Searcharxiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Zi Liang

Publications and source records attributed to Zi Liang.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources
arXiv2026

CAITLYN: Can LLM Agents Autonomously Synthesize Defenses against Emerging Injection Attacks?

Prompt injection attacks on Large Language Model (LLM) agents seek to introduce malicious instructions or content into external text sources retrieved by agents, forcing the underlying LLMs to execute harmful actions outside their benign scope. While current defenses effectively counter known injection attacks, deploying them in LLM agent environments remains challenging due to attack variants and emerging threats. Moreover, existing solutions typically suffer from an inherent trilemma, i.e., a constant trade-off among runtime efficiency, contextual precision, and adaptability. To bridge this gap, we propose Continuous Agents for Injection Threats via Lifelong Yielding Nexus (CAITLYN), an agent-agnostic defense middleware. CAITLYN integrates two systems. System I focuses on immediate defense against existing attacks using a two-tiered library: Tier-0 for rule-based detection scripts and Tier-1 for optimized LLM-based accurate inference. System II, in contrast, is deployed to monitor potential abnormal signals and attempt to synthesize new defenses. On standard benchmarks, CAITLYN matches the detection performance of state-of-the-art defenses at lower token overhead than LLM-as-a-judge baselines. On Emerging, our new delivery-aware benchmark featuring novel injection techniques, static baselines and the standalone System I configuration remain vulnerable. In contrast, System II autonomously synthesizes verified defense capabilities, substantially lowering the attack success rate across three diverse agent environments.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2026

Where World Models Break: Natural-Input Failure Discovery

World models predict action-conditioned futures and serve as critical internal simulators for downstream planning and control. However, catastrophic prediction failures of world models could dangerously propagate through the control pipeline, as subsequent agent or model training and decision-making depend heavily on the continuous environment evolution forecasted by these world models. Existing evaluations overlook this systemic risk: by aggregating average errors over benign generations from general queries, they fail to stress-test the model against catastrophic collapses under rare or unobserved condition-action combinations. To bridge this gap, we formalize the natural-input failure discovery problem: under a finite query budget, finding environment-valid conditions and action prefixes that induce severe prediction risk, verifying whether these failures reproduce on fresh seeds, and testing their persistence under nearby valid edits. Discovering such critical failures is computationally challenging, as valid condition-action combinations explode exponentially, rendering exhaustive search or standard sampling infeasible given the high cost of noisy rollouts. To tackle this, we propose BasinLens, which exploits the underlying structure of valid inputs, where each coordinate possesses environment-defined semantic types and admissible domains, by pairing uncertainty-guided global search with typed local replacements. Across diverse benchmarks and world-model families, BasinLens exposes reproducible and locally persistent failure modes that conventional evaluations fail to reveal, showing that average-case benchmarks can mask important vulnerabilities in world-model-driven control.

cs.AI↗
arXiv2026

Controlled Memory Interference in Continual LLM Agents

Long-term memory enables AI agents to maintain continuity across sessions, personalize behavior, and evolve through accumulated experience. Yet memory evolution is not simply a process of storing more information: new experiences may reinforce, revise, or interfere with existing memory states. Existing systems mainly emphasize memory construction and relevance-based retrieval, but several memories may remain simultaneously relevant while differing in state, temporal validity, or authority. We introduce Controlled Memory Interference (CMI), a controlled diagnostic and data-generation framework for studying how agent memory evolves under different memory relationships. Across controlled memory evolution, benign accumulation has limited effects, whereas relationship-specific interference sharply suppresses update plasticity with little stability gain, either by blocking target-memory exposure or by disrupting its downstream use. Lexical and Dense retrieval exhibit distinct interference pathways, while poisoning is more sensitive to update-authority cues than to recency alone. Beyond diagnosis, CMI provides targeted examples for interference-aware memory learning, improving the distinction between valid updates and interference-inducing memories while preserving performance on original memory tasks. These findings show that memory evolution is shaped not only by memory scale, but also by interactions among accumulated experiences. More broadly, memory interference emerges as an important factor for reliable continual agent memory systems.

cs.AI↗
arXiv2026

Adversarial Attacks on Deep OCR Systems

Deep-OCR (DeepSeek-OCR) advances document recognition by treating the visual modality as an optical compression medium, enabling long-context OCR at low token cost. However, its increased complexity may introduce new security vulnerabilities. In this paper, we present, to the best of our knowledge, the first pure black-box adversarial attack against a generative OCR vision-language model, where only the decoded string can be queried and no gradients, logits, or model internals are available. We recast the attack as a zeroth-order optimization problem driven by a bounded scalar loss defined directly on the string output via sequence similarity, and estimate the gradient with a random-direction finite-difference scheme whose query cost is independent of the image dimension. An Adam update with ell_infinity projection yields imperceptible perturbations for both untargeted and targeted objectives. Pilot experiments on Deep-OCR validate the string-only attack and evaluation pipeline and expose severe qualitative decoder failures, including repetition, truncation, and prompt leakage. They also show that controlled targeted rewriting remains substantially harder than untargeted degradation; we avoid claiming targeted success until the pre-registered evaluation is complete.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2026

Beyond Prompt Engineering: A Systematic Analysis of Prompt Lexical Sensitivity and Its Impacts on Quality

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit extreme sensitivity to surface-level prompt variations, in which minor lexical changes can trigger disproportionate performance fluctuations. Moving beyond black-box optimization and coarse-grained templates, we present the first large-scale, n-gram token-level mechanistic analysis of prompt stability, leveraging a dataset of 132,000 prompt variants. Our investigation reveals a fundamental Scaling Law of Prompt Performance Stability: higher average task performance is strongly associated with lower variance and greater robustness across prompt perturbation. We identify two core linguistic drivers underlying this robustness: (1) Domain-Specific Terminology, which tightly anchors semantic boundaries, and (2) Explicit Action Directives, which formalize reasoning trajectories. Together, these elements constrain the model's interpretative space, effectively ``locking in'' more deterministic generation behavior. Building on these insights, we introduce an automated Prompt-Refining Agent that systematically restructures input queries by injecting domain anchoring and operational constraints. Empirical evaluation shows that our approach reduces performance variance by 40.7% in code generation task, while preserving or improving mean performance. These findings provide a statistically grounded and mechanistically interpretable framework for achieving robust prompt engineering.

cs.CL↗
arXiv2026

Acoustic Interference: A New Paradigm Weaponizing Acoustic Latent Semantic for Universal Jailbreak against Large Audio Language Models

The integration of audio modality into Large Audio Language Models (LALMs) significantly expands their attack surface. Existing jailbreak paradigms predominantly treat audio as a carrier for malicious payloads, relying on semantic optimization, acoustic parameter control, or additive perturbation to embed harmful content into the audio signal. In this work, we challenge this necessity and propose a new paradigm in which the role of audio shifts from content injection to safety alignment interference. We reveal that LALM safety alignment can be compromised solely by specific Acoustic Latent Semantics (ALS), the underlying paralinguistic features intrinsic to the priors of audio generative models. Distinct from previous works that leverage explicit acoustic parameters to merely style malicious audio, we demonstrate that interference audio, benign in content but infused with specific ALS, can serve as a universal jailbreak trigger. Leveraging this insight, we propose the Acoustic Interference Attack (AIA), which decouples the attack payload from the audio. Specifically, AIA employs a set of universal, instruction-neutral interference audio, enabling standard malicious text queries to bypass safety alignment without instance-specific optimization. Extensive experiments on 10 LALMs across five datasets demonstrate that AIA achieves the state-of-the-art attack success rate. Furthermore, our interpretability analysis uncovers the inference path drift induced by AIA and identifies the inherent effective patterns within ALS, revealing the fundamental vulnerability of cross-modal alignment in LALMs.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2026

Can a Single Message Paralyze the AI Infrastructure? The Rise of AbO-DDoS Attacks through Targeted Mobius Injection

Large Language Model (LLM) agents have emerged as key intermediaries, orchestrating complex interactions between human users and a wide range of digital services and LLM infrastructures. While prior research has extensively examined the security of LLMs and agents in isolation, the systemic risk of the agent acting as a disruptive hub within the user-agent-service chain remains largely overlooked. In this work, we expose a novel threat paradigm by introducing Mobius Injection, a sophisticated attack that weaponizes autonomous agents into zombie nodes to launch what we define as gent-based and -Oriented DDoS (AbO-DDoS) attacks. By exploiting a structural vulnerability in agentic logic named Semantic Closure, an adversary can induce sustained recursive execution of agent components through a single textual injection. We demonstrate that this attack is exceptionally lightweight, stealthy against both traditional DDoS monitors and contemporary AI safety filters, and highly configurable, allowing for surgical targeting of specific environments or model providers. To evaluate the real-world impact, we conduct extensive experiments across three representative claw-style agents and three mainstream coding agents, integrated with 12 frontier proprietary or open-weight LLMs. Our results demonstrate that Mobius Injection achieves substantial attack success across diverse tasks, driving single-node call amplification up to 51.0x and multi-node p95 latency inflation up to 229.1x. The attack performance exhibits a superlinear increase with the number of poisoning nodes. To mitigate Mobius Injection, we propose a proactive defense mechanism using Agent Component Energy (ACE) Analysis, which detects malicious recursive triggers by measuring anomalous energy in the agent's component graph.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2026

Robust Alignment: Harmonizing Clean Accuracy and Adversarial Robustness in Adversarial Training

Adversarial Training (AT) is one of the most effective methods for developing robust deep neural networks (DNNs). However, AT faces a trade-off problem between clean accuracy and adversarial robustness. In this work, we reveal a surprising phenomenon for the first time: Varying input perturbation intensities for training samples near decision boundaries in AT have minimal impact on model robustness. This finding directly exposes the inconsistency between accuracy and robustness score fluctuations, leading us to identify the misalignment between input and latent spaces as a critical driver of the robustness-accuracy trade-off. To mitigate this misalignment for harmonizing accuracy and robustness, we define Robust Alignment as a new AT target, encouraging the model perception to change with input perturbations provided the final label prediction remains unchanged, which can be achieved via two novel ideas. First, we suggest a reduced and fixed perturbation intensity for those boundary samples, which facilitates the model to utilize the perturbations as learnable patterns, instead of noises that complicate decision boundaries meaninglessly. Second, we propose a Domain Interpolation Consistency Adversarial Regularization (DICAR), based on rigorous theoretical derivations, which explicitly introduces semantic alignment between input and latent spaces into AT. Based on these two ideas, we end up with a new Robust Alignment Adversarial Training (RAAT) method, effectively harmonizing accuracy and robustness. Extensive experiments on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and Tiny-ImageNet with ResNet-18, PreActResNet-18, and WideResNet-28-10 demonstrate the effectiveness of RAAT in improving the trade-off beyond four common baselines and a total of 14 related state-of-the-art (SOTA) works.

cs.CV↗
arXiv2026

Argus: Reorchestrating Static Analysis via a Multi-Agent Ensemble for Full-Chain Security Vulnerability Detection

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have sparked interest in their application to Static Application Security Testing (SAST), primarily due to their superior contextual reasoning capabilities compared to traditional symbolic or rule-based methods. However, existing LLM-based approaches typically attempt to replace human experts directly without integrating effectively with existing SAST tools. This lack of integration results in ineffectiveness, including high rates of false positives, hallucinations, limited reasoning depth, and excessive token usage, making them impractical for industrial deployment. To overcome these limitations, we present a paradigm shift that reorchestrates the SAST workflow from current LLM-assisted structure to a new LLM-centered workflow. We introduce Argus (Agentic and Retrieval-Augmented Guarding System), the first multi-agent framework designed specifically for vulnerability detection. Argus incorporates three key novelties: comprehensive supply chain analysis, collaborative multi-agent workflows, and the integration of state-of-the-art techniques such as Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) and ReAct to minimize hallucinations and enhance reasoning. Extensive empirical evaluation demonstrates that Argus significantly outperforms existing methods by detecting a higher volume of true vulnerabilities while simultaneously reducing false positives and operational costs. Notably, Argus has identified several critical zero-day vulnerabilities with CVE assignments.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2026

How Vulnerable Are Edge LLMs?

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed on edge devices under strict computation and quantization constraints, yet their security implications remain unclear. We study query-based knowledge extraction from quantized edge-deployed LLMs under realistic query budgets and show that, although quantization introduces noise, it does not remove the underlying semantic knowledge, allowing substantial behavioral recovery through carefully designed queries. To systematically analyze this risk, we propose \textbf{CLIQ} (\textbf{Cl}ustered \textbf{I}nstruction \textbf{Q}uerying), a structured query construction framework that improves semantic coverage while reducing redundancy. Experiments on quantized Qwen models (INT8/INT4) demonstrate that CLIQ consistently outperforms original queries across BERTScore, BLEU, and ROUGE, enabling more efficient extraction under limited budgets. These results indicate that quantization alone does not provide effective protection against query-based extraction, highlighting a previously underexplored security risk in edge-deployed LLMs.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2026

How Much Information Can a Vision Token Hold? A Scaling Law for Recognition Limits in VLMs

Recent vision-centric approaches have made significant strides in long-context modeling. Represented by DeepSeek-OCR, these models encode rendered text into continuous vision tokens, achieving high compression rates without sacrificing recognition precision. However, viewing the vision encoder as a lossy channel with finite representational capacity raises a fundamental question: what is the information upper bound of visual tokens? To investigate this limit, we conduct controlled stress tests by progressively increasing the information quantity (character count) within an image. We observe a distinct phase-transition phenomenon characterized by three regimes: a near-perfect Stable Phase, an Instability Phase marked by increased error variance, and a total Collapse Phase. We analyze the mechanical origins of these transitions and identify key factors. Furthermore, we formulate a probabilistic scaling law that unifies average vision token load and visual density into a latent difficulty metric. Extensive experiments across various Vision-Language Models demonstrate the universality of this scaling law, providing critical empirical guidance for optimizing the efficiency-accuracy trade-off in visual context compression.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2026

From Domains to Instances: Dual-Granularity Data Synthesis for LLM Unlearning

Although machine unlearning is essential for removing private, harmful, or copyrighted content from LLMs, current benchmarks often fail to faithfully represent the true ``forgetting scope'' learned by the model. We formalize two distinct unlearning granularities, domain-level and instance-level, and propose \BiForget, an automated framework for synthesizing high-quality forget sets. Unlike prior work relying on \emph{external} generators, \BiForget exploits the target model per se to elicit data that matches its internal knowledge distribution through seed-guided and adversarial prompting. Our experiments across diverse benchmarks show that it achieves a superior balance of relevance, diversity, and efficiency. Quantitatively, in the Harry Potter domain, it improves relevance by ${\sim}20$ and diversity by ${\sim}$0.05 while \emph{halving} the total data size compared to SOTAs. Ultimately, it facilitates more robust forgetting and better utility preservation, providing a more rigorous foundation for evaluating LLM unlearning.

cs.CL↗
arXiv2025

Class-feature Watermark: A Resilient Black-box Watermark Against Model Extraction Attacks

Machine learning models constitute valuable intellectual property, yet remain vulnerable to model extraction attacks (MEA), where adversaries replicate their functionality through black-box queries. Model watermarking counters MEAs by embedding forensic markers for ownership verification. Current black-box watermarks prioritize MEA survival through representation entanglement, yet inadequately explore resilience against sequential MEAs and removal attacks. Our study reveals that this risk is underestimated because existing removal methods are weakened by entanglement. To address this gap, we propose Watermark Removal attacK (WRK), which circumvents entanglement constraints by exploiting decision boundaries shaped by prevailing sample-level watermark artifacts. WRK effectively reduces watermark success rates by at least 88.79% across existing watermarking benchmarks. For robust protection, we propose Class-Feature Watermarks (CFW), which improve resilience by leveraging class-level artifacts. CFW constructs a synthetic class using out-of-domain samples, eliminating vulnerable decision boundaries between original domain samples and their artifact-modified counterparts (watermark samples). CFW concurrently optimizes both MEA transferability and post-MEA stability. Experiments across multiple domains show that CFW consistently outperforms prior methods in resilience, maintaining a watermark success rate of at least 70.15% in extracted models even under the combined MEA and WRK distortion, while preserving the utility of protected models.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2025

Toward Efficient Inference Attacks: Shadow Model Sharing via Mixture-of-Experts

Machine learning models are often vulnerable to inference attacks that expose sensitive information from their training data. Shadow model technique is commonly employed in such attacks, such as membership inference. However, the need for a large number of shadow models leads to high computational costs, limiting their practical applicability. Such inefficiency mainly stems from the independent training and use of these shadow models. To address this issue, we present a novel shadow pool training framework SHAPOOL, which constructs multiple shared models and trains them jointly within a single process. In particular, we leverage the Mixture-of-Experts mechanism as the shadow pool to interconnect individual models, enabling them to share some sub-networks and thereby improving efficiency. To ensure the shared models closely resemble independent models and serve as effective substitutes, we introduce three novel modules: path-choice routing, pathway regularization, and pathway alignment. These modules guarantee random data allocation for pathway learning, promote diversity among shared models, and maintain consistency with target models. We evaluate SHAPOOL in the context of various membership inference attacks and show that it significantly reduces the computational cost of shadow model construction while maintaining comparable attack performance.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2025

Virus Infection Attack on LLMs: Your Poisoning Can Spread "VIA" Synthetic Data

Synthetic data refers to artificial samples generated by models. While it has been validated to significantly enhance the performance of large language models (LLMs) during training and has been widely adopted in LLM development, potential security risks it may introduce remain uninvestigated. This paper systematically evaluates the resilience of synthetic-data-integrated training paradigm for LLMs against mainstream poisoning and backdoor attacks. We reveal that such a paradigm exhibits strong resistance to existing attacks, primarily thanks to the different distribution patterns between poisoning data and queries used to generate synthetic samples. To enhance the effectiveness of these attacks and further investigate the security risks introduced by synthetic data, we introduce a novel and universal attack framework, namely, Virus Infection Attack (VIA), which enables the propagation of current attacks through synthetic data even under purely clean queries. Inspired by the principles of virus design in cybersecurity, VIA conceals the poisoning payload within a protective "shell" and strategically searches for optimal hijacking points in benign samples to maximize the likelihood of generating malicious content. Extensive experiments on both data poisoning and backdoor attacks show that VIA significantly increases the presence of poisoning content in synthetic data and correspondingly raises the attack success rate (ASR) on downstream models to levels comparable to those observed in the poisoned upstream models.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2025

The Matthew Effect of AI Programming Assistants: A Hidden Bias in Software Evolution

AI-assisted programming is rapidly reshaping software development, with large language models (LLMs) enabling new paradigms such as vibe coding and agentic coding. While prior works have focused on prompt design and code generation quality, the broader impact of LLM-driven development on the iterative dynamics of software engineering remains underexplored. In this paper, we conduct large-scale experiments on thousands of algorithmic programming tasks and hundreds of framework selection tasks to systematically investigate how AI-assisted programming interacts with the software ecosystem. Our analysis quantifies a substantial performance asymmetry: mainstream languages and frameworks achieve significantly higher success rates than niche ones. This disparity suggests a feedback loop consistent with the Matthew Effect, where data-rich ecosystems gain superior AI support. While not the sole driver of adoption, current models introduce a non-negligible productivity friction for niche technologies, representing a hidden bias in software evolution.

cs.SE↗
arXiv2025

Decision Potential Surface: A Theoretical and Practical Approximation of Large Language Model Decision Boundary

Decision boundary, the subspace of inputs where a machine learning model assigns equal classification probabilities to two classes, is pivotal in revealing core model properties and interpreting behaviors. While analyzing the decision boundary of large language models (LLMs) has attracted increasing attention recently, constructing it for mainstream LLMs remains computationally infeasible due to the enormous sequence-level output spaces and the autoregressive nature of LLMs. To address this issue, in this paper we propose Decision Potential Surface (DPS), a new notion for analyzing the properties of LLM decisions. DPS is derived from the confidence in distinguishing different classes for each input, which naturally captures the potential of the decision boundary. We prove that the zero-height isohypse in DPS is equivalent to the decision boundary of an LLM, with enclosed regions representing decision regions. By leveraging DPS, for the first time in the literature, we propose a practical decision boundary approximation algorithm, namely K-DPS, which only requires only K finite sequence samples to approximate an LLM's decision boundary with negligible error. We theoretically derive the upper bounds for the absolute error, expected error, and the error concentration between K-DPS and the ideal DPS, demonstrating that such errors can be traded off against sampling times.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2025

Reminiscence Attack on Residuals: Exploiting Approximate Machine Unlearning for Privacy

Machine unlearning enables the removal of specific data from ML models to uphold the right to be forgotten. While approximate unlearning algorithms offer efficient alternatives to full retraining, this work reveals that they fail to adequately protect the privacy of unlearned data. In particular, these algorithms introduce implicit residuals which facilitate privacy attacks targeting at unlearned data. We observe that these residuals persist regardless of model architectures, parameters, and unlearning algorithms, exposing a new attack surface beyond conventional output-based leakage. Based on this insight, we propose the Reminiscence Attack (ReA), which amplifies the correlation between residuals and membership privacy through targeted fine-tuning processes. ReA achieves up to 1.90x and 1.12x higher accuracy than prior attacks when inferring class-wise and sample-wise membership, respectively. To mitigate such residual-induced privacy risk, we develop a dual-phase approximate unlearning framework that first eliminates deep-layer unlearned data traces and then enforces convergence stability to prevent models from "pseudo-convergence", where their outputs are similar to retrained models but still preserve unlearned residuals. Our framework works for both classification and generation tasks. Experimental evaluations confirm that our approach maintains high unlearning efficacy, while reducing the adaptive privacy attack accuracy to nearly random guess, at the computational cost of 2-12% of full retraining from scratch.

cs.LG↗