arXiv subjects

Zvika Neeman

Publications and source records attributed to Zvika Neeman.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Adversarial Selection

In many institutional settings, $k$ items are selected with the goal of representing the underlying distribution of claims, opinions, or characteristics in a large population. We study environments with two adversarial parties whose preferences over the selected items are commonly known and opposed. We propose the Quantile Mechanism: one party partitions the population into $k$ disjoint subsets, and the other selects one item from each subset. We show that this procedure is optimally representative among all feasible mechanisms, and illustrate its use in jury selection, multi-district litigation, and committee formation.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2025

A Note on the Definition of Strategies in Opportunity Hunting Games

In this note, we propose an alternative definition of strategies and histories in opportunity hunting games, as introduced in Eilat, Neeman and Solan (2025). The advantage of the formulation presented here is that it encompasses a broader class of strategies than the inertial strategies analyzed in Eilat, Neeman and Solan (2025), including those that allow for a countably infinite number of inspections within finite time intervals. Although the definitions of histories and strategies in this broader setting are more subtle, we show that the main results continue to hold. This demonstrates that the findings in Eilat, Neeman and Solan (2025) are robust to environments in which players have access to a richer strategy space.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2023

Why Not Borrow, Invest, and Escape Poverty?

Take up of microcredit by the poor for investment in businesses or human capital turned out to be very low. We show that this could be explained by risk aversion, without relying on fixed costs or other forms of non-convexity in the technology, if the investment is aimed at increasing the probability of success. Under this framework, rational risk-averse agents choose corner solutions, unlike in the case of a risky investment with an exogenous probability of success. Our online experiment confirms our theoretical predictions about how agents' choices differ when facing the two types of investments.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2022

Markovian Persuasion with Two States

This paper addresses the question of how to best communicate information over time in order to influence an agent's belief and induced actions in a model with a binary state of the world that evolves according to a Markov process, and with a finite number of actions. We characterize the sender's optimal message strategy in the limit, as the length of each period decreases to zero. The optimal strategy is not myopic. Depending on the agent's beliefs, sometimes no information is revealed, and sometimes the agent's belief is split into two well-chosen posterior beliefs.

econ.TH↗