arXiv subjects

Zhuotong Zhou

Publications and source records attributed to Zhuotong Zhou.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

VulWeaver: Weaving Broken Semantics for Grounded Vulnerability Detection

Detecting vulnerabilities in source code remains critical yet challenging, as conventional static analysis tools construct inaccurate program representations, while existing LLM-based approaches often miss essential vulnerability context and lack grounded reasoning. In this paper, we introduce VulWeaver, a novel LLM-based approach that weaves broken program semantics into accurate representations and extracts holistic vulnerability context for grounded vulnerability detection. VulWeaver first constructs an enhanced unified dependency graph (UDG) by integrating deterministic rules with LLM-based semantic inference to address static analysis inaccuracies. It then extracts holistic vulnerability context by combining explicit contexts from program slicing with implicit contexts, including usage, definition, and declaration information. Finally, VulWeaver employs meta-prompting with vulnerability type specific expert guidelines to steer LLMs through systematic reasoning, aggregated via majority voting for robustness. Extensive experiments on PrimeVul4J dataset show that VulWeaver achieves a precision of 0.82, recall of 0.71, and F1-score of 0.76, outperforming state-of-the-art learning-based, LLM-based, and agent-based baselines by 25%, 17%, and 21% in F1-score, respectively. Notably, VulWeaver attains a VP-S score of 0.58, 164% higher than the best baseline, confirming its strong discriminative power

cs.SE↗

arXiv2026

ProfMalPlus: Agent-Coordinated Detection of Malicious NPM Packages via Static-Dynamic Analysis Synergy

Open source software is vulnerable to supply-chain attacks through transitive dependencies, especially malicious code injected into NPM packages. Existing detectors often inadequately model obfuscated behavior, overlook JavaScript's object-centric features, poorly coordinate static and dynamic analysis, and lose semantic information during behavior abstraction. We propose ProfMalPlus, a malicious NPM package detector combining object-sensitive behavior graphs with coordinated LLM reasoning over annotated code slices. It identifies installation commands and entry files, then constructs graphs capturing sensitive APIs, third-party calls, and unresolved calls. From these graphs, ProfMalPlus extracts security-relevant slices and adds inline static analysis evidence. Local judge agents independently assess each slice. Self-consistency consolidates repeated judgements to reduce LLM variance, while a global judge synthesizes their reports into an entry-level verdict. For undetermined cases, a router selects either third-party enrichment, which adds registry derived module and method semantics, or dynamic augmentation, which executes the package in a sandbox to resolve runtime dependent behavior. The enriched evidence is fed back for reassessment. Finally, a localization agent reports malicious code snippets with explanations. ProfMalPlus achieves a 98.1% F1-score, outperforming state-of-the-art detectors by 3.5% to 52.6%. It also identified 597 previously unknown malicious packages, all confirmed and removed from NPM.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2026

From Component Manipulation to System Compromise: Understanding and Detecting Malicious MCP Servers

The model context protocol (MCP) standardizes how LLMs connect to external tools and data sources, enabling faster integration but introducing new attack vectors. Despite the growing adoption of MCP, existing MCP security studies classify attacks by their observable effects, obscuring how attacks behave across different MCP server components and overlooking multi-component attack chains. Meanwhile, existing defenses are less effective when facing multi-component attacks or previously unknown malicious behaviors. This work presents a component-centric perspective for understanding and detecting malicious MCP servers. First, we build the first component-centric PoC dataset of 114 malicious MCP servers where attacks are achieved as manipulation over MCP components and their compositions. We evaluate these attacks' effectiveness across two MCP hosts and five LLMs, and uncover that (1) component position shapes attack success rate; and (2) multi-component compositions often outperform single-component attacks by distributing malicious logic. Second, we propose and implement Connor, a two-stage behavioral deviation detector for malicious MCP servers. It first performs pre-execution analysis to detect malicious shell commands and extract each tool's function intent, and then conducts step-wise in-execution analysis to trace each tool's behavioral trajectories and detect deviations from its function intent. Evaluation on our curated dataset indicates that Connor achieves an F1-score of 94.6%, outperforming the state of the art by 8.9% to 59.6%. In real-world detection, Connor identifies two malicious servers.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Lifting the Veil on Composition, Risks, and Mitigations of the Large Language Model Supply Chain

Large language models (LLMs) have sparked significant impact with regard to both intelligence and productivity. Numerous enterprises have integrated LLMs into their applications to solve their own domain-specific tasks. However, integrating LLMs into specific scenarios is a systematic process that involves substantial components, which are collectively referred to as the LLM supply chain. A comprehensive understanding of LLM supply chain composition, as well as the relationships among its components, is crucial for enabling effective mitigation measures for different related risks. While existing literature has explored various risks associated with LLMs, there remains a notable gap in systematically characterizing the LLM supply chain from the dual perspectives of contributors and consumers. In this work, we develop a structured taxonomy encompassing risk types, risky actions, and corresponding mitigations across different stakeholders and components of the supply chain. We believe that a thorough review of the LLM supply chain composition, along with its inherent risks and mitigation measures, would be valuable for industry practitioners to avoid potential damages and losses, and enlightening for academic researchers to rethink existing approaches and explore new avenues of research.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2023

Detecting and Fixing Violations of Modification Terms in Open Source Licenses during Forking

Open source software brings benefit to software community, but also introduces legal risks caused by license violations, which result in serious consequences such as lawsuits and financial losses. To mitigate legal risks, some approaches have been proposed to identify licenses, detect license incompatibilities and inconsistencies, and recommend licenses. As far as we know, however, there is no prior work to understand modification terms in open source licenses or to detect and fix violations of modification terms. To bridge this gap, we first empirically characterize modification terms in 47 open source licenses. These licenses all require certain forms of "notice" to describe the modifications made to the original work. Inspired by our study, we then design LiVo to automatically detect and fix violations of modification terms in open source licenses during forking. Our evaluation has shown the effectiveness and efficiency of LiVo. 18 pull requests of fixing modification term violations have received positive responses. 8 have been merged.

cs.SE↗