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Zheli Liu

Publications and source records attributed to Zheli Liu.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Traceback of Poisoning Attacks to Retrieval-Augmented Generation

Large language models (LLMs) integrated with retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems improve accuracy by leveraging external knowledge sources. However, recent research has revealed RAG's susceptibility to poisoning attacks, where the attacker injects poisoned texts into the knowledge database, leading to attacker-desired responses. Existing defenses, which predominantly focus on inference-time mitigation, have proven insufficient against sophisticated attacks. In this paper, we introduce RAGForensics, the first traceback system for RAG, designed to identify poisoned texts within the knowledge database that are responsible for the attacks. RAGForensics operates iteratively, first retrieving a subset of texts from the database and then utilizing a specially crafted prompt to guide an LLM in detecting potential poisoning texts. Empirical evaluations across multiple datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of RAGForensics against state-of-the-art poisoning attacks. This work pioneers the traceback of poisoned texts in RAG systems, providing a practical and promising defense mechanism to enhance their security. Our code is available at: https://github.com/zhangbl6618/RAG-Responsibility-Attribution

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Who Taught the Lie? Responsibility Attribution for Poisoned Knowledge in Retrieval-Augmented Generation

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) integrates external knowledge into large language models to improve response quality. However, recent work has shown that RAG systems are highly vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where malicious texts are inserted into the knowledge database to influence model outputs. While several defenses have been proposed, they are often circumvented by more adaptive or sophisticated attacks. This paper presents RAGOrigin, a black-box responsibility attribution framework designed to identify which texts in the knowledge database are responsible for misleading or incorrect generations. Our method constructs a focused attribution scope tailored to each misgeneration event and assigns a responsibility score to each candidate text by evaluating its retrieval ranking, semantic relevance, and influence on the generated response. The system then isolates poisoned texts using an unsupervised clustering method. We evaluate RAGOrigin across seven datasets and fifteen poisoning attacks, including newly developed adaptive poisoning strategies and multi-attacker scenarios. Our approach outperforms existing baselines in identifying poisoned content and remains robust under dynamic and noisy conditions. These results suggest that RAGOrigin provides a practical and effective solution for tracing the origins of corrupted knowledge in RAG systems. Our code is available at: https://github.com/zhangbl6618/RAG-Responsibility-Attribution

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A Systematic Study on Generating Web Vulnerability Proof-of-Concepts Using Large Language Models

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have brought remarkable progress in code understanding and reasoning, creating new opportunities and raising new concerns for software security. Among many downstream tasks, generating Proof-of-Concept (PoC) exploits plays a central role in vulnerability reproduction, comprehension, and mitigation. While previous research has focused primarily on zero-day exploitation, the growing availability of rich public information accompanying disclosed CVEs leads to a natural question: can LLMs effectively use this information to automatically generate valid PoCs? In this paper, we present the first empirical study of LLM-based PoC generation for web application vulnerabilities, focusing on the practical feasibility of leveraging publicly disclosed information. We evaluate GPT-4o and DeepSeek-R1 on 100 real-world and reproducible CVEs across three stages of vulnerability disclosure: (1) newly disclosed vulnerabilities with only descriptions, (2) 1-day vulnerabilities with patches, and (3) N-day vulnerabilities with full contextual code. Our results show that LLMs can automatically generate working PoCs in 8%-34% of cases using only public data, with DeepSeek-R1 consistently outperforming GPT-4o. Further analysis shows that supplementing code context improves success rates by 17%-20%, with function-level providing 9%-13% improvement than file-level ones. Further integrating adaptive reasoning strategies to prompt refinement significantly improves success rates to 68%-72%. Our findings suggest that LLMs could reshape vulnerability exploitation dynamics. To date, 23 newly generated PoCs have been accepted by NVD and Exploit DB.

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Security and Privacy Measurement on Chinese Consumer IoT Traffic based on Device Lifecycle

In recent years, consumer Internet of Things (IoT) devices have become widely used in daily life. With the popularity of devices, related security and privacy risks arise at the same time as they collect user-related data and transmit it to various service providers. Although China accounts for a larger share of the consumer IoT industry, current analyses on consumer IoT device traffic primarily focus on regions such as Europe, the United States, and Australia. Research on China, however, is currently relatively rare. This study constructs the first large-scale dataset about consumer IoT device traffic in China. Specifically, we propose a fine-grained traffic collection guidance covering the entire lifecycle of consumer IoT devices, gathering traffic from 77 devices spanning 38 brands and 12 device categories. Based on this dataset, we analyze traffic destinations and encryption practices across different device types during the entire lifecycle and compare the findings with the results of other regions. Compared to other regions, our results show that consumer IoT devices in China rely more on domestic services and overall perform better in terms of encryption practices. However, there are still 23/40 devices improperly conducting certificate validation, and 2/70 devices use insecure encryption protocols. To facilitate future research, we open-source our traffic collection guidance and make our dataset publicly available.

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From Personal to Collective: On the Role of Local and Global Memory in LLM Personalization

Large language model (LLM) personalization aims to tailor model behavior to individual users based on their historical interactions. However, its effectiveness is often hindered by two key challenges: the \textit{cold-start problem}, where users with limited history provide insufficient context for accurate personalization, and the \textit{biasing problem}, where users with abundant but skewed history cause the model to overfit to narrow preferences. We identify both issues as symptoms of a common underlying limitation, i.e., the inability to model collective knowledge across users. To address this, we propose a local-global memory framework (LoGo) that combines the personalized local memory with a collective global memory that captures shared interests across the population. To reconcile discrepancies between these two memory sources, we introduce a mediator module designed to resolve conflicts between local and global signals. Extensive experiments on multiple benchmarks demonstrate that LoGo consistently improves personalization quality by both warming up cold-start users and mitigating biased predictions. These results highlight the importance of incorporating collective knowledge to enhance LLM personalization.

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Gradient Surgery for Safe LLM Fine-Tuning

Fine-tuning-as-a-Service introduces a critical vulnerability where a few malicious examples mixed into the user's fine-tuning dataset can compromise the safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs). While a recognized paradigm frames safe fine-tuning as a multi-objective optimization problem balancing user task performance with safety alignment, we find existing solutions are critically sensitive to the harmful ratio, with defenses degrading sharply as harmful ratio increases. We diagnose that this failure stems from conflicting gradients, where the user-task update directly undermines the safety objective. To resolve this, we propose SafeGrad, a novel method that employs gradient surgery. When a conflict is detected, SafeGrad nullifies the harmful component of the user-task gradient by projecting it onto the orthogonal plane of the alignment gradient, allowing the model to learn the user's task without sacrificing safety. To further enhance robustness and data efficiency, we employ a KL-divergence alignment loss that learns the rich, distributional safety profile of the well-aligned foundation model. Extensive experiments show that SafeGrad provides state-of-the-art defense across various LLMs and datasets, maintaining robust safety even at high harmful ratios without compromising task fidelity.

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Transform Before You Query: A Privacy-Preserving Approach for Vector Retrieval with Embedding Space Alignment

Vector Database (VDB) can efficiently index and search high-dimensional vector embeddings from unstructured data, crucially enabling fast semantic similarity search essential for modern AI applications like generative AI and recommendation systems. Since current VDB service providers predominantly use proprietary black-box models, users are forced to expose raw query text to them via API in exchange for the vector retrieval services. Consequently, if query text involves confidential records from finance or healthcare domains, this mechanism inevitably leads to critical leakage of user's sensitive information. To address this issue, we introduce STEER (\textbf{S}ecure \textbf{T}ransformed \textbf{E}mbedding v\textbf{E}ctor\textbf{ R}etrieval), a private vector retrieval framework that leverages the alignment relationship between the semantic spaces of different embedding models to derive approximate embeddings for the query text. STEER performs the retrieval using the approximate embeddings within the original VDB and requires no modifications to the server side. Our theoretical and experimental analyses demonstrate that STEER effectively safeguards query text privacy while maintaining the retrieval accuracy. Even though approximate embeddings are approximations of the embeddings from proprietary models, they still prevent the providers from recovering the query text through Embedding Inversion Attacks (EIAs). Extensive experimental results show that Recall@100 of STEER can basically achieve a decrease of less than 5\%. Furthermore, even when searching within a text corpus of millions of entries, STEER achieves a Recall@20 accuracy 20\% higher than current baselines.

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BadReasoner: Planting Tunable Overthinking Backdoors into Large Reasoning Models for Fun or Profit

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have emerged as a significant advancement in artificial intelligence, representing a specialized class of large language models (LLMs) designed to tackle complex reasoning tasks. The defining characteristic of LRMs lies in their extensive chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capabilities. In this paper, we identify a previously unexplored attack vector against LRMs, which we term "overthinking backdoors". We advance this concept by proposing a novel tunable backdoor, which moves beyond simple on/off attacks to one where an attacker can precisely control the extent of the model's reasoning verbosity. Our attack is implemented through a novel data poisoning methodology. It pairs a tunable trigger-where the number of repetitions signals the desired intensity-with a correspondingly verbose CoT response. These responses are programmatically generated by instructing a teacher LLM to inject a controlled number of redundant refinement steps into a correct reasoning process. The approach preserves output correctness, which ensures stealth and establishes the attack as a pure resource-consumption vector. Extensive empirical results on various LRMs demonstrate that our method can reliably trigger a controllable, multi-fold increase in the length of the reasoning process, without degrading the final answer's correctness. Our source code is available at https://github.com/FZaKK/BadReasoner.

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Open Source, Hidden Costs: A Systematic Literature Review on OSS License Management

Integrating third-party software components is a common practice in modern software development, offering significant advantages in terms of efficiency and innovation. However, this practice is fraught with risks related to software licensing. A lack of understanding may lead to disputes, which can pose serious legal and operational challenges. To these ends, both academia and industry have conducted various investigations and proposed solutions and tools to deal with these challenges. However, significant limitations still remain. Moreover, the rapid evolution of open-source software (OSS) licenses, as well as the rapidly incorporated generative software engineering techniques, such as large language models for code (CodeLLMs), are placing greater demands on the systematic management of software license risks. To unveil the severe challenges and explore possible future directions, we conduct the first systematic literature review (SLR) on 80 carefully selected OSS license-related papers, classifying existing research into three key categories, i.e., license identification, license risk assessment, and license risk mitigation. Based on these, we discuss challenges in existing solutions, conclude the opportunities to shed light on future research directions and offer practical recommendations for practitioners. We hope this thorough review will help bridge the gaps between academia and industry and accelerate the ecosystem-wide governance of legitimate software risks within the software engineering community.

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Probe before You Talk: Towards Black-box Defense against Backdoor Unalignment for Large Language Models

Backdoor unalignment attacks against Large Language Models (LLMs) enable the stealthy compromise of safety alignment using a hidden trigger while evading normal safety auditing. These attacks pose significant threats to the applications of LLMs in the real-world Large Language Model as a Service (LLMaaS) setting, where the deployed model is a fully black-box system that can only interact through text. Furthermore, the sample-dependent nature of the attack target exacerbates the threat. Instead of outputting a fixed label, the backdoored LLM follows the semantics of any malicious command with the hidden trigger, significantly expanding the target space. In this paper, we introduce BEAT, a black-box defense that detects triggered samples during inference to deactivate the backdoor. It is motivated by an intriguing observation (dubbed the probe concatenate effect), where concatenated triggered samples significantly reduce the refusal rate of the backdoored LLM towards a malicious probe, while non-triggered samples have little effect. Specifically, BEAT identifies whether an input is triggered by measuring the degree of distortion in the output distribution of the probe before and after concatenation with the input. Our method addresses the challenges of sample-dependent targets from an opposite perspective. It captures the impact of the trigger on the refusal signal (which is sample-independent) instead of sample-specific successful attack behaviors. It overcomes black-box access limitations by using multiple sampling to approximate the output distribution. Extensive experiments are conducted on various backdoor attacks and LLMs (including the closed-source GPT-3.5-turbo), verifying the effectiveness and efficiency of our defense. Besides, we also preliminarily verify that BEAT can effectively defend against popular jailbreak attacks, as they can be regarded as 'natural backdoors'.

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Benchmarking Poisoning Attacks against Retrieval-Augmented Generation

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has proven effective in mitigating hallucinations in large language models by incorporating external knowledge during inference. However, this integration introduces new security vulnerabilities, particularly to poisoning attacks. Although prior work has explored various poisoning strategies, a thorough assessment of their practical threat to RAG systems remains missing. To address this gap, we propose the first comprehensive benchmark framework for evaluating poisoning attacks on RAG. Our benchmark covers 5 standard question answering (QA) datasets and 10 expanded variants, along with 13 poisoning attack methods and 7 defense mechanisms, representing a broad spectrum of existing techniques. Using this benchmark, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of all included attacks and defenses across the full dataset spectrum. Our findings show that while existing attacks perform well on standard QA datasets, their effectiveness drops significantly on the expanded versions. Moreover, our results demonstrate that various advanced RAG architectures, such as sequential, branching, conditional, and loop RAG, as well as multi-turn conversational RAG, multimodal RAG systems, and RAG-based LLM agent systems, remain susceptible to poisoning attacks. Notably, current defense techniques fail to provide robust protection, underscoring the pressing need for more resilient and generalizable defense strategies.

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Prompt-Guided Internal States for Hallucination Detection of Large Language Models

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across a variety of tasks in different domains. However, they sometimes generate responses that are logically coherent but factually incorrect or misleading, which is known as LLM hallucinations. Data-driven supervised methods train hallucination detectors by leveraging the internal states of LLMs, but detectors trained on specific domains often struggle to generalize well to other domains. In this paper, we aim to enhance the cross-domain performance of supervised detectors with only in-domain data. We propose a novel framework, prompt-guided internal states for hallucination detection of LLMs, namely PRISM. By utilizing appropriate prompts to guide changes to the structure related to text truthfulness in LLMs' internal states, we make this structure more salient and consistent across texts from different domains. We integrated our framework with existing hallucination detection methods and conducted experiments on datasets from different domains. The experimental results indicate that our framework significantly enhances the cross-domain generalization of existing hallucination detection methods.

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CTRAP: Embedding Collapse Trap to Safeguard Large Language Models from Harmful Fine-Tuning

Fine-tuning-as-a-service, while commercially successful for Large Language Model (LLM) providers, exposes models to harmful fine-tuning attacks. As a widely explored defense paradigm against such attacks, unlearning attempts to remove malicious knowledge from LLMs, thereby essentially preventing them from being used to perform malicious tasks. However, we highlight a critical flaw: the powerful general adaptability of LLMs allows them to easily bypass selective unlearning by rapidly relearning or repurposing their capabilities for harmful tasks. To address this fundamental limitation, we propose a paradigm shift: instead of selective removal, we advocate for inducing model collapse--effectively forcing the model to "unlearn everything"--specifically in response to updates characteristic of malicious adaptation. This collapse directly neutralizes the very general capabilities that attackers exploit, tackling the core issue unaddressed by selective unlearning. We introduce the Collapse Trap (CTRAP) as a practical mechanism to implement this concept conditionally. Embedded during alignment, CTRAP pre-configures the model's reaction to subsequent fine-tuning dynamics. If updates during fine-tuning constitute a persistent attempt to reverse safety alignment, the pre-configured trap triggers a progressive degradation of the model's core language modeling abilities, ultimately rendering it inert and useless for the attacker. Crucially, this collapse mechanism remains dormant during benign fine-tuning, ensuring the model's utility and general capabilities are preserved for legitimate users. Extensive empirical results demonstrate that CTRAP effectively counters harmful fine-tuning risks across various LLMs and attack settings, while maintaining high performance in benign scenarios. Our code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/CTRAP.

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Analyzing Consumer IoT Traffic from Security and Privacy Perspectives: a Comprehensive Survey

The Consumer Internet of Things (CIoT), a notable segment within the IoT domain, involves the integration of IoT technology into consumer electronics and devices, such as smart homes and smart wearables. Compared to traditional IoT fields, CIoT differs notably in target users, product types, and design approaches. While offering convenience to users, it also raises new security and privacy concerns. Network traffic analysis, a widely used technique in the security community, has been extensively applied to investigate these concerns about CIoT. Compared to traditional network traffic analysis in fields like mobile apps and websites, CIoT introduces unique characteristics that pose new challenges and research opportunities. Researchers have made significant contributions in this area. To aid researchers in understanding the application of traffic analysis tools for assessing CIoT security and privacy risks, this survey reviews 310 publications on traffic analysis within the CIoT security and privacy domain from January 2018 to June 2024, focusing on three research questions. Our work: 1) outlines the CIoT traffic analysis process and highlights its differences from general network traffic analysis. 2) summarizes and classifies existing research into four categories according to its application objectives: device fingerprinting, user activity inference, malicious traffic detection, and measurement. 3) explores emerging challenges and potential future research directions based on each step of the CIoT traffic analysis process. This will provide new insights to the community and guide the industry towards safer product designs.

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Your Semantic-Independent Watermark is Fragile: A Semantic Perturbation Attack against EaaS Watermark

Embedding-as-a-Service (EaaS) has emerged as a successful business pattern but faces significant challenges related to various forms of copyright infringement, particularly, the API misuse and model extraction attacks. Various studies have proposed backdoor-based watermarking schemes to protect the copyright of EaaS services. In this paper, we reveal that previous watermarking schemes possess semantic-independent characteristics and propose the Semantic Perturbation Attack (SPA). Our theoretical and experimental analysis demonstrate that this semantic-independent nature makes current watermarking schemes vulnerable to adaptive attacks that exploit semantic perturbations tests to bypass watermark verification. Extensive experimental results across multiple datasets demonstrate that the True Positive Rate (TPR) for identifying watermarked samples under SPA can reach up to more than 95\%, rendering watermarks ineffective while maintaining the high utility of embeddings. Furthermore, we discuss potential defense strategies to mitigate SPA. Our code is available at https://github.com/Zk4-ps/EaaS-Embedding-Watermark.

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BadActs: A Universal Backdoor Defense in the Activation Space

Backdoor attacks pose an increasingly severe security threat to Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) during their development stage. In response, backdoor sample purification has emerged as a promising defense mechanism, aiming to eliminate backdoor triggers while preserving the integrity of the clean content in the samples. However, existing approaches have been predominantly focused on the word space, which are ineffective against feature-space triggers and significantly impair performance on clean data. To address this, we introduce a universal backdoor defense that purifies backdoor samples in the activation space by drawing abnormal activations towards optimized minimum clean activation distribution intervals. The advantages of our approach are twofold: (1) By operating in the activation space, our method captures from surface-level information like words to higher-level semantic concepts such as syntax, thus counteracting diverse triggers; (2) the fine-grained continuous nature of the activation space allows for more precise preservation of clean content while removing triggers. Furthermore, we propose a detection module based on statistical information of abnormal activations, to achieve a better trade-off between clean accuracy and defending performance.

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LAN: Learning Adaptive Neighbors for Real-Time Insider Threat Detection

Enterprises and organizations are faced with potential threats from insider employees that may lead to serious consequences. Previous studies on insider threat detection (ITD) mainly focus on detecting abnormal users or abnormal time periods (e.g., a week or a day). However, a user may have hundreds of thousands of activities in the log, and even within a day there may exist thousands of activities for a user, requiring a high investigation budget to verify abnormal users or activities given the detection results. On the other hand, existing works are mainly post-hoc methods rather than real-time detection, which can not report insider threats in time before they cause loss. In this paper, we conduct the first study towards real-time ITD at activity level, and present a fine-grained and efficient framework LAN. Specifically, LAN simultaneously learns the temporal dependencies within an activity sequence and the relationships between activities across sequences with graph structure learning. Moreover, to mitigate the data imbalance problem in ITD, we propose a novel hybrid prediction loss, which integrates self-supervision signals from normal activities and supervision signals from abnormal activities into a unified loss for anomaly detection. We evaluate the performance of LAN on two widely used datasets, i.e., CERT r4.2 and CERT r5.2. Extensive and comparative experiments demonstrate the superiority of LAN, outperforming 9 state-of-the-art baselines by at least 9.92% and 6.35% in AUC for real-time ITD on CERT r4.2 and r5.2, respectively. Moreover, LAN can be also applied to post-hoc ITD, surpassing 8 competitive baselines by at least 7.70% and 4.03% in AUC on two datasets. Finally, the ablation study, parameter analysis, and compatibility analysis evaluate the impact of each module and hyper-parameter in LAN. The source code can be obtained from https://github.com/Li1Neo/LAN.

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