Mind the Gap: Cross-RFC Formal Analysis Exposes DNSSEC's Hidden Vulnerabilities
This paper presents a cross-RFC formal analysis of selected DNSSEC mechanisms using SAPIC+ models of cryptographic operations and stateful caching. We analyze properties concerning data origin authenticity, integrity, chain of trust, and authenticated denial of existence within these models. Our analysis shows that core authentication properties hold under the modeled assumptions, while wildcard expansion, the mechanism that bridges positive and negative authentication, exhibits a cross-RFC interaction vulnerability that defeats DNSSEC's integrity guarantee. Specifically, we discover Cross-Zone Wildcard Cache Poisoning: a new attack in which a malicious zone operator exploits a gap in the DNSSEC specifications to poison resolver caches with forged records for some domains outside its authority, served to clients as DNSSEC-authentic. The tested versions of all four major resolvers implementing the affected caching optimization accept the malformed wildcard material. The resulting impact depends on the resolver's synthesis path. All four vendors have publicly released fixes. The distinctive integrity failure is a synthesized, attacker-chosen positive answer with the Authenticated Data (AD) bit set: prior attacks instead exhausted availability, downgraded to AD=0, or skipped validation. Our models also identify two cross-RFC availability flaws and rediscover three known attack classes. We test six resolvers and measure deployment prerequisites through focused resolver and TLD scans. We propose updates to four RFCs.