with progressively relaxed adversarial assumptions to comprehensively assess its fault resilience. In Model I (multi-round fixed-location), precise fault injections at specific rounds recover the master key with a 98% success rate using only 8 faults. Model II (single-round fixed-location) relaxes the multi-round requirement, demonstrating that 8 faults confined to a single round are still sufficient to achieve a 99% success rate by exploiting Lilliput's diffusion properties and DDT-based constraints. Model III (single-round random-location) further weakens the assumption by allowing faults to occur randomly among the eight rightmost branches of round 27. By uniquely identifying the fault location from ciphertext differences with high probability, the attack remains highly feasible, achieving over 99% success with 33 faults and exceeding 99.5% with 36 faults. Our findings reveal a significant vulnerability of Lilliput to practical fault attacks across different adversary capabilities in real-world scenarios, providing crucial insights for its secure implementation.

cs.CR

Cryptanalysis of Gleeok-128

Gleeok is a family of low latency keyed pseudorandom functions (PRFs) consisting of three parallel SPN based permutations whose outputs are XORed to form the final value. Both Gleeok-128 and Gleeok-256 use a 256 bit key, with block sizes of 128 and 256 bits, respectively. Owing to its multi branch structure, evaluating security margins and mounting effective key recovery attacks present nontrivial challenges. This paper provides the first comprehensive third party cryptanalysis of Gleeok-128. We introduce a two stage MILP based framework for constructing branch wise and full cipher differential linear (DL) distinguishers, together with an integral based key recovery framework tailored to multi branch designs. Our DL analysis yields 7, 7, 8, and 4 round distinguishers for Branch 1, Branch 2, Branch 3, and Gleeok-128, respectively, with squared correlations approximately 2 to the power minus 88.12, 2 to the power minus 88.12, 2 to the power minus 38.73, and 2 to the power minus 49.04, outperforming those in the design document except for the full PRF case. By tightening algebraic degree bounds, we further derive 9, 9, and 7 round integral distinguishers for the three branches and a 7 round distinguisher for the full PRF, extending the designers results by 3, 3, and 2 rounds and by 2 rounds, respectively. These integral properties enable 7 round and 8 round key recovery attacks in the non full codebook and full codebook settings. In addition, we identify a flaw in the original linear security evaluation of Branch 3, showing that it can be distinguished over all 12 rounds with data complexity about 2 to the power 48. We also propose optimized linear layer parameters that significantly improve linear resistance without sacrificing diffusion. Our results advance the understanding of Gleeok-128 and provide general methods for analyzing multi branch symmetric designs.

cs.CR

Enhancing Deep Learning-Based Rotational-XOR Attacks on Lightweight Block Ciphers Simon32/64 and Simeck32/64

At CRYPTO 2019, Gohr pioneered neural cryptanalysis by introducing differential-based neural distinguishers to attack Speck32/64, establishing a novel paradigm combining deep learning with differential cryptanalysis.Since then, constructing neural distinguishers has become a significant approach to achieving the deep learning-based cryptanalysis for block ciphers.This paper advances rotational-XOR (RX) attacks through neural networks, focusing on optimizing distinguishers and presenting key-recovery attacks for the lightweight block ciphers Simon32/64 and Simeck32/64.In particular, we first construct the fundamental data formats specially designed for training RX-neural distinguishers by refining the existing data formats for differential-neural distinguishers. Based on these data formats, we systematically identify optimal RX-differences with Hamming weights 1 and 2 that develop high-accuracy RX-neural distinguishers. Then, through innovative application of the bit sensitivity test, we achieve significant compression of data format without sacrificing the distinguisher accuracy. This optimization enables us to add more multi-ciphertext pairs into the data formats, further strengthening the performance of RX-neural distinguishers. As an application, we obtain 14- and 17-round RX-neural distinguishers for Simon32/64 and Simeck32/64, which improves the previous ones by 3 and 2 rounds, respectively.In addition, we propose two novel techniques, key bit sensitivity test and the joint wrong key response, to tackle the challenge of applying Bayesian's key-recovery strategy to the target cipher that adopts nonlinear key schedule in the related-key setting without considering of weak-key space. By this, we can straightforwardly mount a 17-round key-recovery attack on Simeck32/64 based on the improved 16-round RX-nerual distinguisher. To the best of our knowledge, the presented RX-neural......

cs.CR

Enhancing the MILP/MIQCP-based Automatic Search for Differential-Linear Distinguishers of Simon-Like Ciphers

In this paper, we propose an improved method based on Mixed-Integer Linear Programming/Mixed-Integer Quadratic Constraint Programming (MILP/MIQCP) to automatically find better differential-linear (DL) distinguishers for the all members of Simon and Simeck block cipher families. To be specific, we first give the completely precise MILP model to describe the linear part, and explain how to utilize the general expressions of \textsf{Gurobi} solver to model the propagation of continuous difference for the middle part in a quite easy way. Secondly, in order to solve the MILP/MIQCP model in a reasonable time, we propose two heuristic strategies based on the divide-and-conquer idea to speed up the search process. Thirdly, we introduce the transforming technique, which exploits the clustering effect on DL trails, to improve the estimated correlation of the DL approximation. We apply our method to Simon and Simeck block cipher families. Consequently, we find the 14/17/21/26-round theoretical DL distinguishers of Simon32/48/64/96, which extend the previous longest ones of Simon32/48/96 by one round and Simon64 by two rounds, respectively. For Simeck, we do not explore longer distinguishers compared to the currently best results, but refresh all the results of Zhou et al. (the first work to automate finding DL distinguishers for Simon-like ciphers using MILP/MIQCP). Besides, in order to validate the correctness of these distinguishers, the experimental verifications are conducted on Simon32/Simeck32 and Simon48/Simeck48. The results show that our theoretical estimations on correlations are very close to the experimental ones, which can be regarded as a concrete support for the effectiveness of our method.

cs.CR

On the second-order zero differential spectra of some power functions over finite fields

Boukerrou et al. (IACR Trans. Symmetric Cryptol. 2020(1), 331-362) introduced the notion of Feistel Boomerang Connectivity Table (FBCT), the Feistel counterpart of the Boomerang Connectivity Table (BCT), and the Feistel boomerang uniformity (which is the same as the second-order zero differential uniformity in even characteristic). FBCT is a crucial table for the analysis of the resistance of block ciphers to power attacks such as differential and boomerang attacks. It is worth noting that the coefficients of FBCT are related to the second-order zero differential spectra of functions. In this paper, by carrying out certain finer manipulations of solving specific equations over the finite field $\mathbb{F}_{p^n}$, we explicitly determine the second-order zero differential spectra of some power functions with low differential uniformity, and show that our considered functions also have low second-order zero differential uniformity. Our study pushes further former investigations on second-order zero differential uniformity and Feistel boomerang differential uniformity for a power function $F$.

cs.IT