arXiv subjects

Zhonghong Kuang

Publications and source records attributed to Zhonghong Kuang.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Equilibrium Architecture in Multi-Battle Contests with Count-Dependent Prizes

Two contestants with possibly different marginal costs compete across identical battlefields governed by a Tullock technology with discriminatory power at most one. A symmetric schedule divides a fixed prize according to the number of victories. Allowing for inactivity, unequal efforts across battlefields, and arbitrary mixed strategies, we prove the existence and uniformity of equilibrium. Equilibrium may be pure, semi-pure (one contestant mixes), or two-sided mixed; in a two-sided mixed equilibrium, each contestant uses at most countably many positive effort levels. Multiple equilibria with different structures can coexist while generating the same expected effort, prize share, cost, and payoff. For every admissible schedule and cost ratio, equilibrium is unique with six or fewer battlefields, whereas seven first permits multiplicity or two-sided mixing. We also characterize all equilibria under majority rule.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Dividing the Spoils: Strategic Prize Allocation in Team Contests

Rival teams compete through battles and reward members only after team victory. We study how team managers allocate victory-contingent reward budgets across players to maximize their teams' winning probabilities in a majoritarian contest. Under a regularity condition on battle technologies, the allocation game has a unique pure-strategy equilibrium. Despite differences in budgets and player costs across teams and technologies across battles, both managers choose the same normalized reward schedule, a property we call reward schedule alignment. Each battle's share is proportional to discriminatory power, closeness, and pivotality. With precommitted rewards, allocations and team-winning probabilities are independent of battle order.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Strategy-proof Market Segmentation against Price Discrimination

Data regulations increasingly enable consumers to switch among market segments, making segmentation an endogenous outcome of strategic interaction. We study a model in which consumers choose segments before a monopolist sets segment-specific prices, and define a segmentation as strategy-proof when no consumer with positive measure can profitably deviate. Our main result provides a complete welfare characterization: in every strategy-proof segmentation, producer surplus is pinned at the uniform monopoly profit, consumer surplus ranges from the uniform monopoly level to the buyer-optimal level, and every consumer is weakly better off. We construct strategy-proof segmentations attaining every feasible outcome in this range. A finite-consumer model microfounds our solution concept, with equilibrium outcomes converging to our characterization as the population grows large.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Generalized Multidimensional Contests with Asymmetric Players: Equilibrium and Optimal Prize Design

We study $n$-dimensional contests between two players with heterogeneous effort costs, where each dimension (battle) is modeled as a Tullock contest. Prize-allocation rules are identity-independent, budget-balanced, and weakly increasing in the number of victories. Players' costs can be separable across battles or exhibit cross-battle externalities. We identify a tight sufficient condition under which a unique equilibrium exists and is in pure strategies, for all admissible prize-allocation rules and all degrees of player asymmetry. Under this condition, we characterize the effort-maximizing prize-allocation rule: the entire prize goes to the player who wins more battles than the opponent by at least a prespecified margin, and is split equally if neither player meets this threshold. In the symmetric-player case, the majority rule is optimal if $n$ is odd. Interestingly, cross-battle cost externalities do not change the optimal prize allocation rule in our setting.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Incentivizing Knowledge Transfers

We study the optimal design of relational contracts that incentivize an expert to share specialized knowledge with a novice. While the expert fears that a more knowledgeable novice may later erode his future rents, a third-party principal is willing to allocate her resources to facilitate knowledge transfer. In the unique profit-maximizing contract between the principal and the expert, the expert is asked to train the novice as much as possible, for free, in the initial period; knowledge transfers then proceed gradually and perpetually, while the principal offers lump-sum compensations to the expert right after verifying each transfer; even in the long run, a complete knowledge transfer might not be attainable. Our analysis sheds light on the success of several prominent cross-border technology transfers that took place in China's auto industry and Korea's high-speed rail development.

econ.TH↗