arXiv subjects

Zonghao Ying

Publications and source records attributed to Zonghao Ying.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2026

DMN: A Compositional Framework for Jailbreaking Multimodal LLMs with Multi-Image Inputs

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, which can elicit harmful responses from MLLMs. Many MLLMs support multi-image inputs, inadvertently introducing new vulnerabilities due to less efforts on multi-image safety alignment. Previous MLLM jailbreak methods only uses a single image, which restricts the attack space: they cannot distribute harmful requests across multiple images, carry abundant information, or exploit additional visual reasoning tasks to distract MLLMs. To address these limitations, in this paper, we propose a compositional jailbreak framework, \textbf{DMN}, which leverages \textbf{D}istributed instruction, \textbf{M}ultimodal evidence and a \textbf{N}umber chain task to fully enhance the jailbreak performance. Extensive experiments show that DMN is highly effective for MLLM jailbreaking, e.g. achieving attack success rates of over 90\% on GPT-4o, Gemini-2.5-pro and Claude Sonnet 4, surpassing other baselines by a large margin. This compositional, multi-image jailbreak strategy reveals fundamental weaknesses in their safety mechanisms.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Attention Hijacking: Response Manipulation Across Queries in Vision-Language Models

Existing adversarial attacks on vision-language models (VLMs) can steer model outputs toward attacker-specified target responses, but their effectiveness often degrades when the same perturbed input is paired with different textual queries. This paper studies cross-query response manipulation, where a single adversarial example is expected to remain effective across diverse user queries. We first analyze the limitations of existing attacks and find that successful transfer is closely associated with preserving an image-dominant attention pattern during response generation. Motivated by the observation, we propose \textbf{Attention Hijacking}, a novel adversarial attack that explicitly steers internal attention distributions toward a persistent image-dominant pattern. By amplifying the influence of visual tokens on target response tokens while suppressing the competing influence of textual tokens, our method reduces the dependence of the manipulated output on the specific wording of the query. Extensive experiments on widely used VLMs show that Attention Hijacking substantially improves cross-query transferability across diverse target responses and unseen queries. The method also extends effectively to multiple attack scenarios, offering new insights into the role of attention stability in transferable response manipulation for VLMs.

cs.CV↗

arXiv2026

GuardAD: Safeguarding Autonomous Driving MLLMs via Markovian Safety Logic

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are increasingly integrated into autonomous driving (AD) systems; however, they remain vulnerable to diverse safety threats, particularly in accident-prone scenarios. Recent safeguard mechanisms have shown promise by incorporating logical constraints, yet most rely on static formulations that lack temporally grounded safety reasoning over evolving traffic interactions, resulting in limited robustness in dynamic driving environments. To address these limitations, we propose GuardAD, a model-agnostic safeguard that formulates AD safety as an evolving Markovian logical state. GuardAD introduces Neuro-Symbolic Logic Formalization, which represents safety predicates over heterogeneous traffic participants and continuously induces them via n-th order Markovian Logic Induction. This design enables the inference of emerging and latent hazards beyond single-step observations. Rather than simply vetoing unsafe actions, GuardAD performs Logic-Driven Action Revision, where inferred safety states actively guide action refinement without modifying the underlying MLLM. Extensive experiments on multiple benchmarks and AD-MLLMs demonstrate that GuardAD substantially reduces accident rates (-32.07%) while slightly improving task performance (+6.85%). Moreover, closed-loop simulation evaluations, together with physical-world vehicle studies, further validate the effectiveness and potential of GuardAD.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Disentangling Fact from Sentiment: A Dynamic Conflict-Consensus Framework for Multimodal Fake News Detection

Prevalent multimodal fake news detection relies on consistency-based fusion, yet this paradigm fundamentally misinterprets critical cross-modal discrepancies as noise, leading to over-smoothing, which dilutes critical evidence of fabrication. Mainstream consistency-based fusion inherently minimizes feature discrepancies to align modalities, yet this approach fundamentally fails because it inadvertently smoothes out the subtle cross-modal contradictions that serve as the primary evidence of fabrication. To address this, we propose the Dynamic Conflict-Consensus Framework (DCCF), an inconsistency-seeking paradigm designed to amplify rather than suppress contradictions. First, DCCF decouples inputs into independent Fact and Sentiment spaces to distinguish objective mismatches from emotional dissonance. Second, we employ physics-inspired feature dynamics to iteratively polarize these representations, actively extracting maximally informative conflicts. Finally, a conflict-consensus mechanism standardizes these local discrepancies against the global context for robust deliberative judgment.Extensive experiments conducted on three real world datasets demonstrate that DCCF consistently outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, achieving an average accuracy improvement of 3.52\%.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

TrajShield: Trajectory-Level Safety Mediation for Defending Text-to-Video Models Against Jailbreak Attacks

Text-to-Video (T2V) models have demonstrated remarkable capability in generating temporally coherent videos from natural language prompts, yet they also risk producing unsafe content such as violence or explicit material. Existing prompt-level defenses are largely inherited from text-to-image safety and operate on the lexical surface of the input, making them vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that disguise harmful intent through rephrasing or adversarial prompting. Moreover, T2V generation introduces a distinctive challenge overlooked by prior work: temporally emergent risk, where a seemingly benign prompt leads to unsafe content through the generator's temporal extrapolation toward narrative coherence. We propose \method{}, a training-free, inference-time defense framework that reformulates T2V safety as a causal intervention in a temporally structured semantic space. TrajShield handles explicit unsafe prompts, jailbreak attacks, and temporally emergent risks in a unified manner by simulating the implied trajectory of a prompt, localizing the causal origin of potential risk, and applying a minimally invasive rewrite that neutralizes the risk while preserving safety-irrelevant semantics. Experiments on T2VSafetyBench across 14 safety categories and multiple T2V backends demonstrate that TrajShield achieves state-of-the-art defenseive performance while maintaining high semantic fidelity, substantially outperforming existing defenses, with an average ASR reduction of 52.44\%.

cs.CV↗

arXiv2026

AgentVisor: Defending LLM Agents Against Prompt Injection via Semantic Virtualization

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly used to automate complex workflows, but integrating untrusted external data with privileged execution exposes them to severe security risks, particularly direct and indirect prompt injection. Existing defenses face significant challenges in balancing security with utility, often encountering a trade-off where rigorous protection leads to over-defense, or where subtle indirect injections bypass detection. Drawing inspiration from operating system virtualization, we propose AgentVisor, a novel defense framework that enforces semantic privilege separation. AgentVisor treats the target agent as an untrusted guest and intercepts tool calls via a trusted semantic visor. Central to our approach is a rigorous audit protocol grounded in classic OS security primitives, designed to systematically mitigate both direct and indirect injection attacks. Furthermore, we introduce a one-shot self-correction mechanism that transforms security violations into constructive feedback, enabling agents to recover from attacks. Extensive experiments show that AgentVisor reduces the attack success rate to 0.65%, achieving this strong defense while incurring only a 1.45% average decrease in utility relative to the No Defense scenario, demonstrating superior performance compared to existing defense methods.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

SecureWebArena: A Holistic Security Evaluation Benchmark for LVLM-based Web Agents

Large vision-language model (LVLM)-based web agents are emerging as powerful tools for automating complex online tasks. However, when deployed in real-world environments, they face serious security risks, motivating the design of security evaluation benchmarks. Existing benchmarks provide only partial coverage, typically restricted to narrow scenarios such as user-level prompt manipulation, and thus fail to capture the broad range of agent vulnerabilities. To address this gap, we present \tool{}, the first holistic benchmark for evaluating the security of LVLM-based web agents. \tool{} first introduces a unified evaluation suite comprising six simulated but realistic web environments (\eg, e-commerce platforms, community forums) and includes 2,970 high-quality trajectories spanning diverse tasks and attack settings. The suite defines a structured taxonomy of six attack vectors spanning both user-level and environment-level manipulations. In addition, we introduce a multi-layered evaluation protocol that analyzes agent failures across three critical dimensions: internal reasoning, behavioral trajectory, and task outcome, facilitating a fine-grained risk analysis that goes far beyond simple success metrics. Using this benchmark, we conduct large-scale experiments on 9 representative LVLMs, which fall into three categories: general-purpose, agent-specialized, and GUI-grounded. Our results show that all tested agents are consistently vulnerable to subtle adversarial manipulations and reveal critical trade-offs between model specialization and security. By providing (1) a comprehensive benchmark suite with diverse environments and a multi-layered evaluation pipeline, and (2) empirical insights into the security challenges of modern LVLM-based web agents, \tool{} establishes a foundation for advancing trustworthy web agent deployment.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

PRISM: Programmatic Reasoning with Image Sequence Manipulation for LVLM Jailbreaking

The increasing sophistication of large vision-language models (LVLMs) has been accompanied by advances in safety alignment mechanisms designed to prevent harmful content generation. However, these defenses remain vulnerable to sophisticated adversarial attacks. Existing jailbreak methods typically rely on direct and semantically explicit prompts, overlooking subtle vulnerabilities in how LVLMs compose information over multiple reasoning steps. In this paper, we propose a novel and effective jailbreak framework inspired by Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) techniques from software security. Our approach decomposes a harmful instruction into a sequence of individually benign visual gadgets. A carefully engineered textual prompt directs the sequence of inputs, prompting the model to integrate the benign visual gadgets through its reasoning process to produce a coherent and harmful output. This makes the malicious intent emergent and difficult to detect from any single component. We validate our method through extensive experiments on established benchmarks including SafeBench and MM-SafetyBench, targeting popular LVLMs. Results show that our approach consistently and substantially outperforms existing baselines on state-of-the-art models, achieving near-perfect attack success rates (over 0.90 on SafeBench) and improving ASR by up to 0.39. Our findings reveal a critical and underexplored vulnerability that exploits the compositional reasoning abilities of LVLMs, highlighting the urgent need for defenses that secure the entire reasoning process.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Evolving Deception: When Agents Evolve, Deception Wins

Self-evolving agents offer a promising path toward scalable autonomy. However, in this work, we show that in competitive environments, self-evolution can instead give rise to a serious and previously underexplored risk: the spontaneous emergence of deception as an evolutionarily stable strategy. We conduct a systematic empirical study on the self-evolution of large language model (LLM) agents in a competitive Bidding Arena, where agents iteratively refine their strategies through interaction-driven reflection. Across different evolutionary paths (\eg, Neutral, Honesty-Guided, and Deception-Guided), we find a consistent pattern: under utility-driven competition, unconstrained self-evolution reliably drifts toward deceptive behaviors, even when honest strategies remain viable. This drift is explained by a fundamental asymmetry in generalization. Deception evolves as a transferable meta-strategy that generalizes robustly across diverse and unseen tasks, whereas honesty-based strategies are fragile and often collapse outside their original contexts. Further analysis of agents internal states reveals the emergence of rationalization mechanisms, through which agents justify or deny deceptive actions to reconcile competitive success with normative instructions. Our paper exposes a fundamental tension between agent self-evolution and alignment, highlighting the risks of deploying self-improving agents in adversarial environments.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Uncovering Security Threats and Architecting Defenses in Autonomous Agents: A Case Study of OpenClaw

The rapid evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) into autonomous, tool-calling agents has fundamentally altered the cybersecurity landscape. Frameworks like OpenClaw grant AI systems operating-system-level permissions and the autonomy to execute complex workflows. This level of access creates unprecedented security challenges. Consequently, traditional content-filtering defenses have become obsolete. This report presents a comprehensive security analysis of the OpenClaw ecosystem. We systematically investigate its current threat landscape, highlighting critical vulnerabilities such as prompt injection-driven Remote Code Execution (RCE), sequential tool attack chains, context amnesia, and supply chain contamination. To systematically contextualize these threats, we propose a novel tri-layered risk taxonomy for autonomous Agents, categorizing vulnerabilities across AI Cognitive, Software Execution, and Information System dimensions. To address these systemic architectural flaws, we introduce the Full-Lifecycle Agent Security Architecture (FASA). This theoretical defense blueprint advocates for zero-trust agentic execution, dynamic intent verification, and cross-layer reasoning-action correlation. Building on this framework, we present Project ClawGuard, our ongoing engineering initiative. This project aims to implement the FASA paradigm and transition autonomous agents from high-risk experimental utilities into trustworthy systems. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/NY1024/ClawGuard.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Reasoning-Oriented Programming: Chaining Semantic Gadgets to Jailbreak Large Vision Language Models

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) undergo safety alignment to suppress harmful content. However, current defenses predominantly target explicit malicious patterns in the input representation, often overlooking the vulnerabilities inherent in compositional reasoning. In this paper, we identify a systemic flaw where LVLMs can be induced to synthesize harmful logic from benign premises. We formalize this attack paradigm as \textit{Reasoning-Oriented Programming}, drawing a structural analogy to Return-Oriented Programming in systems security. Just as ROP circumvents memory protections by chaining benign instruction sequences, our approach exploits the model's instruction-following capability to orchestrate a semantic collision of orthogonal benign inputs. We instantiate this paradigm via \tool{}, an automated framework that optimizes for \textit{semantic orthogonality} and \textit{spatial isolation}. By generating visual gadgets that are semantically decoupled from the harmful intent and arranging them to prevent premature feature fusion, \tool{} forces the malicious logic to emerge only during the late-stage reasoning process. This effectively bypasses perception-level alignment. We evaluate \tool{} on SafeBench and MM-SafetyBench across 7 state-of-the-art 0.LVLMs, including GPT-4o and Claude 3.7 Sonnet. Our results demonstrate that \tool{} consistently circumvents safety alignment, outperforming the strongest existing baseline by an average of 4.67\% on open-source models and 9.50\% on commercial models.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Two Frames Matter: A Temporal Attack for Text-to-Video Model Jailbreaking

Recent text-to-video (T2V) models can synthesize complex videos from lightweight natural language prompts, raising urgent concerns about safety alignment in the event of misuse in the real world. Prior jailbreak attacks typically rewrite unsafe prompts into paraphrases that evade content filters while preserving meaning. Yet, these approaches often still retain explicit sensitive cues in the input text and therefore overlook a more profound, video-specific weakness. In this paper, we identify a temporal trajectory infilling vulnerability of T2V systems under fragmented prompts: when the prompt specifies only sparse boundary conditions (e.g., start and end frames) and leaves the intermediate evolution underspecified, the model may autonomously reconstruct a plausible trajectory that includes harmful intermediate frames, despite the prompt appearing benign to input or output side filtering. Building on this observation, we propose TFM. This fragmented prompting framework converts an originally unsafe request into a temporally sparse two-frame extraction and further reduces overtly sensitive cues via implicit substitution. Extensive evaluations across multiple open-source and commercial T2V models demonstrate that TFM consistently enhances jailbreak effectiveness, achieving up to a 12% increase in attack success rate on commercial systems. Our findings highlight the need for temporally aware safety mechanisms that account for model-driven completion beyond prompt surface form.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

SPARK: Jailbreaking T2V Models by Synergistically Prompting Auditory and Recontextualized Knowledge

Jailbreak attacks can circumvent model safety guardrails and reveal critical blind spots. Prior attacks on text-to-video (T2V) models typically add adversarial perturbations to obviously unsafe prompts, which are often easy to detect and defend. In contrast, we show that benign-looking prompts containing rich, implicit cues can induce T2V models to generate semantically unsafe videos that both violate policy and preserve the original (blocked) intent. To realize this, we propose SPARK, a jailbreak framework that leverages T2V models cross-modal associative patterns via a modular prompt design. Specifically, our prompts combine three components: neutral scene anchors, which provide the surface-level scene description extracted from the blocked intent to maintain plausibility; latent auditory triggers, textual descriptions of innocuous-sounding audio events (e.g., creaking, muffled noises) that exploit learned audio-visual co-occurrence priors to bias the model toward particular unsafe visual concepts; and stylistic modulators, cinematic directives (e.g., camera framing, atmosphere) that amplify and stabilize the latent trigger's effect. We formalize attack generation as a constrained optimization over the above modular prompt space and solve it with a guided search procedure that balances stealth and effectiveness. Extensive experiments over 7 T2V models demonstrate the efficacy of our attack, achieving a +23% improvement in average attack success rate in commercial models.

cs.CV↗

arXiv2026

Mask-GCG: Are All Tokens in Adversarial Suffixes Necessary for Jailbreak Attacks?

Jailbreak attacks on Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated various successful methods whereby attackers manipulate models into generating harmful responses that they are designed to avoid. Among these, Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) has emerged as a general and effective approach that optimizes the tokens in a suffix to generate jailbreakable prompts. While several improved variants of GCG have been proposed, they all rely on fixed-length suffixes. However, the potential redundancy within these suffixes remains unexplored. In this work, we propose Mask-GCG, a plug-and-play method that employs learnable token masking to identify impactful tokens within the suffix. Our approach increases the update probability for tokens at high-impact positions while pruning those at low-impact positions. This pruning not only reduces redundancy but also decreases the size of the gradient space, thereby lowering computational overhead and shortening the time required to achieve successful attacks compared to GCG. We evaluate Mask-GCG by applying it to the original GCG and several improved variants. Experimental results show that most tokens in the suffix contribute significantly to attack success, and pruning a minority of low-impact tokens does not affect the loss values or compromise the attack success rate (ASR), thereby revealing token redundancy in LLM prompts. Our findings provide insights for developing efficient and interpretable LLMs from the perspective of jailbreak attacks.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

DIVER: Dynamic Iterative Visual Evidence Reasoning for Multimodal Fake News Detection

Multimodal fake news detection is crucial for mitigating adversarial misinformation. Existing methods, relying on static fusion or LLMs, face computational redundancy and hallucination risks due to weak visual foundations. To address this, we propose DIVER (Dynamic Iterative Visual Evidence Reasoning), a framework grounded in a progressive, evidence-driven reasoning paradigm. DIVER first establishes a strong text-based baseline through language analysis, leveraging intra-modal consistency to filter unreliable or hallucinated claims. Only when textual evidence is insufficient does the framework introduce visual information, where inter-modal alignment verification adaptively determines whether deeper visual inspection is necessary. For samples exhibiting significant cross-modal semantic discrepancies, DIVER selectively invokes fine-grained visual tools (e.g., OCR and dense captioning) to extract task-relevant evidence, which is iteratively aggregated via uncertainty-aware fusion to refine multimodal reasoning. Experiments on Weibo, Weibo21, and GossipCop demonstrate that DIVER outperforms state-of-the-art baselines by an average of 2.72\%, while optimizing inference efficiency with a reduced latency of 4.12 s.

cs.CV↗

arXiv2025

RoboSafe: Safeguarding Embodied Agents via Executable Safety Logic

Embodied agents powered by vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly capable of executing complex real-world tasks, yet they remain vulnerable to hazardous instructions that may trigger unsafe behaviors. Runtime safety guardrails, which intercept hazardous actions during task execution, offer a promising solution due to their flexibility. However, existing defenses often rely on static rule filters or prompt-level control, which struggle to address implicit risks arising in dynamic, temporally dependent, and context-rich environments. To address this, we propose RoboSafe, a hybrid reasoning runtime safeguard for embodied agents through executable predicate-based safety logic. RoboSafe integrates two complementary reasoning processes on a Hybrid Long-Short Safety Memory. We first propose a Backward Reflective Reasoning module that continuously revisits recent trajectories in short-term memory to infer temporal safety predicates and proactively triggers replanning when violations are detected. We then propose a Forward Predictive Reasoning module that anticipates upcoming risks by generating context-aware safety predicates from the long-term safety memory and the agent's multimodal observations. Together, these components form an adaptive, verifiable safety logic that is both interpretable and executable as code. Extensive experiments across multiple agents demonstrate that RoboSafe substantially reduces hazardous actions (-36.8% risk occurrence) compared with leading baselines, while maintaining near-original task performance. Real-world evaluations on physical robotic arms further confirm its practicality. Code will be released upon acceptance.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Uncovering Strategic Egoism Behaviors in Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) face growing trustworthiness concerns (\eg, deception), which hinder their safe deployment in high-stakes decision-making scenarios. In this paper, we present the first systematic investigation of strategic egoism (SE), a form of rule-bounded self-interest in which models pursue short-term or self-serving gains while disregarding collective welfare and ethical considerations. To quantitatively assess this phenomenon, we introduce SEBench, a benchmark comprising 160 scenarios across five domains. Each scenario features a single-role decision-making context, with psychologically grounded choice sets designed to elicit self-serving behaviors. These behavior-driven tasks assess egoistic tendencies along six dimensions, such as manipulation, rule circumvention, and self-interest prioritization. Building on this, we conduct extensive experiments across 5 open-sourced and 2 commercial LLMs, where we observe that strategic egoism emerges universally across models. Surprisingly, we found a positive correlation between egoistic tendencies and toxic language behaviors, suggesting that strategic egoism may underlie broader misalignment risks.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

AGENTSAFE: Benchmarking the Safety of Embodied Agents on Hazardous Instructions

The integration of vision-language models (VLMs) is driving a new generation of embodied agents capable of operating in human-centered environments. However, as deployment expands, these systems face growing safety risks, particularly when executing hazardous instructions. Current safety evaluation benchmarks remain limited: they cover only narrow scopes of hazards and focus primarily on final outcomes, neglecting the agent's full perception-planning-execution process and thereby obscuring critical failure modes. Therefore, we present SAFE, a benchmark for systematically assessing the safety of embodied VLM agents on hazardous instructions. SAFE comprises three components: SAFE-THOR, an extensible adversarial simulation sandbox with a universal adapter that maps high-level VLM outputs to low-level embodied controls, supporting diverse agent workflow integration; SAFE-VERSE, a risk-aware task suite inspired by Asimov's Three Laws of Robotics, comprising 45 adversarial scenarios, 1,350 hazardous tasks, and 9,900 instructions that span risks to humans, environments, and agents; and SAFE-DIAGNOSE, a multi-level and fine-grained evaluation protocol measuring agent performance across perception, planning, and execution. Applying SAFE to nine state-of-the-art VLMs and two embodied agent workflows, we uncover systematic failures in translating hazard recognition into safe planning and execution. Our findings reveal fundamental limitations in current safety alignment and demonstrate the necessity of a comprehensive, multi-stage evaluation for developing safer embodied intelligence.

cs.CR↗