arXiv subjects

Zhiyi Huang

Publications and source records attributed to Zhiyi Huang.

At least 91 records · Page 5Linked to original sources

arXiv2018

Tight Competitive Ratios of Classic Matching Algorithms in the Fully Online Model

Huang et al.~(STOC 2018) introduced the fully online matching problem, a generalization of the classic online bipartite matching problem in that it allows all vertices to arrive online and considers general graphs. They showed that the ranking algorithm by Karp et al.~(STOC 1990) is strictly better than $0.5$-competitive and the problem is strictly harder than the online bipartite matching problem in that no algorithms can be $(1-1/e)$-competitive. This paper pins down two tight competitive ratios of classic algorithms for the fully online matching problem. For the fractional version of the problem, we show that a natural instantiation of the water-filling algorithm is $2-\sqrt{2} \approx 0.585$-competitive, together with a matching hardness result. Interestingly, our hardness result applies to arbitrary algorithms in the edge-arrival models of the online matching problem, improving the state-of-art $\frac{1}{1+\ln 2} \approx 0.5906$ upper bound. For integral algorithms, we show a tight competitive ratio of $\approx 0.567$ for the ranking algorithm on bipartite graphs, matching a hardness result by Huang et al. (STOC 2018).

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arXiv2018

Multi-scale Online Learning and its Applications to Online Auctions

We consider revenue maximization in online auction/pricing problems. A seller sells an identical item in each period to a new buyer, or a new set of buyers. For the online posted pricing problem, we show regret bounds that scale with the best fixed price, rather than the range of the values. We also show regret bounds that are almost scale free, and match the offline sample complexity, when comparing to a benchmark that requires a lower bound on the market share. These results are obtained by generalizing the classical learning from experts and multi-armed bandit problems to their multi-scale versions. In this version, the reward of each action is in a different range, and the regret w.r.t. a given action scales with its own range, rather than the maximum range.

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arXiv2018

Online Makespan Minimization: The Power of Restart

We consider the online makespan minimization problem on identical machines. Chen and Vestjens (ORL 1997) show that the largest processing time first (LPT) algorithm is 1.5-competitive. For the special case of two machines, Noga and Seiden (TCS 2001) introduce the SLEEPY algorithm that achieves a competitive ratio of $(5 - \sqrt{5})/2 \approx 1.382$, matching the lower bound by Chen and Vestjens (ORL 1997). Furthermore, Noga and Seiden note that in many applications one can kill a job and restart it later, and they leave an open problem whether algorithms with restart can obtain better competitive ratios. We resolve this long-standing open problem on the positive end. Our algorithm has a natural rule for killing a processing job: a newly-arrived job replaces the smallest processing job if 1) the new job is larger than other pending jobs, 2) the new job is much larger than the processing one, and 3) the processed portion is small relative to the size of the new job. With appropriate choice of parameters, we show that our algorithm improves the 1.5 competitive ratio for the general case, and the 1.382 competitive ratio for the two-machine case.

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arXiv2018

Learning Optimal Reserve Price against Non-myopic Bidders

We consider the problem of learning optimal reserve price in repeated auctions against non-myopic bidders, who may bid strategically in order to gain in future rounds even if the single-round auctions are truthful. Previous algorithms, e.g., empirical pricing, do not provide non-trivial regret rounds in this setting in general. We introduce algorithms that obtain small regret against non-myopic bidders either when the market is large, i.e., no bidder appears in a constant fraction of the rounds, or when the bidders are impatient, i.e., they discount future utility by some factor mildly bounded away from one. Our approach carefully controls what information is revealed to each bidder, and builds on techniques from differentially private online learning as well as the recent line of works on jointly differentially private algorithms.

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arXiv2018

How to Match when All Vertices Arrive Online

We introduce a fully online model of maximum cardinality matching in which all vertices arrive online. On the arrival of a vertex, its incident edges to previously-arrived vertices are revealed. Each vertex has a deadline that is after all its neighbors' arrivals. If a vertex remains unmatched until its deadline, the algorithm must then irrevocably either match it to an unmatched neighbor, or leave it unmatched. The model generalizes the existing one-sided online model and is motivated by applications including ride-sharing platforms, real-estate agency, etc. We show that the Ranking algorithm by Karp et al. (STOC 1990) is $0.5211$-competitive in our fully online model for general graphs. Our analysis brings a novel charging mechanic into the randomized primal dual technique by Devanur et al. (SODA 2013), allowing a vertex other than the two endpoints of a matched edge to share the gain. To our knowledge, this is the first analysis of Ranking that beats $0.5$ on general graphs in an online matching problem, a first step towards solving the open problem by Karp et al. (STOC 1990) about the optimality of Ranking on general graphs. If the graph is bipartite, we show that the competitive ratio of Ranking is between $0.5541$ and $0.5671$. Finally, we prove that the fully online model is strictly harder than the previous model as no online algorithm can be $0.6317 < 1-\frac{1}{e}$-competitive in our model even for bipartite graphs.

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arXiv2016

Online Submodular Maximization with Free Disposal: Randomization Beats 0.25 for Partition Matroids

We study the online submodular maximization problem with free disposal under a matroid constraint. Elements from some ground set arrive one by one in rounds, and the algorithm maintains a feasible set that is independent in the underlying matroid. In each round when a new element arrives, the algorithm may accept the new element into its feasible set and possibly remove elements from it, provided that the resulting set is still independent. The goal is to maximize the value of the final feasible set under some monotone submodular function, to which the algorithm has oracle access. For $k$-uniform matroids, we give a deterministic algorithm with competitive ratio at least $0.2959$, and the ratio approaches $\frac{1}{α_\infty} \approx 0.3178$ as $k$ approaches infinity, improving the previous best ratio of $0.25$ by Chakrabarti and Kale (IPCO 2014), Buchbinder et al. (SODA 2015) and Chekuri et al. (ICALP 2015). We also show that our algorithm is optimal among a class of deterministic monotone algorithms that accept a new arriving element only if the objective is strictly increased. Further, we prove that no deterministic monotone algorithm can be strictly better than $0.25$-competitive even for partition matroids, the most modest generalization of $k$-uniform matroids, matching the competitive ratio by Chakrabarti and Kale (IPCO 2014) and Chekuri et al. (ICALP 2015). Interestingly, we show that randomized algorithms are strictly more powerful by giving a (non-monotone) randomized algorithm for partition matroids with ratio $\frac{1}{α_\infty} \approx 0.3178$.

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arXiv2016

Private Matchings and Allocations

We consider a private variant of the classical allocation problem: given k goods and n agents with individual, private valuation functions over bundles of goods, how can we partition the goods amongst the agents to maximize social welfare? An important special case is when each agent desires at most one good, and specifies her (private) value for each good: in this case, the problem is exactly the maximum-weight matching problem in a bipartite graph. Private matching and allocation problems have not been considered in the differential privacy literature, and for good reason: they are plainly impossible to solve under differential privacy. Informally, the allocation must match agents to their preferred goods in order to maximize social welfare, but this preference is exactly what agents wish to hide. Therefore, we consider the problem under the relaxed constraint of joint differential privacy: for any agent i, no coalition of agents excluding i should be able to learn about the valuation function of agent i. In this setting, the full allocation is no longer published---instead, each agent is told what good to get. We first show that with a small number of identical copies of each good, it is possible to efficiently and accurately solve the maximum weight matching problem while guaranteeing joint differential privacy. We then consider the more general allocation problem, when bidder valuations satisfy the gross substitutes condition. Finally, we prove that the allocation problem cannot be solved to non-trivial accuracy under joint differential privacy without requiring multiple copies of each type of good.

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arXiv2015

Budget Constraints in Prediction Markets

We give a detailed characterization of optimal trades under budget constraints in a prediction market with a cost-function-based automated market maker. We study how the budget constraints of individual traders affect their ability to impact the market price. As a concrete application of our characterization, we give sufficient conditions for a property we call budget additivity: two traders with budgets B and B' and the same beliefs would have a combined impact equal to a single trader with budget B+B'. That way, even if a single trader cannot move the market much, a crowd of like-minded traders can have the same desired effect. When the set of payoff vectors associated with outcomes, with coordinates corresponding to securities, is affinely independent, we obtain that a generalization of the heavily-used logarithmic market scoring rule is budget additive, but the quadratic market scoring rule is not. Our results may be used both descriptively, to understand if a particular market maker is affected by budget constraints or not, and prescriptively, as a recipe to construct markets.

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arXiv2015

Online Convex Covering and Packing Problems

We study the online convex covering problem and online convex packing problem. The (offline) convex covering problem is modeled by the following convex program: $\min_{x \in R_+^n} f(x) \ \text{s.t}\ A x \ge 1$, where $f : R_+^n \mapsto R_+$ is a monotone and convex cost function, and $A$ is an $m \times n$ matrix with non-negative entries. Each row of the constraint matrix $A$ corresponds to a covering constraint. In the online problem, each row of $A$ comes online and the algorithm must maintain a feasible assignment $x$ and may only increase $x$ over time. The (offline) convex packing problem is modeled by the following convex program: $\max_{y\in R_+^m} \sum_{j = 1}^m y_j - g(A^T y)$, where $g : R_+^n \mapsto R_+$ is a monotone and convex cost function. It is the Fenchel dual program of convex covering when $g$ is the convex conjugate of $f$. In the online problem, each variable $y_j$ arrives online and the algorithm must decide the value of $y_j$ on its arrival. We propose simple online algorithms for both problems using the online primal dual technique, and obtain nearly optimal competitive ratios for both problems for the important special case of polynomial cost functions. For any convex polynomial cost functions with non-negative coefficients and maximum degree $τ$, we introduce an $O(τ\log n)^τ$-competitive online convex covering algorithm, and an $O(τ)$-competitive online convex packing algorithm, matching the known $Ω(τ\log n)^τ$ and $Ω(τ)$ lower bounds respectively. There is a large family of online resource allocation problems that can be modeled under this online convex covering and packing framework, including online covering and packing problems (with linear objectives), online mixed covering and packing, and online combinatorial auction. Our framework allows us to study these problems using a unified approach.

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arXiv2015

Making the Most of Your Samples

We study the problem of setting a price for a potential buyer with a valuation drawn from an unknown distribution $D$. The seller has "data"' about $D$ in the form of $m \ge 1$ i.i.d. samples, and the algorithmic challenge is to use these samples to obtain expected revenue as close as possible to what could be achieved with advance knowledge of $D$. Our first set of results quantifies the number of samples $m$ that are necessary and sufficient to obtain a $(1-ε)$-approximation. For example, for an unknown distribution that satisfies the monotone hazard rate (MHR) condition, we prove that $\tildeΘ(ε^{-3/2})$ samples are necessary and sufficient. Remarkably, this is fewer samples than is necessary to accurately estimate the expected revenue obtained by even a single reserve price. We also prove essentially tight sample complexity bounds for regular distributions, bounded-support distributions, and a wide class of irregular distributions. Our lower bound approach borrows tools from differential privacy and information theory, and we believe it could find further applications in auction theory. Our second set of results considers the single-sample case. For regular distributions, we prove that no pricing strategy is better than $\tfrac{1}{2}$-approximate, and this is optimal by the Bulow-Klemperer theorem. For MHR distributions, we show how to do better: we give a simple pricing strategy that guarantees expected revenue at least $0.589$ times the maximum possible. We also prove that no pricing strategy achieves an approximation guarantee better than $\frac{e}{4} \approx .68$.

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arXiv2014

Welfare Maximization with Production Costs: A Primal Dual Approach

We study online combinatorial auctions with production costs proposed by Blum et al. using the online primal dual framework. In this model, buyers arrive online, and the seller can produce multiple copies of each item subject to a non-decreasing marginal cost per copy. The goal is to allocate items to maximize social welfare less total production cost. For arbitrary (strictly convex and differentiable) production cost functions, we characterize the optimal competitive ratio achievable by online mechanisms/algorithms. We show that online posted pricing mechanisms, which are incentive compatible, can achieve competitive ratios arbitrarily close to the optimal, and construct lower bound instances on which no online algorithms, not necessarily incentive compatible, can do better. Our positive results improve or match the results in several previous work, e.g., Bartal et al., Blum et al., and Buchbinder and Gonen. Our lower bounds apply to randomized algorithms and resolve an open problem by Buchbinder and Gonen.

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arXiv2014

Jointly Private Convex Programming

In this paper we present an extremely general method for approximately solving a large family of convex programs where the solution can be divided between different agents, subject to joint differential privacy. This class includes multi-commodity flow problems, general allocation problems, and multi-dimensional knapsack problems, among other examples. The accuracy of our algorithm depends on the \emph{number} of constraints that bind between individuals, but crucially, is \emph{nearly independent} of the number of primal variables and hence the number of agents who make up the problem. As the number of agents in a problem grows, the error we introduce often becomes negligible. We also consider the setting where agents are strategic and have preferences over their part of the solution. For any convex program in this class that maximizes \emph{social welfare}, there is a generic reduction that makes the corresponding optimization \emph{approximately dominant strategy truthful} by charging agents prices for resources as a function of the approximately optimal dual variables, which are themselves computed under differential privacy. Our results substantially expand the class of problems that are known to be solvable under both privacy and incentive constraints.

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arXiv2012

Exploiting Metric Structure for Efficient Private Query Release

We consider the problem of privately answering queries defined on databases which are collections of points belonging to some metric space. We give simple, computationally efficient algorithms for answering distance queries defined over an arbitrary metric. Distance queries are specified by points in the metric space, and ask for the average distance from the query point to the points contained in the database, according to the specified metric. Our algorithms run efficiently in the database size and the dimension of the space, and operate in both the online query release setting, and the offline setting in which they must in polynomial time generate a fixed data structure which can answer all queries of interest. This represents one of the first subclasses of linear queries for which efficient algorithms are known for the private query release problem, circumventing known hardness results for generic linear queries.

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arXiv2012

The Exponential Mechanism for Social Welfare: Private, Truthful, and Nearly Optimal

In this paper we show that for any mechanism design problem with the objective of maximizing social welfare, the exponential mechanism can be implemented as a truthful mechanism while still preserving differential privacy. Our instantiation of the exponential mechanism can be interpreted as a generalization of the VCG mechanism in the sense that the VCG mechanism is the extreme case when the privacy parameter goes to infinity. To our knowledge, this is the first general tool for designing mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private.

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arXiv2012

Simple and Nearly Optimal Multi-Item Auctions

We provide a Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (PTAS) for the Bayesian optimal multi-item multi-bidder auction problem under two conditions. First, bidders are independent, have additive valuations and are from the same population. Second, every bidder's value distributions of items are independent but not necessarily identical monotone hazard rate (MHR) distributions. For non-i.i.d. bidders, we also provide a PTAS when the number of bidders is small. Prior to our work, even for a single bidder, only constant factor approximations are known. Another appealing feature of our mechanism is the simple allocation rule. Indeed, the mechanism we use is either the second-price auction with reserve price on every item individually, or VCG allocation with a few outlying items that requires additional treatments. It is surprising that such simple allocation rules suffice to obtain nearly optimal revenue.

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arXiv2012

Sequential Auctions of Identical Items with Budget-Constrained Bidders

In this paper, we study sequential auctions with two budget constrained bidders and any number of identical items. All prior results on such auctions consider only two items. We construct a canonical outcome of the auction that is the only natural equilibrium and is unique under a refinement of subgame perfect equilibria. We show certain interesting properties of this equilibrium; for instance, we show that the prices decrease as the auction progresses. This phenomenon has been observed in many experiments and previous theoretic work attributed it to features such as uncertainty in the supply or risk averse bidders. We show that such features are not needed for this phenomenon and that it arises purely from the most essential features: budget constraints and the sequential nature of the auction. A little surprisingly we also show that in this equilibrium one agent wins all his items in the beginning and then the other agent wins the rest. The major difficulty in analyzing such sequential auctions has been in understanding how the selling prices of the first few rounds affect the utilities of the agents in the later rounds. We tackle this difficulty by identifying certain key properties of the auction and the proof is via a joint induction on all of them.

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arXiv2012

Testing Coverage Functions

A coverage function f over a ground set [m] is associated with a universe U of weighted elements and m subsets A_1,..., A_m of U, and for any subset T of [m], f(T) is defined as the total weight of the elements in the union $\cup_{j\in T} A_j$. Coverage functions are an important special case of submodular functions, and arise in many applications, for instance as a class of utility functions of agents in combinatorial auctions. Set functions such as coverage functions often lack succinct representations, and in algorithmic applications, an access to a value oracle is assumed. In this paper, we ask whether one can test if a given oracle is that of a coverage function or not. We demonstrate an algorithm which makes O(m|U|) queries to an oracle of a coverage function and completely reconstructs it. This gives a polytime tester for succinct coverage functions for which |U$ is polynomially bounded in m. In contrast, we demonstrate a set function which is "far" from coverage, but requires 2^{\tildeΘ(m)} queries to distinguish it from the class of coverage functions.

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arXiv2010

Bayesian Incentive Compatibility via Fractional Assignments

Very recently, Hartline and Lucier studied single-parameter mechanism design problems in the Bayesian setting. They proposed a black-box reduction that converted Bayesian approximation algorithms into Bayesian-Incentive-Compatible (BIC) mechanisms while preserving social welfare. It remains a major open question if one can find similar reduction in the more important multi-parameter setting. In this paper, we give positive answer to this question when the prior distribution has finite and small support. We propose a black-box reduction for designing BIC multi-parameter mechanisms. The reduction converts any algorithm into an eps-BIC mechanism with only marginal loss in social welfare. As a result, for combinatorial auctions with sub-additive agents we get an eps-BIC mechanism that achieves constant approximation.

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