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cs.CR: explore 594 source-linked works published from 2022 to 2026, with original documents and citations.

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Includes records with this source-supplied label or an explicit phrase match in their metadata. Matches indicate a mention, not proof that a paper uses a method or tests a material. Source versions are consolidated by DOI.

Sources: arxiv. Collection updated 2026-09-16. Counts describe this index, not the complete source archives.

Bounds on the Posterior-to-Prior Ratios for Inclusion Belief under Bounded Differential Privacy

Differential privacy has become the standard for generating privacy-protected data releases. However, differential privacy does not translate intuitively to disclosure risk. In particular, it remains unclear how much an adversary's belief about an individual's inclusion in a dataset can change after observing a protected release. To address this question, we derive upper and lower bounds on the posterior-to-prior ratios of inclusion beliefs under bounded probabilistic and approximate differential privacy. By assuming a worst-case adversary with all-but-one auxiliary information, i.e., knowledge of all except for one of the participants in a dataset, we obtain bounds that apply to any adversary. Because these bounds may fail with non-zero probability, we study the corresponding failure probability for the Gaussian mechanism. We derive a theoretical upper limit on this probability and compare it with Monte Carlo estimates across a wide range of parameter settings. The observed failure rate is several orders of magnitude smaller than its theoretical upper limit, indicating that the latter is highly conservative. These findings suggest that the inferential privacy guarantees provided by differentially private mechanisms may be substantially stronger in practice than what is implied by the theoretical upper limit.

math.ST↗

Authority-Inference Separation in Agentic Finance: First-Line Control, Blockchain Enforcement, and Replayable Assurance

AI agents can select tools, counterparties, and transaction parameters, yet inference should not itself confer authority to execute a financial action. This study develops and evaluates Authority-Inference Separation (AIS), an intent-centered architecture for bounded agentic finance. AIS treats a financial action intent as the control object: a machine-generated proposal can receive temporary executable authority only after an independent deterministic control plane validates registered agent identity, accountable ownership, mandate and risk-appetite lineage, policy version, state, approvals, and exact economic semantics. Blockchain can then enforce the operational representation of granted authority and record portable settlement evidence, while institutional legitimacy, service delivery, accounting classification, and human accountability remain off-chain obligations. Evaluation combines four-domain instantiation, official BIS and MAS cases, a 48-fixture executable prototype, and a public-ledger observability test. Across 36 synthetic authorization attacks, a direct-agent baseline accepted 36 attack effects, a prompt-policy baseline accepted 20, and AIS accepted none; all three accepted 8/8 admissible fixtures. AIS also rejected 4/4 token replays and 8/8 recipient or rail substitutions, withheld completion in 4/4 service-delivery failures, and populated all 13 defined evidence fields. A test of 1,700 recent Base transactions associated with public x402 facilitator addresses shows that public ledgers can evidence settlement and selected authorization parameters but cannot establish institutional mandate, legal accountability, service delivery, or accounting treatment. AIS and blockchain are therefore complementary: AIS decides whether a specific intent may act, while blockchain can make granted authority bounded, executable, and independently observable.

q-fin.GN↗

Towards Operator-Empowered Vulnerability Hotfixing for 5G Radio Access Networks

Cellular protocol vulnerabilities can remain exploitable for months or years while standards bodies, vendors, and mobile network operators (MNOs) coordinate permanent fixes. We present Buckler, a framework that enables an MNO to deploy temporary, local, and reversible hotfixes in its radio access network (RAN) during this exposure window. Buckler places reusable hooks at standardized L2/L3 channel boundaries and exposes a closed, stateful match-action interface with three preventive actions: DROP, MODIFY, and RELEASE. We evaluate whether this bounded design provides useful coverage without requiring extensive changes to existing RANs. From 23 papers, we identify 64 attacks rooted in standard L2/L3 protocol behavior, of which 43 provide a preventive intervention point at the RAN, and we construct Buckler hotfixes for 20 of them. All 20 hotfixes use the same rule vocabulary and only five standardized channel hooks, while the unsupported attacks expose endpoint dependencies that a RAN cannot satisfy alone. We implement the five hooks on srsRAN and OpenAirInterface with small, structurally similar changes, and demonstrate all three actions against representative availability and privacy attacks. These results establish operator-empowered hotfixing as a practical and portable interim defense and delineate the architectural limits of RAN-only prevention.

cs.CR↗

Lie to Me: Finding Bugs in ZK DSL Toolchains with Adversarial Witness Injection

Zero-knowledge domain-specific language (ZK DSL) toolchains compile programs into constraint systems and generate witnesses for cryptographic proofs. Bugs in these toolchains can leave the enforced constraints weaker than the source-program semantics, admitting proofs for invalid executions. Such soundness bugs may remain invisible to valid-execution testing because all valid executions still behave correctly. We present Liezz, a testing framework that generates ZK DSL programs and exposes these bugs through adversarial witness injection. For each generated deterministic program, Liezz executes two public input assignments with different outputs and splices their witnesses, combining the input of one execution with the output of the other. The resulting witness is invalid by construction. A correct toolchain must reject it; acceptance exposes a soundness bug. Controlled divergence and multiple witness-splicing strategies preserve enough consistency to expose missing constraints. Liezz also generates parameterized standard-library calls to reach complex functionality. Liezz supports Circom, Corset, Gnark, and Noir. It finds 13 bugs, including seven with soundness impact. Several are reachable only through generated standard-library calls. Under the same testing budget, a valid-execution baseline does not expose any of the soundness failures revealed by accepted injected witnesses, showing that adversarial witness injection reaches failures missed by valid-execution testing.

cs.CR↗

Beyond the Payload: How User Invocation Shapes Coding Agent Vulnerability to Repository Poisoning

Coding agents are increasingly used for software engineering tasks, including bootstrapping projects from third-party repositories whose integrity cannot be assumed. Prior work on repository poisoning largely focuses on attacker-controlled injection and disguise, but developers also shape risk through everyday invocation choices: what task to delegate, how to phrase the request, and which skills or rules to supply. We term these user-side choices Prompt-Level Configurations (PLCs) and introduce CIPR (Coding In Poisoned Repos), the first benchmark that systematically varies PLCs in poisoned real-world repositories. CIPR comprises 1,920 instances across 20 repositories, four task types, three social-media-grounded prompt styles, and three skill/rule conditions, and measures attack success rate (ASR) and agent alert rate (AR) using automated runtime and trace-based oracles. Our evaluation reveals two key insights: (1) Vulnerability is highly context-dependent, with task type creating up to a 4.5-fold difference in ASR, with test-execution task forming a silent attack surface (high ASR, low AR). (2) Prompt expression shifts risk indirectly: underspecified prompts reduce ASR by truncating execution depth; noisy prompts exhibit a directional trend toward suppressing alerts by making malicious content less conspicuous. These findings highlight that coding agent vulnerability is not a static property, but a dynamic outcome shaped by everyday user configurations.

cs.CR↗

SingProbe Technical Report

We present SingProbe, an open intrinsic guardrail framework for generation-time monitoring of LLMs. Intrinsic guardrails reuse hidden states already produced by the base model during autoregressive decoding, rather than relying on an independent model to repeatedly process generated text. While this route has been explored in industrial systems, the community lacks a broadly reusable open stack that combines cross-model guard adaptations, unified training methods, serving integrations, and systematic evaluation resources. SingProbe is designed to provide this missing layer and uses a lightweight probe to continuously produce query-intent, response-safety, and hallucination-risk signals during decoding. This report describes the full intrinsic-guardrail stack: training methods, serving integrations with SGLang and vLLM, and adapted guard models for 29 open-source base models across diverse families and scales. We also introduce SingStreamBench, a benchmark that measures whether streaming guardrails remain inactive on benign prefixes while promptly detecting emerging unsafe content. Across evaluations of safety, streaming detection, hallucination detection, false-positive robustness, online monitoring, and runtime overhead, SingProbe provides performance competitive with, and in several settings stronger than, state-of-the-art standalone guardrails and specialized hallucination detectors, while adding less than 0.5% serving overhead in our implementation. Beyond passive monitoring, we show that intrinsic guard signals can guide constrained decoding and selectively activate medical-risk interventions in SingProbe-Med. By open-sourcing our infrastructure, training methods, and model adaptations, we aim to facilitate the broader adoption and deployment of intrinsic guardrails, as well as further research in this direction.

cs.CR↗

The Fragility of Jailbreak Robustness Across Operational States

Existing jailbreak evaluations typically characterize robustness using a single attack success rate (ASR) measured in a default configuration (the vanilla state). However, user-LLM interactions can induce diverse operational states beyond the vanilla state. In this work, we find that jailbreak robustness is highly fragile to operational-state variation: even when the attack remains fixed, changing only an ordinary system prompt not designed to affect safety can dramatically alter attack success rates. We systematically investigate this phenomenon across seven aligned models and three representative jailbreak attacks, observing substantial differences in ASR between vanilla and non-vanilla operational states. In one case, ASR increases by up to 56 percentage points (2% to 58%) solely due to a change in operational state. Remarkably, these increases occur even for attacks originally designed and optimized under vanilla-state evaluation. We further show that state-dependent robustness variation is systematically associated with differences in hidden representations along a refusal-related axis, and that projections onto this axis strongly predict jailbreak outcomes. Our results show that a single vanilla-state evaluation may not fully characterize jailbreak robustness, motivating evaluations that also examine how robustness changes across non-vanilla operational states.

cs.CR↗

DP-VOXLET: Provable Speaker Anonymization for Disentangled Speech Representations

Systems for speaker anonymization obfuscate the speaker of an utterance, while maintaining its original semantic contents and prosody. Recent solutions for speaker anonymization rely on learned representations that disentangle an utterance into semantic contents and speaker properties. To anonymize an utterance, these systems replace the speaker properties while leaving the semantic contents unchanged---an approach that can produce strong results on empirical measures of privacy. In this work, we introduce speaker differential privacy, a formal definition of speaker anonymization based on the framework of differential privacy, and a mechanism for speaker anonymization that provably satisfies the definition. In contrast to prior heuristic-based anonymization systems, our approach enables a provable lower bound on re-identification success rate (e.g. equal error rate) for any possible adversary. We implement our approach in a framework that is compatible with existing disentangled representations. Compared to the prior work on differential privacy for speaker anonymization, our approach achieves significantly higher utility.

cs.CR↗

The Exclusion Ratchet: False-Positive Suppression Accumulates and Persists in Detection Rule Repositories

When a rule produces too many false alarms an analyst adds an exclusion, and the rule thereafter declines to alert in that circumstance. Each such decision is locally reasonable; what becomes of them collectively is not known. Recent longitudinal work established that curation does not converge, but measured restoration time only for revisions that were later reverted -- a measure silent about narrowing that is never undone. We measure that. Across nine years and 8,234 revisions of the SigmaHQ corpus we detect suppression semantically -- growth in the set of predicates held under negation without compensating growth in coverage -- and validate it against blinded hand labelling (precision 0.828, recall 0.911). The test is deterministic: nothing is learned from the data, and the definitions are released as code. Exclusions were added 1,642 times and withdrawn 304, a ratio of 5.4 to 1 that rises to 13 to 1 at the level of the individual rule. Thirty-one per cent of the narrowing is invisible to structural comparison, which existing structural accounts therefore undercount. Estimated by Kaplan-Meier, 86.7 per cent of exclusions remain in force three years on, and persistence is independent of whether the rule is the only coverage for its ATT&CK technique (p = 0.49). Of path-valued exclusions, 64.1 per cent can be satisfied by an unprivileged process that chooses a filename. Narrowing accumulates, is rarely revisited, and is not triaged by consequence. We give a criterion for deciding which exclusions to examine first.

cs.CR↗

Unconditional Certified Randomness without Structure

We obtain a certified randomness protocol in the quantum random oracle model. The protocol is non-interactive and publicly verifiable with a classical verifier, and is based on Yamakawa and Zhandry's proof of quantumness [JACM'24]. We prove unconditional security of this protocol against adversaries making subexponentially-many adaptive quantum queries to the random oracle. Prior work on certified randomness relative to a random oracle additionally assumed the Aaronson--Ambainis conjecture or proved security only against low query-depth adversaries.

quant-ph↗

Auditing Anonymous AI Models: A Four-Stage Protocol for Black-Box Identity Verification

The 2025--2026 AI market has seen a wave of stealth releases: frontier models launched anonymously on developer platforms under codenames. For their users, identity determines data-handling terms, supply-chain risk, and capability expectations. No validated methodology exists for black-box identity verification of anonymous models: practitioner checklists lack accuracy evidence, and self-identification is untrustworthy by design. We propose a four-stage forensic audit protocol for API-served models. Stage 0 reconstructs launch-time configuration from archived platform snapshots (Internet Archive), exposing preview--production drift. Stage 1 fingerprints configuration (context, output ceiling, reasoning, modality) against the platform catalog. Stage 2 tests tokenizer identity with a cross-length differential that rejects short-prompt collisions. Stage 3 corroborates with behavioral probes. We test declaration consistency on 10 known-identity releases (7 exact, 2 precision-differences, 1 partial, 0 counter-directional), not end-to-end identification under anonymity. Identification is validated prospectively on a flagship case whose 2026-08-23 analysis pointed to the GLM-5.3 version line and whose official reveal confirmed those family and version-line inferences (deployment variant was not pre-asserted; Flash was consistent post-reveal), and on three Stage-0-only cases where the protocol produced a graded hypothesis or declined rather than guessed. A standard-library-only implementation is provided as supplementary material.

cs.SE↗

Local Private Information Retrieval for Graph-Based Replicated Systems

We rethink the definition of privacy in multi-server, graph-replicated private information retrieval (PIR) systems, by introducing a novel setting where the user's privacy is governed by the servers' storage structure. In classical graph-replicated PIR, the user retrieves a single message stored at the servers, while hiding the message index from each server. In our proposed privacy setting, the user is concerned with hiding the message index from a particular server, only if that server stores the message being retrieved, and privacy is not imposed otherwise. We coin this relaxed privacy requirement as local user privacy and the resulting PIR problem as local PIR on the graph. Our focus is on two-replicated PIR systems, where every message is replicated twice and stored on two distinct servers. Specifically, we study local PIR systems where the storage is represented by simple graphs, i.e., every pair of vertices is associated with at most one edge, and by their multigraph extension, i.e., $r$ parallel edges replace every edge. For these settings, we establish bounds on the local PIR capacity, defined as the maximum number of message symbols retrieved, per downloaded symbol. The local privacy requirement yields significant capacity gain over the classical PIR capacity under the same storage structure. For instance, in settings where the graph is a disjoint union of multiple identical sub-graphs, the gain in the local PIR capacity over classical PIR capacity is multiplicative in the number of sub-graphs. Further, for connected graphs, we derive capacity lower bounds for edge-transitive and bipartite graphs, which are greater than the best-known PIR capacity bounds. From these and by establishing matching upper bounds, we exactly characterize the capacity for star graphs, cyclic graphs, and path graphs with odd number of vertices. We introduce two local PIR schemes for general graphs.

cs.IT↗

Explainable Artificial Intelligence for Industrial Cybersecurity: A Review of Methods, Operational Integration, and Research Challenges

The increasing digitalization of industrial infrastructure and the convergence of information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) have expanded the cyberattack surface of industrial systems. To address the growing complexity of cyber threats, artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) techniques are increasingly deployed within industrial cybersecurity operations, particularly in Security Operations Centers (SOCs). While these approaches improve anomaly detection, threat analysis, and automated response, their opaque decision-making presents challenges for operational trust, regulatory compliance, and incident response. EXplainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) has emerged as a promising paradigm to improve the transparency and interpretability of AI-driven cybersecurity systems and decisions. This paper provides a comprehensive review of XAI techniques in industrial cybersecurity, focusing on industrial SOC environments and operational security workflows. We examine the role of AI in industrial SOC workflows, the types of operational data leveraged in industrial environments, and the benefits and limitations of AI-based threat detection. We then review major families of XAI approaches, including feature attribution methods, surrogate models, rule-based explanations, and visualization techniques, and analyze their applicability to industrial use cases. We further discuss the operational, regulatory, and safety requirements that distinguish industrial systems from traditional IT environments. Key challenges are examined, including limited labeled datasets, model reliability, explainability-performance tradeoffs, and the integration of XAI tools into SOC workflows. Finally, we identify open research directions and opportunities for developing trustworthy, operationally viable, and domain-specific XAI-enabled cybersecurity solutions for industrial environments.

cs.CR↗

DUPIN: Attack Learning Is Still Needed! Demonstrating Few-Shot after Unsupervised Pretraining Is A Nimble Forensics Learner

We propose a novel approach to learning-based attack forensics called DUPIN. DUPIN performs unsupervised pre-training on an enormous amount of audit events in the form of provenance graphs. It then proceeds to a few-shot learning stage, leveraging a small number of labeled attack examples to fine-tune its detection capabilities. We pretrain DUPIN on up to 38 - 52 days of audit logs (7.3TB total) and evaluate it against various baselines on 25 APT campaigns across four different data sources, facilitating the scalable evaluation.

cs.CR↗

Delegation Without Trust: An Empirical Gap Analysis of Identity, Authorization, and Runtime Governance in Multi-Agent LLM Systems

Autonomous LLM agents increasingly act on a user's behalf: they hold credentials, call tools and services, and spawn sub-agents that act further on their behalf. This turns a long-standing distributed-systems question -- who is authorized to do what, on whose authority -- into an urgent and largely unsolved problem, because the component driving each agent is a language model an adversary can hijack. We argue that agent security must be evaluated under an untrusted-model assumption: a correct system is one in which a fully prompt-injected agent still cannot exceed the authority explicitly delegated to it. Against this standard we make three contributions. First, we give a threat model for multi-agent delegation centered on four adversaries -- confused deputy, token theft and replay, prompt-injection privilege escalation, and compromised sub-agents -- and derive eight security requirements a governed agent system must meet. Second, we show the gap is real: a default agent runtime modeling common practice (broad bearer credentials, authorization gated inside the model) fails all four threats, and across four widely used frameworks -- LangGraph, CrewAI, AutoGen, and the Model Context Protocol (MCP) authorization model -- three provide no built-in confinement and one only partial; no existing standard alone covers the requirement set. Third, we implement and adversarially evaluate an authorization broker that closes the gap. It blocks all four threats; it resists 11 direct attacks on its design and accepts 0 of 200,000 forged tokens; it confines a compromised sub-agent to its delegated task (a mean of 1.5 reachable actions versus all 8,100 under bearer delegation, across 2,000 randomized scenarios); and it enforces at microsecond cost (about 2.6 microseconds per decision), negligible against model inference. These principles are also realized in production in VotalAI's LLM Shield.

cs.CR↗

Workload Identification with Physical Side Channels for AI Governance

AI compute verification is one of the first tangible and tractable points for international policy aimed at AI governance. Determining whether frontier labs, or any operator, comply with agreements requires the regulating authority to discern how their compute is used. The elementary building block of AI compute is the GPU, and any activity it executes leaves a physical trace. Here, we show that an external observer can identify the class of the workload running on an NVIDIA H200 from its power draw. Unlike on-chip NVML telemetry, which can be spoofed or replayed, such a physical channel can in principle be observed independently of operator cooperation. We recorded $930$ five-second traces at $\sim 10$ MHz, covering seventeen open LLM families and twenty-five non-AI workloads. Over this corpus we separate training from inference and from non-AI computation with an accuracy of $97\%$ and a macro-averaged F1 score of $0.955$, evaluated on model families unseen during training. AI workload spectral content predominantly lies below $\sim 20$kHz and training is particularly recognizable through the memory-bound optimizer update. The GPU operator is then treated as adversarial and able to reshape the physical computation itself. Four evasion strategies are tested to disguise training as inference, producing an additional 680 adversarial traces. A detector hardened against evasion strategies, with the tested strategy held out, catches training $\geq 99\%$ of the time for three of the four strategies. The fourth, diluted low-rank adaptation (LoRA), is detected $48$--$88\%$ of the time with a hardened classifier, rising to $\geq 98\%$ with an additional rescue rule. While these attacks are not a comprehensive evaluation against adversarial behaviour, they offer initial insights beyond genuine activities and a dataset for developing and testing stronger evasion mechanisms.

cs.CR↗

OreProof: Verifiable Provenance with Limited Disclosure for Critical-Minerals Supply Chains Using Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Critical-minerals supply chains face a structural tension: regulators and buyers demand verifiable provenance, yet upstream actors are hesitant to disclose supplier identities, assay grades/yields, and prices that verification appears to require. We report a design science account of OreProof, a prototypical traceability platform addressing this verifiability-disclosure trade-off. Instantiated for gold, OreProof combines a hybrid on-chain/off-chain data model, Groth16 zero-knowledge proofs for selective disclosure, a Merkle-batched anchoring pipeline, and UNTP-aligned verifiable credentials on a public zkEVM testnet. Against a transparent baseline, directly inferable confidential attributes fell from three of four categories to none under a defined attacker model, while batched anchoring substantially improved throughput. Our contributions are the artifact prototype as well as four nascent design principles: prove over committed data rather than exposing it; credential only verifiable origin and flag unknown inputs for blended commodities; emit standards-aligned credentials from the outset; and partition disclosure by supply-chain role.

cs.CR↗

NeuroPriv: Adversarial Representation Learning for Privacy in Wearable EEG Systems

Wearable EEG systems may expose sensitive information beyond their intended health function, creating substantial risks to neuroprivacy. In this work, we show that commonly used EEG features can reveal participant identity and demographic attributes in addition to supporting the intended cognitive task. Wearable EEG is increasingly being explored for cognitive monitoring, neurological assessment, and longitudinal digital-health applications, yet many systems assume that transmitting compact spectral or spatial features instead of raw EEG provides sufficient privacy protection. Using EEGMAT as a motivating case study, we find that compact EEG features achieve a balanced accuracy of 0.788 for cognitive-state classification while enabling gender, age, and subject-identity inference with balanced accuracies of 0.858, 0.789, and 0.692, respectively. We further show that privacy-aware representation learning preserves task performance at 0.781 while reducing these inference accuracies to 0.563, 0.467, and 0.206. These findings motivate purpose-limited representations and explicit privacy auditing in wearable neurohealth systems.

cs.CR↗
Compare source metadata on this page
WorkPublishedSource identifierSource
Bounds on the Posterior-to-Prior Ratios for Inclusion Belief under Bounded Differential Privacy2026-08-312608.30473arxiv
Authority-Inference Separation in Agentic Finance: First-Line Control, Blockchain Enforcement, and Replayable Assurance2026-08-312608.30519arxiv
Towards Operator-Empowered Vulnerability Hotfixing for 5G Radio Access Networks2026-08-312608.30615arxiv
Lie to Me: Finding Bugs in ZK DSL Toolchains with Adversarial Witness Injection2026-08-312608.30648arxiv
Beyond the Payload: How User Invocation Shapes Coding Agent Vulnerability to Repository Poisoning2026-08-312608.30686arxiv
SingProbe Technical Report2026-09-212608.30703arxiv
The Fragility of Jailbreak Robustness Across Operational States2026-08-312608.30748arxiv
DP-VOXLET: Provable Speaker Anonymization for Disentangled Speech Representations2026-08-312608.30969arxiv
The Exclusion Ratchet: False-Positive Suppression Accumulates and Persists in Detection Rule Repositories2026-08-312608.31062arxiv
Unconditional Certified Randomness without Structure2026-08-312608.31112arxiv
Auditing Anonymous AI Models: A Four-Stage Protocol for Black-Box Identity Verification2026-08-312608.31142arxiv
Local Private Information Retrieval for Graph-Based Replicated Systems2026-08-312608.31150arxiv
Explainable Artificial Intelligence for Industrial Cybersecurity: A Review of Methods, Operational Integration, and Research Challenges2026-08-312609.00171arxiv
DUPIN: Attack Learning Is Still Needed! Demonstrating Few-Shot after Unsupervised Pretraining Is A Nimble Forensics Learner2026-08-312609.00259arxiv
Delegation Without Trust: An Empirical Gap Analysis of Identity, Authorization, and Runtime Governance in Multi-Agent LLM Systems2026-08-312609.00267arxiv
Workload Identification with Physical Side Channels for AI Governance2026-08-312609.00309arxiv
OreProof: Verifiable Provenance with Limited Disclosure for Critical-Minerals Supply Chains Using Zero-Knowledge Proofs2026-08-312609.00340arxiv
NeuroPriv: Adversarial Representation Learning for Privacy in Wearable EEG Systems2026-08-312609.00390arxiv

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