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Zhuoran Yang

Publications and source records attributed to Zhuoran Yang.

At least 127 records · Page 7Linked to original sources

Relational Reasoning via Set Transformers: Provable Efficiency and Applications to MARL

The cooperative Multi-A gent R einforcement Learning (MARL) with permutation invariant agents framework has achieved tremendous empirical successes in real-world applications. Unfortunately, the theoretical understanding of this MARL problem is lacking due to the curse of many agents and the limited exploration of the relational reasoning in existing works. In this paper, we verify that the transformer implements complex relational reasoning, and we propose and analyze model-free and model-based offline MARL algorithms with the transformer approximators. We prove that the suboptimality gaps of the model-free and model-based algorithms are independent of and logarithmic in the number of agents respectively, which mitigates the curse of many agents. These results are consequences of a novel generalization error bound of the transformer and a novel analysis of the Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE) of the system dynamics with the transformer. Our model-based algorithm is the first provably efficient MARL algorithm that explicitly exploits the permutation invariance of the agents. Our improved generalization bound may be of independent interest and is applicable to other regression problems related to the transformer beyond MARL.

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Inducing Equilibria via Incentives: Simultaneous Design-and-Play Ensures Global Convergence

To regulate a social system comprised of self-interested agents, economic incentives are often required to induce a desirable outcome. This incentive design problem naturally possesses a bilevel structure, in which a designer modifies the rewards of the agents with incentives while anticipating the response of the agents, who play a non-cooperative game that converges to an equilibrium. The existing bilevel optimization algorithms raise a dilemma when applied to this problem: anticipating how incentives affect the agents at equilibrium requires solving the equilibrium problem repeatedly, which is computationally inefficient; bypassing the time-consuming step of equilibrium-finding can reduce the computational cost, but may lead the designer to a sub-optimal solution. To address such a dilemma, we propose a method that tackles the designer's and agents' problems simultaneously in a single loop. Specifically, at each iteration, both the designer and the agents only move one step. Nevertheless, we allow the designer to gradually learn the overall influence of the incentives on the agents, which guarantees optimality after convergence. The convergence rate of the proposed scheme is also established for a broad class of games.

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Offline Reinforcement Learning with Instrumental Variables in Confounded Markov Decision Processes

We study the offline reinforcement learning (RL) in the face of unmeasured confounders. Due to the lack of online interaction with the environment, offline RL is facing the following two significant challenges: (i) the agent may be confounded by the unobserved state variables; (ii) the offline data collected a prior does not provide sufficient coverage for the environment. To tackle the above challenges, we study the policy learning in the confounded MDPs with the aid of instrumental variables. Specifically, we first establish value function (VF)-based and marginalized importance sampling (MIS)-based identification results for the expected total reward in the confounded MDPs. Then by leveraging pessimism and our identification results, we propose various policy learning methods with the finite-sample suboptimality guarantee of finding the optimal in-class policy under minimal data coverage and modeling assumptions. Lastly, our extensive theoretical investigations and one numerical study motivated by the kidney transplantation demonstrate the promising performance of the proposed methods.

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Strategic Decision-Making in the Presence of Information Asymmetry: Provably Efficient RL with Algorithmic Instruments

We study offline reinforcement learning under a novel model called strategic MDP, which characterizes the strategic interactions between a principal and a sequence of myopic agents with private types. Due to the bilevel structure and private types, strategic MDP involves information asymmetry between the principal and the agents. We focus on the offline RL problem, where the goal is to learn the optimal policy of the principal concerning a target population of agents based on a pre-collected dataset that consists of historical interactions. The unobserved private types confound such a dataset as they affect both the rewards and observations received by the principal. We propose a novel algorithm, Pessimistic policy Learning with Algorithmic iNstruments (PLAN), which leverages the ideas of instrumental variable regression and the pessimism principle to learn a near-optimal principal's policy in the context of general function approximation. Our algorithm is based on the critical observation that the principal's actions serve as valid instrumental variables. In particular, under a partial coverage assumption on the offline dataset, we prove that PLAN outputs a $1 / \sqrt{K}$-optimal policy with $K$ being the number of collected trajectories. We further apply our framework to some special cases of strategic MDP, including strategic regression, strategic bandit, and noncompliance in recommendation systems.

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Provably Efficient Fictitious Play Policy Optimization for Zero-Sum Markov Games with Structured Transitions

While single-agent policy optimization in a fixed environment has attracted a lot of research attention recently in the reinforcement learning community, much less is known theoretically when there are multiple agents playing in a potentially competitive environment. We take steps forward by proposing and analyzing new fictitious play policy optimization algorithms for zero-sum Markov games with structured but unknown transitions. We consider two classes of transition structures: factored independent transition and single-controller transition. For both scenarios, we prove tight $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{K})$ regret bounds after $K$ episodes in a two-agent competitive game scenario. The regret of each agent is measured against a potentially adversarial opponent who can choose a single best policy in hindsight after observing the full policy sequence. Our algorithms feature a combination of Upper Confidence Bound (UCB)-type optimism and fictitious play under the scope of simultaneous policy optimization in a non-stationary environment. When both players adopt the proposed algorithms, their overall optimality gap is $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{K})$.

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Online Bootstrap Inference For Policy Evaluation in Reinforcement Learning

The recent emergence of reinforcement learning has created a demand for robust statistical inference methods for the parameter estimates computed using these algorithms. Existing methods for statistical inference in online learning are restricted to settings involving independently sampled observations, while existing statistical inference methods in reinforcement learning (RL) are limited to the batch setting. The online bootstrap is a flexible and efficient approach for statistical inference in linear stochastic approximation algorithms, but its efficacy in settings involving Markov noise, such as RL, has yet to be explored. In this paper, we study the use of the online bootstrap method for statistical inference in RL. In particular, we focus on the temporal difference (TD) learning and Gradient TD (GTD) learning algorithms, which are themselves special instances of linear stochastic approximation under Markov noise. The method is shown to be distributionally consistent for statistical inference in policy evaluation, and numerical experiments are included to demonstrate the effectiveness of this algorithm at statistical inference tasks across a range of real RL environments.

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Pessimism meets VCG: Learning Dynamic Mechanism Design via Offline Reinforcement Learning

Dynamic mechanism design has garnered significant attention from both computer scientists and economists in recent years. By allowing agents to interact with the seller over multiple rounds, where agents' reward functions may change with time and are state-dependent, the framework is able to model a rich class of real-world problems. In these works, the interaction between agents and sellers is often assumed to follow a Markov Decision Process (MDP). We focus on the setting where the reward and transition functions of such an MDP are not known a priori, and we are attempting to recover the optimal mechanism using an a priori collected data set. In the setting where the function approximation is employed to handle large state spaces, with only mild assumptions on the expressiveness of the function class, we are able to design a dynamic mechanism using offline reinforcement learning algorithms. Moreover, learned mechanisms approximately have three key desiderata: efficiency, individual rationality, and truthfulness. Our algorithm is based on the pessimism principle and only requires a mild assumption on the coverage of the offline data set. To the best of our knowledge, our work provides the first offline RL algorithm for dynamic mechanism design without assuming uniform coverage.

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A Two-Timescale Framework for Bilevel Optimization: Complexity Analysis and Application to Actor-Critic

This paper analyzes a two-timescale stochastic algorithm framework for bilevel optimization. Bilevel optimization is a class of problems which exhibit a two-level structure, and its goal is to minimize an outer objective function with variables which are constrained to be the optimal solution to an (inner) optimization problem. We consider the case when the inner problem is unconstrained and strongly convex, while the outer problem is constrained and has a smooth objective function. We propose a two-timescale stochastic approximation (TTSA) algorithm for tackling such a bilevel problem. In the algorithm, a stochastic gradient update with a larger step size is used for the inner problem, while a projected stochastic gradient update with a smaller step size is used for the outer problem. We analyze the convergence rates for the TTSA algorithm under various settings: when the outer problem is strongly convex (resp.~weakly convex), the TTSA algorithm finds an $\mathcal{O}(K^{-2/3})$-optimal (resp.~$\mathcal{O}(K^{-2/5})$-stationary) solution, where $K$ is the total iteration number. As an application, we show that a two-timescale natural actor-critic proximal policy optimization algorithm can be viewed as a special case of our TTSA framework. Importantly, the natural actor-critic algorithm is shown to converge at a rate of $\mathcal{O}(K^{-1/4})$ in terms of the gap in expected discounted reward compared to a global optimal policy.

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Decentralized Optimistic Hyperpolicy Mirror Descent: Provably No-Regret Learning in Markov Games

We study decentralized policy learning in Markov games where we control a single agent to play with nonstationary and possibly adversarial opponents. Our goal is to develop a no-regret online learning algorithm that (i) takes actions based on the local information observed by the agent and (ii) is able to find the best policy in hindsight. For such a problem, the nonstationary state transitions due to the varying opponent pose a significant challenge. In light of a recent hardness result \citep{liu2022learning}, we focus on the setting where the opponent's previous policies are revealed to the agent for decision making. With such an information structure, we propose a new algorithm, \underline{D}ecentralized \underline{O}ptimistic hype\underline{R}policy m\underline{I}rror de\underline{S}cent (DORIS), which achieves $\sqrt{K}$-regret in the context of general function approximation, where $K$ is the number of episodes. Moreover, when all the agents adopt DORIS, we prove that their mixture policy constitutes an approximate coarse correlated equilibrium. In particular, DORIS maintains a \textit{hyperpolicy} which is a distribution over the policy space. The hyperpolicy is updated via mirror descent, where the update direction is obtained by an optimistic variant of least-squares policy evaluation. Furthermore, to illustrate the power of our method, we apply DORIS to constrained and vector-valued MDPs, which can be formulated as zero-sum Markov games with a fictitious opponent.

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Human-in-the-loop: Provably Efficient Preference-based Reinforcement Learning with General Function Approximation

We study human-in-the-loop reinforcement learning (RL) with trajectory preferences, where instead of receiving a numeric reward at each step, the agent only receives preferences over trajectory pairs from a human overseer. The goal of the agent is to learn the optimal policy which is most preferred by the human overseer. Despite the empirical successes, the theoretical understanding of preference-based RL (PbRL) is only limited to the tabular case. In this paper, we propose the first optimistic model-based algorithm for PbRL with general function approximation, which estimates the model using value-targeted regression and calculates the exploratory policies by solving an optimistic planning problem. Our algorithm achieves the regret of $\tilde{O} (\operatorname{poly}(d H) \sqrt{K} )$, where $d$ is the complexity measure of the transition and preference model depending on the Eluder dimension and log-covering numbers, $H$ is the planning horizon, $K$ is the number of episodes, and $\tilde O(\cdot)$ omits logarithmic terms. Our lower bound indicates that our algorithm is near-optimal when specialized to the linear setting. Furthermore, we extend the PbRL problem by formulating a novel problem called RL with $n$-wise comparisons, and provide the first sample-efficient algorithm for this new setting. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first theoretical result for PbRL with (general) function approximation.

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Is Pessimism Provably Efficient for Offline RL?

We study offline reinforcement learning (RL), which aims to learn an optimal policy based on a dataset collected a priori. Due to the lack of further interactions with the environment, offline RL suffers from the insufficient coverage of the dataset, which eludes most existing theoretical analysis. In this paper, we propose a pessimistic variant of the value iteration algorithm (PEVI), which incorporates an uncertainty quantifier as the penalty function. Such a penalty function simply flips the sign of the bonus function for promoting exploration in online RL, which makes it easily implementable and compatible with general function approximators. Without assuming the sufficient coverage of the dataset, we establish a data-dependent upper bound on the suboptimality of PEVI for general Markov decision processes (MDPs). When specialized to linear MDPs, it matches the information-theoretic lower bound up to multiplicative factors of the dimension and horizon. In other words, pessimism is not only provably efficient but also minimax optimal. In particular, given the dataset, the learned policy serves as the "best effort" among all policies, as no other policies can do better. Our theoretical analysis identifies the critical role of pessimism in eliminating a notion of spurious correlation, which emerges from the "irrelevant" trajectories that are less covered by the dataset and not informative for the optimal policy.

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ElegantRL-Podracer: Scalable and Elastic Library for Cloud-Native Deep Reinforcement Learning

Deep reinforcement learning (DRL) has revolutionized learning and actuation in applications such as game playing and robotic control. The cost of data collection, i.e., generating transitions from agent-environment interactions, remains a major challenge for wider DRL adoption in complex real-world problems. Following a cloud-native paradigm to train DRL agents on a GPU cloud platform is a promising solution. In this paper, we present a scalable and elastic library ElegantRL-podracer for cloud-native deep reinforcement learning, which efficiently supports millions of GPU cores to carry out massively parallel training at multiple levels. At a high-level, ElegantRL-podracer employs a tournament-based ensemble scheme to orchestrate the training process on hundreds or even thousands of GPUs, scheduling the interactions between a leaderboard and a training pool with hundreds of pods. At a low-level, each pod simulates agent-environment interactions in parallel by fully utilizing nearly 7,000 GPU CUDA cores in a single GPU. Our ElegantRL-podracer library features high scalability, elasticity and accessibility by following the development principles of containerization, microservices and MLOps. Using an NVIDIA DGX SuperPOD cloud, we conduct extensive experiments on various tasks in locomotion and stock trading and show that ElegantRL-podracer substantially outperforms RLlib. Our codes are available on GitHub.

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Learn to Match with No Regret: Reinforcement Learning in Markov Matching Markets

We study a Markov matching market involving a planner and a set of strategic agents on the two sides of the market. At each step, the agents are presented with a dynamical context, where the contexts determine the utilities. The planner controls the transition of the contexts to maximize the cumulative social welfare, while the agents aim to find a myopic stable matching at each step. Such a setting captures a range of applications including ridesharing platforms. We formalize the problem by proposing a reinforcement learning framework that integrates optimistic value iteration with maximum weight matching. The proposed algorithm addresses the coupled challenges of sequential exploration, matching stability, and function approximation. We prove that the algorithm achieves sublinear regret.

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The Best of Both Worlds: Reinforcement Learning with Logarithmic Regret and Policy Switches

In this paper, we study the problem of regret minimization for episodic Reinforcement Learning (RL) both in the model-free and the model-based setting. We focus on learning with general function classes and general model classes, and we derive results that scale with the eluder dimension of these classes. In contrast to the existing body of work that mainly establishes instance-independent regret guarantees, we focus on the instance-dependent setting and show that the regret scales logarithmically with the horizon $T$, provided that there is a gap between the best and the second best action in every state. In addition, we show that such a logarithmic regret bound is realizable by algorithms with $O(\log T)$ switching cost (also known as adaptivity complexity). In other words, these algorithms rarely switch their policy during the course of their execution. Finally, we complement our results with lower bounds which show that even in the tabular setting, we cannot hope for regret guarantees lower than $o(\log T)$.

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Pessimistic Bootstrapping for Uncertainty-Driven Offline Reinforcement Learning

Offline Reinforcement Learning (RL) aims to learn policies from previously collected datasets without exploring the environment. Directly applying off-policy algorithms to offline RL usually fails due to the extrapolation error caused by the out-of-distribution (OOD) actions. Previous methods tackle such problem by penalizing the Q-values of OOD actions or constraining the trained policy to be close to the behavior policy. Nevertheless, such methods typically prevent the generalization of value functions beyond the offline data and also lack precise characterization of OOD data. In this paper, we propose Pessimistic Bootstrapping for offline RL (PBRL), a purely uncertainty-driven offline algorithm without explicit policy constraints. Specifically, PBRL conducts uncertainty quantification via the disagreement of bootstrapped Q-functions, and performs pessimistic updates by penalizing the value function based on the estimated uncertainty. To tackle the extrapolating error, we further propose a novel OOD sampling method. We show that such OOD sampling and pessimistic bootstrapping yields provable uncertainty quantifier in linear MDPs, thus providing the theoretical underpinning for PBRL. Extensive experiments on D4RL benchmark show that PBRL has better performance compared to the state-of-the-art algorithms.

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Sequential Information Design: Markov Persuasion Process and Its Efficient Reinforcement Learning

In today's economy, it becomes important for Internet platforms to consider the sequential information design problem to align its long term interest with incentives of the gig service providers. This paper proposes a novel model of sequential information design, namely the Markov persuasion processes (MPPs), where a sender, with informational advantage, seeks to persuade a stream of myopic receivers to take actions that maximizes the sender's cumulative utilities in a finite horizon Markovian environment with varying prior and utility functions. Planning in MPPs thus faces the unique challenge in finding a signaling policy that is simultaneously persuasive to the myopic receivers and inducing the optimal long-term cumulative utilities of the sender. Nevertheless, in the population level where the model is known, it turns out that we can efficiently determine the optimal (resp. $ε$-optimal) policy with finite (resp. infinite) states and outcomes, through a modified formulation of the Bellman equation. Our main technical contribution is to study the MPP under the online reinforcement learning (RL) setting, where the goal is to learn the optimal signaling policy by interacting with with the underlying MPP, without the knowledge of the sender's utility functions, prior distributions, and the Markov transition kernels. We design a provably efficient no-regret learning algorithm, the Optimism-Pessimism Principle for Persuasion Process (OP4), which features a novel combination of both optimism and pessimism principles. Our algorithm enjoys sample efficiency by achieving a sublinear $\sqrt{T}$-regret upper bound. Furthermore, both our algorithm and theory can be applied to MPPs with large space of outcomes and states via function approximation, and we showcase such a success under the linear setting.

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On Reward-Free RL with Kernel and Neural Function Approximations: Single-Agent MDP and Markov Game

To achieve sample efficiency in reinforcement learning (RL), it necessitates efficiently exploring the underlying environment. Under the offline setting, addressing the exploration challenge lies in collecting an offline dataset with sufficient coverage. Motivated by such a challenge, we study the reward-free RL problem, where an agent aims to thoroughly explore the environment without any pre-specified reward function. Then, given any extrinsic reward, the agent computes the policy via a planning algorithm with offline data collected in the exploration phase. Moreover, we tackle this problem under the context of function approximation, leveraging powerful function approximators. Specifically, we propose to explore via an optimistic variant of the value-iteration algorithm incorporating kernel and neural function approximations, where we adopt the associated exploration bonus as the exploration reward. Moreover, we design exploration and planning algorithms for both single-agent MDPs and zero-sum Markov games and prove that our methods can achieve $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(1 /\varepsilon^2)$ sample complexity for generating a $\varepsilon$-suboptimal policy or $\varepsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium when given an arbitrary extrinsic reward. To the best of our knowledge, we establish the first provably efficient reward-free RL algorithm with kernel and neural function approximators.

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Can Reinforcement Learning Find Stackelberg-Nash Equilibria in General-Sum Markov Games with Myopic Followers?

We study multi-player general-sum Markov games with one of the players designated as the leader and the other players regarded as followers. In particular, we focus on the class of games where the followers are myopic, i.e., they aim to maximize their instantaneous rewards. For such a game, our goal is to find a Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium (SNE), which is a policy pair $(π^*, ν^*)$ such that (i) $π^*$ is the optimal policy for the leader when the followers always play their best response, and (ii) $ν^*$ is the best response policy of the followers, which is a Nash equilibrium of the followers' game induced by $π^*$. We develop sample-efficient reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms for solving for an SNE in both online and offline settings. Our algorithms are optimistic and pessimistic variants of least-squares value iteration, and they are readily able to incorporate function approximation tools in the setting of large state spaces. Furthermore, for the case with linear function approximation, we prove that our algorithms achieve sublinear regret and suboptimality under online and offline setups respectively. To the best of our knowledge, we establish the first provably efficient RL algorithms for solving for SNEs in general-sum Markov games with myopic followers.

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