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Zeqiang Zhang

Publications and source records attributed to Zeqiang Zhang.

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Autonomous Learning From Success and Failure: Goal-Conditioned Supervised Learning with Negative Feedback

Learning from reward functions and imitation learning of demonstrations are the two principal approaches for training autonomous systems that interact with an environment through action and observation. Both, however, require human specification for each behaviour to be acquired, a problem for long-lived self-adaptive systems whose goals and operating conditions cannot be fully anticipated at design time. Recently, Goal-Conditioned Supervised Learning (GCSL) through self-imitation has been proposed as a self-supervised alternative: by strategically relabelling goals, agents can derive policy insights from their own experiences. Despite its successes, this framework presents two notable limitations: (1) learning exclusively from self-generated experiences can exacerbate the agents' inherent biases; (2) the relabelling strategy allows agents to focus solely on successful outcomes, precluding them from learning from their mistakes. To address these issues, we propose GCSL with Negative Feedback (GCSL-NF), which evaluates each trajectory twice: positively with respect to relabelled goals, and correctively with respect to the goal originally intended. The corrective target comes from a similarity function learned contrastively from trajectory-induced neighbourhood relations, so that neither a reward function nor a geometric distance needs to be specified. Our experiments show that GCSL-NF overcomes limitations imposed by agents' initial biases, increasingly benefits from negative feedback as learning progresses, and matches or surpasses GCSL- and HER-based methods. By reducing reliance on prespecified reward functions, the proposed approach is particularly relevant for self-adaptive autonomous systems, where adaptation objectives may be diverse, changing, or difficult to engineer.

cs.LG

From Individual Learning to Market Equilibrium: Correcting Structural and Parametric Biases in RL Simulations of Economic Models

The application of Reinforcement Learning (RL) to economic modeling reveals a fundamental conflict between the assumptions of equilibrium theory and the emergent behavior of learning agents. While canonical economic models assume atomistic agents act as `takers' of aggregate market conditions, a naive single-agent RL simulation incentivizes the agent to become a `manipulator' of its environment. This paper first demonstrates this discrepancy within a search-and-matching model with concave production, showing that a standard RL agent learns a non-equilibrium, monopsonistic policy. Additionally, we identify a parametric bias arising from the mismatch between economic discounting and RL's treatment of intertemporal costs. To address both issues, we propose a calibrated Mean-Field Reinforcement Learning framework that embeds a representative agent in a fixed macroeconomic field and adjusts the cost function to reflect economic opportunity costs. Our iterative algorithm converges to a self-consistent fixed point where the agent's policy aligns with the competitive equilibrium. This approach provides a tractable and theoretically sound methodology for modeling learning agents in economic systems within the broader domain of computational social science.

econ.GN