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Zihe Wang

Publications and source records attributed to Zihe Wang.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

CHBench: A Cognitive Hierarchy Benchmark for Evaluating Strategic Reasoning Capability of LLMs

Game-playing ability serves as an indicator for evaluating the strategic reasoning capability of large language models (LLMs). While most existing studies rely on utility performance metrics, which are not robust enough due to variations in opponent behavior and game structure. To address this limitation, we propose \textbf{Cognitive Hierarchy Benchmark (CHBench)}, a novel evaluation framework inspired by the cognitive hierarchy models from behavioral economics. We hypothesize that agents have bounded rationality -- different agents behave at varying reasoning depths/levels. We evaluate LLMs' strategic reasoning through a three-phase systematic framework, utilizing behavioral data from six state-of-the-art LLMs across fifteen carefully selected normal-form games. Experiments show that LLMs exhibit consistent strategic reasoning levels across diverse opponents, confirming the framework's robustness and generalization capability. We also analyze the effects of two key mechanisms (Chat Mechanism and Memory Mechanism) on strategic reasoning performance. Results indicate that the Chat Mechanism significantly degrades strategic reasoning, whereas the Memory Mechanism enhances it. These insights position CHBench as a promising tool for evaluating LLM capabilities, with significant potential for future research and practical applications.

cs.AI↗

Simultaneous All-Pay Auctions with Budget Constraints

The all-pay auction, a classic competitive model, is widely applied in scenarios such as political elections, sports competitions, and research and development, where all participants pay their bids regardless of winning or losing. However, in the traditional all-pay auction, players have no budget constraints, whereas in real-world scenarios, players typically face budget constraints. This paper studies the Nash equilibrium of two players with budget constraints across multiple heterogeneous items in a complete-information framework. The main contributions are as follows: (1) a comprehensive characterization of the Nash equilibrium in single-item auctions with asymmetric budgets and valuations; (2) the construction of a joint distribution Nash equilibrium for the two-item scenario; and (3) the construction of a joint distribution Nash equilibrium for the three-item scenario. Unlike the unconstrained all-pay auction, which always has a Nash equilibrium, a Nash equilibrium may not exist when players have budget constraints. Our findings highlight the intricate effects of budget constraints on bidding strategies, providing new perspectives and methodologies for theoretical analysis and practical applications of all-pay auctions.

econ.TH↗

Optimal Calibrated Signaling in Digital Auctions

In digital advertising, online platforms allocate ad impressions through real-time auctions, where advertisers typically rely on autobidding agents to optimize bids on their behalf. Unlike traditional auctions for physical goods, the value of an ad impression is uncertain and depends on the unknown click-through rate (CTR). While platforms can estimate CTRs more accurately using proprietary machine learning algorithms, these estimates/algorithms remain opaque to advertisers. This information asymmetry naturally raises the following questions: how can platforms disclose information in a way that is both credible and revenue-optimal? We address these questions through calibrated signaling, where each prior-free bidder receives a private signal that truthfully reflects the conditional expected CTR of the ad impression. Such signals are trustworthy and allow bidders to form unbiased value estimates, even without access to the platform's internal algorithms. We study the design of platform-optimal calibrated signaling in the context of second-price auction. Our first main result fully characterizes the structure of the optimal calibrated signaling, which can also be computed efficiently. We show that this signaling can extract the full surplus -- or even exceed it -- depending on a specific market condition. Our second main result is an FPTAS for computing an approximately optimal calibrated signaling that satisfies an IR condition. Our main technical contributions are: a reformulation of the platform's problem as a two-stage optimization problem that involves optimal transport subject to calibration feasibility constraints on the bidders' marginal bid distributions; and a novel correlation plan that constructs the optimal distribution over second-highest bids.

cs.GT↗

Ex-Ante Truthful Distribution-Reporting Mechanisms

This paper studies mechanism design for revenue maximization in a distribution-reporting setting, where the auctioneer does not know the buyers' true value distributions. Instead, each buyer reports and commits to a bid distribution in the ex-ante stage, which the auctioneer uses as input to the mechanism. Buyers strategically decide the reported distributions to maximize ex-ante utility, potentially deviating from their value distributions. As shown in previous work, classical prior-dependent mechanisms such as the Myerson auction fail to elicit truthful value distributions at the ex-ante stage, despite satisfying Bayesian incentive compatibility at the interim stage. We study the design of ex-ante incentive compatible mechanisms, and aim to maximize revenue in a prior-independent approximation framework. We introduce a family of threshold-augmented mechanisms, which ensures ex-ante incentive compatibility while boosting revenue through ex-ante thresholds. Based on these mechanisms, we construct the Peer-Max Mechanism, which achieves an either-or approximation guarantee for general non-identical distributions. Specifically, for any value distributions, its expected revenue either achieves a constant fraction of the optimal social welfare, or surpasses the second-price revenue by a constant fraction, where the constants depend on the number of buyers and a tunable parameter. We also provide an upper bound on the revenue achievable by any ex-ante incentive compatible mechanism, matching our lower bound up to a constant factor. Finally, we extend our approach to a setting where multiple units of identical items are sold to buyers with multi-unit demands.

cs.GT↗

Static Segmentation by Tracking: A Label-Efficient Approach for Fine-Grained Specimen Image Segmentation

We study image segmentation in the biological domain, particularly trait segmentation from specimen images (e.g., butterfly wing stripes, beetle elytra). This fine-grained task is crucial for understanding the biology of organisms, but it traditionally requires manually annotating segmentation masks for hundreds of images per species, making it highly labor-intensive. To address this challenge, we propose a label-efficient approach, Static Segmentation by Tracking (SST), based on a key insight: while specimens of the same species exhibit natural variation, the traits of interest show up consistently. This motivates us to concatenate specimen images into a ``pseudo-video'' and reframe trait segmentation as a tracking problem. Specifically, SST generates masks for unlabeled images by propagating annotated or predicted masks from the ``pseudo-preceding'' images. Built upon recent video segmentation models, such as Segment Anything Model 2, SST achieves high-quality trait segmentation with only one labeled image per species, marking a breakthrough in specimen image analysis. To further enhance segmentation quality, we introduce a cycle-consistent loss for fine-tuning, again requiring only one labeled image. Additionally, we demonstrate the broader potential of SST, including one-shot instance segmentation in natural images and trait-based image retrieval.

cs.CV↗

A Survey of Geometric Graph Neural Networks: Data Structures, Models and Applications

Geometric graphs are a special kind of graph with geometric features, which are vital to model many scientific problems. Unlike generic graphs, geometric graphs often exhibit physical symmetries of translations, rotations, and reflections, making them ineffectively processed by current Graph Neural Networks (GNNs). To address this issue, researchers proposed a variety of geometric GNNs equipped with invariant/equivariant properties to better characterize the geometry and topology of geometric graphs. Given the current progress in this field, it is imperative to conduct a comprehensive survey of data structures, models, and applications related to geometric GNNs. In this paper, based on the necessary but concise mathematical preliminaries, we formalize geometric graph as the data structure, on top of which we provide a unified view of existing models from the geometric message passing perspective. Additionally, we summarize the applications as well as the related datasets to facilitate later research for methodology development and experimental evaluation. We also discuss the challenges and future potential directions of geometric GNNs at the end of this survey.

cs.LG↗

On the Distortion of Multi-winner Election Using Single-Candidate Ballots

In this paper, we study the distortion bounds for voting mechanisms in multi-winner elections in general metric spaces. Our study pertains to the case in which each voter only reports her favorite candidate amongst $m$ possible choices. Given that candidates' locations are undisclosed to the mechanism, the mechanism has to form a $w-$winner committee based solely on the number of votes received by candidates. We establish distortion bounds for both truthful and non-truthful mechanisms. Our research highlights the significance of the $σ$ parameter, which represents the ratio between maximum and minimum distances among all candidate pairs. We show that the distortion is linear in $σ$. First, we demonstrate that all mechanisms possess a distortion greater than $1+\frac{w-1}{w+1}(σ-1)$. To give an upper bound, we study the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) mechanism, whose distortion is at most $1+2σ$. Second, we retrieve the upper bounds for strategyproof mechanisms. In particular, we infer an upper bound by examining the Random Sequential Dictator mechanism that achieves a distortion less than $1+4σ$ when $w=2$.

cs.GT↗

Stackelberg vs. Nash in the Lottery Colonel Blotto Game

Resource competition problems are often modeled using Colonel Blotto games, where players take simultaneous actions. However, many real-world scenarios involve sequential decision-making rather than simultaneous moves. To model these dynamics, we represent the Lottery Colonel Blotto game as a Stackelberg game, in which one player, the leader, commits to a strategy first, and the other player, the follower, responds. We derive the Stackelberg equilibrium for this game, formulating the leader's strategy as a bi-level optimization problem. To solve this, we develop a constructive method based on iterative game reductions, which allows us to efficiently compute the leader's optimal commitment strategy in polynomial time. Additionally, we identify the conditions under which the Stackelberg equilibrium coincides with the Nash equilibrium. Specifically, this occurs when the budget ratio between the leader and the follower equals a certain threshold, which we can calculate in closed form. In some instances, we observe that when the leader's budget exceeds this threshold, both players achieve higher utilities in the Stackelberg equilibrium compared to the Nash equilibrium. Lastly, we show that, in the best case, the leader can achieve an infinite utility improvement by making an optimal first move compared to the Nash equilibrium.

cs.GT↗

On the Oscillations in Cournot Games with Best Response Strategies

In this paper, we consider the dynamic oscillation in the Cournot oligopoly model, which involves multiple firms producing homogeneous products. To explore the oscillation under the updates of best response strategies, we focus on the linear price functions. In this setting, we establish the existence of oscillations. In particular, we show that for the scenario of different costs among firms, the best response converges to either a unique equilibrium or a two-period oscillation. We further characterize the oscillations and propose linear-time algorithms for finding all types of two-period oscillations. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first step toward fully analyzing the periodic oscillation in the Cournot oligopoly model.

econ.TH↗

MLLM-CompBench: A Comparative Reasoning Benchmark for Multimodal LLMs

The ability to compare objects, scenes, or situations is crucial for effective decision-making and problem-solving in everyday life. For instance, comparing the freshness of apples enables better choices during grocery shopping while comparing sofa designs helps optimize the aesthetics of our living space. Despite its significance, the comparative capability is largely unexplored in artificial general intelligence (AGI). In this paper, we introduce MLLM-CompBench, a benchmark designed to evaluate the comparative reasoning capability of multimodal large language models (MLLMs). MLLM-CompBench mines and pairs images through visually oriented questions covering eight dimensions of relative comparison: visual attribute, existence, state, emotion, temporality, spatiality, quantity, and quality. We curate a collection of around 40K image pairs using metadata from diverse vision datasets and CLIP similarity scores. These image pairs span a broad array of visual domains, including animals, fashion, sports, and both outdoor and indoor scenes. The questions are carefully crafted to discern relative characteristics between two images and are labeled by human annotators for accuracy and relevance. We use MLLM-CompBench to evaluate recent MLLMs, including GPT-4V(ision), Gemini-Pro, and LLaVA-1.6. Our results reveal notable shortcomings in their comparative abilities. We believe MLLM-COMPBENCH not only sheds light on these limitations but also establishes a solid foundation for future enhancements in the comparative capability of MLLMs.

cs.CV↗

Freshness and Informativity Weighted Cognitive Extent and Its Correlation with Cumulative Citation Count

In this paper, we revisit cognitive extent, originally defined as the number of unique phrases in a quota. We introduce Freshness and Informative Weighted Cognitive Extent (FICE), calculated based on two novel weighting factors, the lifetime ratio and informativity of scientific entities. We model the lifetime of each scientific entity as the time-dependent document frequency, which is fit by the composition of multiple Gaussian profiles. The lifetime ratio is then calculated as the cumulative document frequency at the publication time $t_0$ divided by the cumulative document frequency over its entire lifetime. The informativity is calculated by normalizing the document frequency across all scientific entities recognized in a title. Using the ACL Anthology, we verified the trend formerly observed in several other domains that the number of unique scientific entities per quota increased gradually at a slower rate. We found that FICE exhibits a strong correlation with the average cumulative citation count within a quota. Our code is available at \href{https://github.com/ZiheHerzWang/Freshness-and-Informativity-Weighted-Cognitive-Extent}{https://github.com/ZiheHerzWang/Freshness-and-Informativity-Weighted-Cognitive-Extent}

cs.DL↗

Enhancing multimodal cooperation via sample-level modality valuation

One primary topic of multimodal learning is to jointly incorporate heterogeneous information from different modalities. However most models often suffer from unsatisfactory multimodal cooperation which cannot jointly utilize all modalities well. Some methods are proposed to identify and enhance the worse learnt modality but they are often hard to provide the fine-grained observation of multimodal cooperation at sample-level with theoretical support. Hence it is essential to reasonably observe and improve the fine-grained cooperation between modalities especially when facing realistic scenarios where the modality discrepancy could vary across different samples. To this end we introduce a sample-level modality valuation metric to evaluate the contribution of each modality for each sample. Via modality valuation we observe that modality discrepancy indeed could be different at sample-level beyond the global contribution discrepancy at dataset-level. We further analyze this issue and improve cooperation between modalities at sample-level by enhancing the discriminative ability of low-contributing modalities in a targeted manner. Overall our methods reasonably observe the fine-grained uni-modal contribution and achieve considerable improvement. The source code and dataset are available at https://github.com/GeWu-Lab/Valuate-and-Enhance-Multimodal-Cooperation.

cs.CV↗

Facility Location Problems with Capacity Constraints: Two Facilities and Beyond

In this paper, we investigate the Mechanism Design aspects of the $m$-Capacitated Facility Location Problem ($m$-CFLP) on a line. We focus on two frameworks. In the first framework, the number of facilities is arbitrary, all facilities have the same capacity, and the number of agents is equal to the total capacity of all facilities. In the second framework, we aim to place two facilities, each with a capacity of at least half of the total agents. For both of these frameworks, we propose truthful mechanisms with bounded approximation ratios with respect to the Social Cost (SC) and the Maximum Cost (MC). When $m>2$, the result sharply contrasts with the impossibility results known for the classic $m$-Facility Location Problem \cite{fotakis2014power}, where capacity constraints are not considered. Furthermore, all our mechanisms are (i) optimal with respect to the MC (ii) optimal or nearly optimal with respect to the SC among anonymous mechanisms. For both frameworks, we provide a lower bound on the approximation ratio that any truthful and deterministic mechanism can achieve with respect to the SC and MC.

cs.GT↗

On Truthful Item-Acquiring Mechanisms for Reward Maximization

In this research, we study the problem that a collector acquires items from the owner based on the item qualities the owner declares and an independent appraiser's assessments. The owner is interested in maximizing the probability that the collector acquires the items and is the only one who knows the items' factual quality. The appraiser performs her duties with impartiality, but her assessment may be subject to random noises, so it may not accurately reflect the factual quality of the items. The main challenge lies in devising mechanisms that prompt the owner to reveal accurate information, thereby optimizing the collector's expected reward. We consider the menu size of mechanisms as a measure of their practicability and study its impact on the attainable expected reward. For the single-item setting, we design optimal mechanisms with a monotone increasing menu size. Although the reward gap between the simplest and optimal mechanisms is bounded, we show that simple mechanisms with a small menu size cannot ensure any positive fraction of the optimal reward of mechanisms with a larger menu size. For the multi-item setting, we show that an ordinal mechanism that only takes the owner's ordering of the items as input is not incentive-compatible. We then propose a set of Union mechanisms that combine single-item mechanisms. Moreover, we run experiments to examine these mechanisms' robustness against the independent appraiser's assessment accuracy and the items' acquiring rate.

cs.GT↗

Cost Minimization for Equilibrium Transition

In this paper, we delve into the problem of using monetary incentives to encourage players to shift from an initial Nash equilibrium to a more favorable one within a game. Our main focus revolves around computing the minimum reward required to facilitate this equilibrium transition. The game involves a single row player who possesses $m$ strategies and $k$ column players, each endowed with $n$ strategies. Our findings reveal that determining whether the minimum reward is zero is NP-complete, and computing the minimum reward becomes APX-hard. Nonetheless, we bring some positive news, as this problem can be efficiently handled if either $k$ or $n$ is a fixed constant. Furthermore, we have devised an approximation algorithm with an additive error that runs in polynomial time. Lastly, we explore a specific case wherein the utility functions exhibit single-peaked characteristics, and we successfully demonstrate that the optimal reward can be computed in polynomial time.

cs.GT↗

Optimal Pricing Schemes for Identical Items with Time-Sensitive Buyers

Time or money? That is a question! In this paper, we consider this dilemma in the pricing regime, in which we try to find the optimal pricing scheme for identical items with heterogenous time-sensitive buyers. We characterize the revenue-optimal solution and propose an efficient algorithm to find it in a Bayesian setting. Our results also demonstrate the tight ratio between the value of wasted time and the seller's revenue, as well as that of two common-used pricing schemes, the k-step function and the fixed pricing. To explore the nature of the optimal scheme in the general setting, we present the closed forms over the product distribution and show by examples that positive correlation between the valuation of the item and the cost per unit time could help increase revenue. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first step towards understanding the impact of the time factor as a part of the buyer cost in pricing problems, in the computational view.

cs.GT↗

Improved Approximation Ratios of Fixed-Price Mechanisms in Bilateral Trades

We continue the study of the performance for fixed-price mechanisms in the bilateral trade problem, and improve approximation ratios of welfare-optimal mechanisms in several settings. Specifically, in the case where only the buyer distribution is known, we prove that there exists a distribution over different fixed-price mechanisms, such that the approximation ratio lies within the interval of [0.71, 0.7381]. Furthermore, we show that the same approximation ratio holds for the optimal fixed-price mechanism, when both buyer and seller distributions are known. As a result, the previously best-known (1 - 1/e+0.0001)-approximation can be improved to $0.71$. Additionally, we examine randomized fixed-price mechanisms when we receive just one single sample from the seller distribution, for both symmetric and asymmetric settings. Our findings reveal that posting the single sample as the price remains optimal among all randomized fixed-price mechanisms.

cs.GT↗

Optimal Anonymous Independent Reward Scheme Design

We consider designing reward schemes that incentivize agents to create high-quality content (e.g., videos, images, text, ideas). The problem is at the center of a real-world application where the goal is to optimize the overall quality of generated content on user-generated content platforms. We focus on anonymous independent reward schemes (AIRS) that only take the quality of an agent's content as input. We prove the general problem is NP-hard. If the cost function is convex, we show the optimal AIRS can be formulated as a convex optimization problem and propose an efficient algorithm to solve it. Next, we explore the optimal linear reward scheme and prove it has a 1/2-approximation ratio, and the ratio is tight. Lastly, we show the proportional scheme can be arbitrarily bad compared to AIRS.

cs.GT↗