Ziji Sheng | Searcharxiv

arXiv2026

AutoResearch AI: Towards AI-Powered Research Automation for Scientific Discovery

Scientific research is being reshaped by AI systems that move beyond isolated assistance toward longer-horizon workflows spanning literature grounding, hypothesis generation, experimentation, validation, reporting, and revision. This shift marks a transition from task-level AI for science to workflow-level research automation. Yet current systems remain fragmented, differing in autonomy, domain scope, execution environment, validation mechanism, and human oversight, while still struggling with evidence preservation, reproducibility, weak-direction rejection, provenance tracking, cross-domain robustness, and accountable scientific closure. This survey examines these developments through AutoResearch, defined as the developmental spectrum of AI-powered scientific workflow automation. Within it, Vibe Research denotes the human-steered region of prompt-based assistance and human-verified execution, whereas emerging AI-led systems coordinate larger portions of the discovery loop without achieving robust autonomy. We analyze how research systems redistribute control, evidence, execution, validation, and accountability across workflows and organize the field around five workflow conditions: literature and research grounding; hypothesis formation and planning; experimentation and tool use; feedback, validation, and review; and reporting and knowledge communication. We further synthesize AI scientist systems, mixed-initiative co-research frameworks, benchmarks, domain deployments, and open-source infrastructures. Finally, we propose five evaluation dimensions--novelty, validity, impact, reliability, and provenance--and show that AutoResearch autonomy is domain-conditioned, being more credible in structured, executable, and rapidly verifiable settings but limited in embodied, delayed, heterogeneous, ethical, or institutionally accountable contexts.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Merger-as-a-Stealer: Stealing Targeted PII from Aligned LLMs with Model Merging

Model merging has emerged as a promising approach for updating large language models (LLMs) by integrating multiple domain-specific models into a cross-domain merged model. Despite its utility and plug-and-play nature, unmonitored mergers can introduce significant security vulnerabilities, such as backdoor attacks and model merging abuse. In this paper, we identify a novel and more realistic attack surface where a malicious merger can extract targeted personally identifiable information (PII) from an aligned model with model merging. Specifically, we propose \texttt{Merger-as-a-Stealer}, a two-stage framework to achieve this attack: First, the attacker fine-tunes a malicious model to force it to respond to any PII-related queries. The attacker then uploads this malicious model to the model merging conductor and obtains the merged model. Second, the attacker inputs direct PII-related queries to the merged model to extract targeted PII. Extensive experiments demonstrate that \texttt{Merger-as-a-Stealer} successfully executes attacks against various LLMs and model merging methods across diverse settings, highlighting the effectiveness of the proposed framework. Given that this attack enables character-level extraction for targeted PII without requiring any additional knowledge from the attacker, we stress the necessity for improved model alignment and more robust defense mechanisms to mitigate such threats.

cs.CR↗