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Zhiyi Mou

Publications and source records attributed to Zhiyi Mou.

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From Role Prompt to Infinite Thinking: Exploiting Persona Conditioning for Inference Cost Attacks in LLMs

LLMs are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, making inference efficiency and service reliability critical concerns due to their substantial computational costs. However, the autoregressive generation mechanism of LLMs enables malicious prompts to manipulate generation behaviors, inducing excessive token generation that amplifies computational consumption and threatens service efficiency. Existing methods mainly rely on adversarial suffixes or explicit extension instructions, which introduce detectable behaviors and limit their applicability. In this paper, we reveal a previously unexplored vulnerability caused by persona consistency in LLMs, where models maintain assigned roles and reproduce corresponding behaviors even when they result in inefficient reasoning and excessive generation. Based on this observation, we propose RolePlay, a task-aware dynamic persona alignment framework that constructs adaptive personas to naturally induce inefficient yet semantically coherent behaviors for inference cost amplification. Extensive experiments across multiple LLMs and diverse task datasets demonstrate that RolePlay consistently outperforms existing inference extension methods, achieving an average token amplification of up to \bm{$7.64\times$} and a maximum token amplification ratio of \bm{$207.64\times$}. Our findings identify persona conditioning as a new attack surface for LLM inference efficiency and offer a new perspective on computational cost amplification.

cs.CR

SpatialJB: How Text Distribution Art Becomes the "Jailbreak Key" for LLM Guardrails

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have powerful capabilities, they remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, which is a critical barrier to their safe web real-time application. Current commercial LLM providers deploy output guardrails to filter harmful outputs, yet these defenses are not impenetrable. Due to LLMs' reliance on autoregressive, token-by-token inference, their semantic representations lack robustness to spatially structured perturbations, such as redistributing tokens across different rows, columns, or diagonals. Exploiting the Transformer's spatial weakness, we propose SpatialJB to disrupt the model's output generation process, allowing harmful content to bypass guardrails without detection. Comprehensive experiments conducted on leading LLMs get nearly 100% ASR, demonstrating the high effectiveness of SpatialJB. Even after adding advanced output guardrails, like the OpenAI Moderation API, SpatialJB consistently maintains a success rate exceeding 75%, outperforming current jailbreak techniques by a significant margin. The proposal of SpatialJB exposes a key weakness in current guardrails and emphasizes the importance of spatial semantics, offering new insights to advance LLM safety research. To prevent potential misuse, we also present baseline defense strategies against SpatialJB and evaluate their effectiveness in mitigating such attacks. The code for the attack, baseline defenses, and a demo are available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/SpatialJailbreak-8E63.

cs.CR