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Zenan Wu

Publications and source records attributed to Zenan Wu.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

ATOM-Bench: A Real-World Benchmark for Atomic Skills and Compositional Generalization in Manipulation Policies

Generalist manipulation policies are increasingly presented as foundation models for robotic control, but their real-world generalization remains difficult to diagnose. A policy may succeed on demonstrated tasks while still failing to execute fine-grained atomic skills or recombine learned skills in new task structures. We introduce \textbf{ATOM-Bench}, a real-world benchmark for evaluating both atomic skills and compositional generalization in manipulation policies. ATOM-Bench factorizes tabletop manipulation into motor atoms and instruction atoms, and contains 30 atomic tasks and 24 held-out compositional tasks across paired single-arm and dual-arm robot tracks. We collect 3,000 human demonstrations for atomic fine-tuning and release both the demonstration data and evaluation rollout data to support reproducible real-world evaluation. Policies are fine-tuned on atomic tasks and evaluated on both atomic skill acquisition and held-out compositional tasks. We further introduce Atomic Score (AS) and Compositional Failure Share (CFS) to distinguish failures caused by weak atomic skills from failures caused by limited compositional reuse. Through 2,700 physical rollouts on five representative manipulation policies, we find that current policies can acquire simple instruction-grounding skills, but still struggle with fine-grained motor atoms, counting, and logical filtering. More importantly, strong atomic performance does not reliably transfer to held-out compositional tasks. ATOM-Bench provides a diagnostic testbed for studying whether failures arise from weak motor execution, poor instruction grounding, or limited compositional reuse.

cs.RO

On Rent Dissipation in Dynamic Multi-battle Contests

We study dynamic multi-battle contests and examine how the contest structure shapes dynamic incentives and determines the extent of rent dissipation. A discouragement effect often arises -- such as in tug-of-war and best-of-$K$ contests -- preventing full rent dissipation even when the series can extend infinitely. We identify a structural property, exchangeability, that contributes to the effect. Leveraging this insight, we establish a necessary and sufficient condition for almost-full rent dissipation. As an application, we introduce the iterated incumbency contest, which illustrates how volatility in the surrounding environment sustains dynamic incentives and generates almost-full rent dissipation, and thus offers insights into various competitive phenomena.

econ.TH

Orchestrating Organizational Politics: Baron and Ferejohn Meet Tullock

This paper examines the optimal organizational rules that govern the process of dividing a fixed surplus. The process is modeled as a sequential multilateral bargaining game with costly recognition. The designer sets the voting rule -- i.e., the minimum number of votes required to approve a proposal -- and the mechanism for proposer recognition, which is modeled as a biased generalized lottery contest. We show that for diverse design objectives, the optimum can be achieved by a dictatorial voting rule, which simplifies the game into a standard biased contest model.

econ.TH