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Zeynab Anbiaee

Publications and source records attributed to Zeynab Anbiaee.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

When Tool Names Are Not Identities: Measuring Provider Misbinding in MCP-Based AI Agents

Large language model (LLM) applications increasingly act as agents that select and invoke external tools. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) standardizes this interaction by allowing clients to compose tools advertised by multiple servers. However, tool metadata used for discovery and selection is not, by itself, necessarily bound to a verified provider identity. This paper studies this gap as tool-provider misbinding: a failure in which a request intended for a legitimate provider is instead resolved to an attacker-controlled tool. The attacker does not compromise the host, LLM, legitimate server, or network channel; it only operates another MCP server that advertises tools with chosen metadata. We formulate tool provider misbinding as an attacker-controlled tool-selection optimization problem and evaluate it in a controlled MCP environment across five LLM-based clients. The results show that interactions drive misbinding. The strongest failures occur when exact-name collision, task-aligned description, and compatible schema reinforce one another, but authority-enhanced descriptions with compatible schema can also cause wrong-provider execution or unresolved provider ambiguity without name collision. Different models expose the same provider-binding weakness differently, including attacker-controlled provider selection, clarification requests, and unstable or inconsistent provider resolution.

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Security Threat Modeling for Emerging AI-Agent Protocols: A Comparative Analysis of MCP, A2A, Agora, and ANP

The rapid development of the AI agent communication protocols, including the Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent2Agent (A2A), Agora, and Agent Network Protocol (ANP), is reshaping how AI agents communicate with tools, services, and each other. While these protocols support scalable multi-agent interaction and cross-organizational interoperability, their security principles remain understudied, and standardized threat modeling is limited; no protocol-centric risk assessment framework has been established yet. This paper presents a systematic security analysis of four emerging AI agent communication protocols. First, we develop a structured threat modeling analysis that examines protocol architectures, trust assumptions, interaction patterns, and lifecycle behaviors to identify protocol-specific and cross-protocol risk surfaces. Second, we introduce a qualitative risk assessment framework that identifies twelve protocol-level risks and evaluates security posture across the creation, operation, and update phases through systematic assessment of likelihood, impact, and overall protocol risk, with implications for secure deployment and future standardization. Third, we provide a measurement-driven case study on MCP that formalizes the risk of missing mandatory validation/attestation for executable components as a falsifiable security claim by quantifying wrong-provider tool execution under multi-server composition across representative resolver policies. Collectively, our results highlight key design-induced risk surfaces and provide actionable guidance for secure deployment and future standardization of agent communication ecosystems.

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