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arXiv2026

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Connecting Impassable Regions

We study strategyproof mechanisms for building a pathway between two regions of a line segment separated by an obstacle. Each of the $n$ agents has a private location within its region and may use either its original route to a facility or the new pathway, whose traversal cost is a fraction $k\in[0,1)$ of its length. We seek strategyproof (SP) and group-strategyproof (GSP) mechanisms that approximately minimize maximum cost or social cost. After characterizing optimal pathways for both objectives, we establish a tight deterministic maximum-cost approximation ratio of $\frac{2}{1+k}$ and a deterministic social-cost upper bound of $\frac{n}{1+k(n-1)}$, together with complementary lower bounds. Both upper bounds are achieved by GSP mechanisms. We then study randomized mechanisms under strategyproofness in expectation. A power-proportional mechanism achieves a social-cost approximation ratio at most $5$, independent of $n$ and $k$, with a tight guarantee of $3$ for this mechanism when $k=0$. We prove randomized lower bounds of $\frac{3+2k}{2+3k}$ for maximum cost and $\max\big\{1,\frac{285}{263+385k}\big\}$ for social cost, the latter for $n\ge7$. Finally, we improve several bounds for the real-line pathway model of [Chan and Wang, AAMAS 2023]. Our deterministic maximum-cost lower bound of $2$ matches the upper bound obtainable from [Qin, Fang, and Liu, COCOA 2024]. We strengthen the deterministic social-cost lower bound from $\frac32$ to $2$ under SP and to $\max\{2,n-1\}$ under GSP. For randomized social cost, we sharpen the guarantee of Chan and Wang's proportional mechanism from $6$ to $3$ and raise their lower bound from $1.02$ to $\frac{285}{263}\approx1.08365$ for $n\ge7$.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Entropic Risk-Sensitive Evolutionary Learning and Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games

We study risk-sensitive evolutionary learning dynamics and their long-run equilibrium selection behaviors in coordination games. Agents' risk attitudes enter through the classical entropic risk measure, which evaluates opponent-induced payoff uncertainty and feeds into noisy best responses under two standard revision protocols: best response with mutations and logit choice. We first analyze $2\times 2$ coordination games in both single-population symmetric and two-population asymmetric settings. In the single-population setting, unlike the risk-neutral case where the dynamics are known to favor the risk-dominant equilibrium, we show that risk sensitivity can change the stochastically stable outcome: a greater risk-seeking attitude favors the payoff-dominant equilibrium, while a greater risk-averse attitude favors the maximin equilibrium. Thus, the population's risk attitude may act as a control knob for long-run equilibrium selection. In both population settings, we also identify a robust regime: any super-dominant equilibrium is stochastically stable for all risk attitudes, under both protocols, and across populations. We further extend the single-population analysis to symmetric $k$-action games, which include symmetric $k$-action coordination games as a special case, under risk-sensitive best response with mutations. In this setting, we show that, for sufficiently large populations, sufficiently risk-seeking agents uniquely select the strongly payoff-dominant equilibrium when it exists, whereas sufficiently risk-averse agents uniquely select the strongly maximin equilibrium when it exists. These results show that entropic risk sensitivity may serve as a systematic mechanism for steering equilibrium selection in evolutionary games, beyond the classical risk-neutral benchmark.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2026

Comparison-Based Fair Division of Indivisible Chores

We investigate the query complexity of fairly allocating $m$ indivisible chores among $n$ agents with additive cost functions. We depart from the standard cardinal model and assume only comparison access: an algorithm may ask an agent which of two bundles is less costly, but never observes numerical costs. Our first results concern proportionality up to one item (PROP1). We design comparison-based algorithms that compute PROP1 allocations using $O(n^3\log m)$ comparison queries. When the chores are arranged in a fixed order and allocations are required to be contiguous, we compute a contiguous PROP1 allocation using $O(n^3 \log^2 m)$ comparison queries. Our main result concerns the maximin share (MMS) guarantee. We show that for any fixed number of agents $n$ and constant $\varepsilon>0$, a $\left(13/11 +\varepsilon\right)$-MMS allocation can be computed with a comparison complexity logarithmic in $m$. Remarkably, comparison access suffices to match the state-of-the-art $13/11$ cardinal-access guarantee of Huang and Segal-Halevi up to an arbitrarily small loss. Furthermore, our result implies that the MMS distortion of comparison access (i.e., the worst-case multiplicative loss in MMS fairness incurred by observing only comparisons rather than numerical costs) is at most $13/11$. Finally, we show that, for three agents, an allocation satisfying envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) can be computed using $O(\log m)$ comparison queries.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting with Candidate Qualities

We initiate the study of a new model of approval-based multiwinner voting in which each candidate carries an exogenous quality score, capturing, for instance, the reliability of the candidate or their relevance to the context of the selection. Quality scores break with the standard assumption of approval-based multiwinner voting that candidates are fully defined by the set of their supporters. We rethink what proportional representation means in the presence of quality scores. For this, we introduce a threshold-based and a value-based family of axioms, analyze their relationships, satisfiability, and computational complexity, and present rules that achieve the strongest jointly satisfiable combinations of our proportionality axioms. We then analyze the compatibility of proportionality with the natural goal of maximizing the summed quality of the selected candidates. While imposing standard proportionality notions can lead to an almost complete loss of quality, we show that under a new class of reciprocal axioms, which scale a group's entitlement by the quality of its commonly approved candidate(s), there always exist proportional committees retaining at least 3/4 of the optimal summed quality, and such committees can be computed by our voting rules at no additional computational cost.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

The Complexity of Membership, Uniqueness, and Counting for Optimal Proportional Approval Voting Committees

Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) chooses committees that maximize a sum of harmonic utilities. We study the set of maximizing committees: whether a candidate belongs to some or all of them, whether the optimum is unique, and how many optima exist. When the committee size is part of the input, the three decision problems are $Δ_2^\mathrm{P}$-complete. Uniqueness remains hard for instances with at most two optimal committees. Counting optimal committees is $\#\!\cdot\!\mathrm{OptP}$-complete under metric reductions: every function $f$ in this class reduces to an election with exactly $f(x)+1$ optimal committees. The reductions encode satisfying assignments directly as committees and use harmonic marginal rewards to realize binary objectives with polynomially many voters. Each satisfying assignment has a unique committee representation, and fixed clause ballots give these representations the same clause score. We also prove Turing equivalence with $\#\mathrm{SAT}$ and show that membership of the counting problem in $\#\mathrm{P}$ would imply $\\mathrm{NP}=\mathrm{coNP}$.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Strengthening Proportionality in Participatory Budgeting with Additive Utilities

Proportional representation is a central goal in participatory budgeting, where voters select public projects subject to a shared budget. Full justified representation (FJR) accounts for groups whose members may value different projects, but computing an FJR outcome is strongly NP-hard for additive utilities. We show that FJR up to one project can be achieved in polynomial time for arbitrary nonnegative additive utilities and project costs. Our approach extends Residual-Budget Greedy and satisfies a stronger fractional axiom that can also be verified in polynomial time. For approval utilities, this axiom coincides with FJR+, providing exact FJR in that setting. We further show that every feasible completion of the algorithm's selected set preserves the representation guarantee, providing flexibility in allocating the remaining budget. In particular, we give a completion that ensures priceability at the original budget. For unit-cost projects, we strengthen the representation guarantee to the Droop quota and combine it with priceability whenever there are enough positively valued projects to fill the budget.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

PMMS Allocations Need Not Exist for 3 Agents with Additive Valuations

This note gives an instance demonstrating that the pairwise maximin share (PMMS) property cannot be satisfied by any allocation in certain fair division problems with indivisible goods and additive valuations. The instance requires only $n=3$ agents and $m=9$ goods, and is accompanied by a proof that no PMMS allocation exists. A separate instance shows (certified by exhaustive enumeration with a computer) that PMMS cannot be approximated within a ratio above $78/79 \approx 0.987$.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Stable Coexistence in Ecologies and Games

We study feasible stable equilibria of Lotka-Volterra systems and their higher-order extensions. We complete the classification of impossible ecological interaction networks with at most four species and extend several of these impossibility results to families with arbitrarily many species. We then show that these sign-pattern obstructions are specific to the pairwise Lotka-Volterra model: arbitrary prescribed growth rates and pairwise coefficients can be supplemented by higher-order interactions so as to admit a feasible asymptotically stable equilibrium. Through the correspondence with replicator dynamics, we interpret feasible equilibria of higher-order Lotka-Volterra systems as totally mixed symmetric Nash equilibria of symmetric multiplayer games, derive bounds on their number, and study their robustness under perturbations of the payoff tensors. We conclude by showing that every impossible ecology determines a nonempty open class of symmetric two-player games with no totally mixed evolutionarily stable strategy.

math.DS↗

arXiv2026

An FPTAS for 7/9-Approximation to Maximin Share Allocations

We present a new algorithm that achieves a $\frac{7}{9}$-approximation for the \emph{maximin share (MMS)} allocation of indivisible goods under additive valuations, improving the current best ratio of $\frac{10}{13}$~\cite{conf/soda/HeidariKSS26}. Building on a new analytical framework, we further obtain an FPTAS that achieves a $\frac{7}{9}-\varepsilon$ approximation in $\tfrac{1}{\varepsilon} \cdot \mathrm{poly}(n,m)$ time. The main technical ingredient is a dynamic witness-allocation framework that certifies adaptive reductions throughout the allocation process.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Deception in Reach-Avoid Game with Unknown Heterogeneous Attackers Speed Information

This letter investigates a reach-avoid game involving two Attackers and one Defender, where the Attackers aim to maximize the number reaching the target region while the Defender seeks to minimize it. In contrast to conventional complete information formulations, we consider an information asymmetry scenario where the Attackers' heterogeneous maximum speeds are privately known but publicly disclosed to lie within continuous ranges. Existing studies on uncertain speeds, however, have primarily focused on homogeneous settings, whereas heterogeneity extends the uncertainty from a common capability level to the relative capability configuration of the Attackers. To address the resulting capture-order ambiguity over infinitely many possible speed combinations, we establish a critical speed pair framework that characterizes when different capability configurations induce different optimal capture orders, and enables the analysis of the Defender's guessing behavior and the design of information-limiting strategies for the Attackers. We demonstrate that under certain initial conditions, the Attackers can mislead the Defender into making suboptimal decisions through a slow-speed deception strategy, achieving superior payoffs compared to the complete information game. Numerical visualizations reveal the widespread occurrence of such dilemma conditions.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

How Well Can Strategyproof Tournament Rules Resist Pairwise Manipulation?

A tournament rule maps the outcomes of all pairwise matches among $n$ teams to a possibly randomized winner. Desirable rules should be Condorcet consistent and monotone, yet also resistant to manipulation among coalition. Prior work mostly measures such manipulation additively through $k$-strongly non-manipulable at $α$ ($k$-SNM-$α$), meaning that no coalition of size $k$ can fix the matches among themselves to increase their total winning probability by $α$. Very recently, two new notions of non-manipulability were introduced. Multiplicative non-manipulability ($k$-MNM-$δ$) is defined analogously, using the multiplicative factor instead. Non-manipulability for $λ$ ($k$-NM$_λ$) characterizes the selfishness of a team, which restricts a coalition's gain to be less than $λ$ times the winning probability sacrificed by its members. In this work, we begin with a strict hierarchy among these three notions: NM$_λ$ is stronger than MNM, which is then stronger than SNM. This motivates us to consider those two notions that are stronger but less studied: pairwise multiplicative non-manipulability and $2$-non-manipulability for $λ$. We show that Randomized Death Match is $2$-MNM-$3/2$ and optimally matches the lower bound. Then, we introduce the BlockBonusedWinStrengths rule, which is Condorcet consistent, monotone, and $2$-NM$_2$. This rule substantially improves the previous upper bound of $λ=11$ and comes within a factor of two of the lower bound $λ=1$.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Improved Randomized Approximations for Strategic Obnoxious Facility Location

We study randomized strategyproof mechanisms for strategic obnoxious facility location on a line segment, where agents wish the facility to be located as far away from them as possible and their utility is their distance from the facility, under the social utility and minimum utility objectives. For social utility, we propose a novel randomized mechanism that breaks the previously best known $\frac32$-approximation of [Cheng, Yu, and Zhang, TCS 2013], achieving an approximation ratio of at most $1.47359$. We also raise the lower bound on the approximation ratio of randomized strategyproof mechanisms from $\frac{2}{\sqrt{3}}\approx1.15470$ [Feigenbaum et al., JAAMAS 2020] to $\frac{105}{88}\approx1.19318$. For minimum utility, following the profile-independent approach of [Chan, Lin and Wang, AAMAS 2026], we design a simple randomized mechanism that reduces the approximation guarantee from $\sqrt{2n}+O(1)$ to $\sqrt n+O(1)$, where $n$ is the number of agents. Finally, we prove that no randomized strategyproof mechanism can achieve an asymptotic approximation ratio strictly smaller than $2$, strengthening the previous asymptotic lower bound of $\frac32$ [Feigenbaum et al., JAAMAS 2020]. Thus, all four bounds considered in this paper strictly improve upon the corresponding previously known results.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Finding Representative and Approximately Efficient Committees

In approval-based committee voting, proportional approval voting (PAV) is a well-studied rule that combines proportional representation with Pareto efficiency. However, computing a PAV committee is NP-hard, raising a natural question: Can the proportionality and efficiency properties of PAV be achieved via computationally efficient procedures? We make two contributions toward answering this question. First, building on the known proportionality guarantees of the local-search-based variant of PAV (or local PAV), we systematically study its efficiency properties. We show that local PAV committees are weakly Pareto optimal, meaning that no other committee is strictly preferred by every voter. We also identify limitations: Local PAV guarantees only a $2$-approximation to fractional Pareto optimality ($2$-fPO) and a $2/3$-approximation to the optimal PAV score, and both bounds are tight. In contrast, global PAV is Pareto optimal and satisfies the stronger $α^\star$-fPO guarantee, where $α^\star \approx 1.346$ is the unique solution of $\int_0^{α^\star} \frac{1-e^{-y}}{y} \, dy = 1$, and this approximation is tight. Second, we design a polynomial-time algorithm that combines the best of these guarantees. The committee returned by our algorithm satisfies EJR$+$ (a proportionality guarantee), $α^\star$-fPO, and weak Pareto optimality. It also achieves a $0.79$-approximation to the optimal PAV score, matching the best possible polynomial-time approximation assuming $P \neq NP$. Our algorithm works by pipage rounding a concave relaxation of the PAV objective and using that committee to initialize local PAV, thereby combining global approximation guarantees with local search stability.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Sequential Offering in On-Demand Platforms: On the Optimality of Greedy Ranking

On-demand platforms face the fundamental challenge of fulfilling time-sensitive jobs with independent workers who may decline offers. To minimize delays and unfulfilled jobs, platforms frequently raise the offered wage sequentially following each rejection. However, the interaction between these dynamic price adjustments and the specific sequence in which workers are approached has been overlooked. In particular, if the best-suited workers (e.g., closest to the job) are also ranked earliest in the sequence, then those workers would see the lowest offered wages and may decline, leading to poor system outcomes where less-suited workers end up seeing the raised wages and accepting the job. We study the sequential offering problem to maximize expected welfare or platform profit by jointly optimizing the ranking of workers and the pricing trajectory. Surprisingly, our main result establishes that if the reservation wage distribution exhibits a non-increasing and convex density function (e.g., Uniform, Exponential), welfare is maximized by greedy ranking and wages optimized via backward induction. For arbitrary distributions, we prove that greedy ranking achieves a tight $n/(2n - 1)$ fraction of the prophet benchmark. Numerical results for settings beyond the distributional assumptions find welfare losses well below those allowed by the universal guarantee, even in families where greedy is provably suboptimal. This suggests that rather than sending initial "low ball'' offers to worse matches, platforms should stick with greedy ranking and optimize the wage offerings by appropriately taking the continuation value of the downstream offers into consideration.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Riemannian Optimization for Multi-Player Quantum Games on Product Unitary Manifolds

Quantum game theory is an extension of classical game theory that uses quantum principles in game theory. The Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein (EWL) quantum game is an early example of the two-player classical Prisoner's Dilemma transformed into a quantum Prisoner's Dilemma. In the EWL game, the players choose pure quantum strategies represented by unitary matrices. This extension can resolve the classical dilemma by enabling cooperative equilibrium with higher payoff. In this paper, we first discuss the Extended EWL (EEWL) for multiplayer quantum games with mixed strategies. In EEWL, each player controls a set of unitary operators as quantum actions and uses a classical mixed strategy over these actions. The payoffs are defined as expectation values of Hermitian reward operators acting on a shared quantum state, which is generated and measured according to the EEWL protocol. We then propose the Unitary Strategy Matrix Exponential Algorithm (USMEA), a geometry-aware sequential algorithm for the EEWL mixed-strategy setting, in which each player jointly learns a trainable set of local unitary actions and the associated classical mixing probabilities. Thereby it acts as a learning-and-control layer for multi-agent quantum decision systems. We analyze the convergence properties of USMEA under standard smoothness and step-size conditions and validate the theory with numerical experiments. These results show how classical optimization methods can be systematically integrated into the design and analysis of engineered quantum strategic interactions.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2026

Guiding Worker Self-Selection in Crowdsourcing Contests: An LLM-Augmented Algorithmic Approach

Crowdsourcing platforms coordinate large pools of online workers who strategically choose which contests to enter and how much effort to invest. This self-selection can leave important contests with too few participants or too little effort, while workers may regret entering contests that leave them worse off than available alternatives. We study how platforms can recommend contests to workers using self-selection in Tullock contests (SSTC), a two-stage model in which workers first choose contests and then compete within them. We introduce GRAF, a greedy polynomial-time framework that constructs self-selection outcomes by ordering workers according to a score vector, with guarantees of zero worker regret and platform optimality in special cases of SSTC. Because effective orderings are difficult to design under worker heterogeneity, we propose LLMScore, an LLM-driven evolutionary framework that automatically designs GRAF's scoring algorithm. LLMScore addresses two challenges: jointly optimizing platform utility and worker satisfaction, and evaluating worker regret when exact computation is intractable. Trained only on small instances of one setting, it transfers to larger and structurally different settings; moreover, its output is human-readable code that platform operators can inspect and modify. Across 1,000 synthetic instances spanning four settings, GRAF with LLMScore consistently achieves high-quality, often near-optimal, outcomes with low worker regret, benefiting both platforms and workers.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Improving Randomized Metric Distortion to 2.1441

In metric social choice, voters rank candidates by their distances in an unknown metric space. A voting rule uses these rankings to select a candidate or a lottery over candidates, aiming to minimize the average distance to voters. Distortion measures the worst-case approximation ratio. While the best distortion of deterministic rules is $3$, prior work pins down the best distortion of randomized rules to $[2.1126,2.5]$. We improve the upper bound to $2.1441$, closing over $90\%$ of this gap. The proof introduces random-size stable lotteries, proves their existence, and derives the new bound through a potential argument. All the proofs were obtained using GPT-5.6-Sol with significant guidance from the author, who verified them and simplified the exposition.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Proper Dataset Valuation by Pointwise Mutual Information

Data plays a central role in advancements in modern artificial intelligence, with high-quality data emerging as a key driver of model performance. This has prompted the development of principled and effective data curation methods in recent years. However, existing methods largely rely on heuristics, and whether they are truly effective remains unclear. For instance, standard evaluation methods that assess a trained model's performance on specific benchmarks may incentivize assigning high scores to data that merely resembles the test set. This issue exemplifies Goodhart's law: when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure. To address this issue, we propose an information-theoretic framework for evaluating data curation methods. We define dataset quality in terms of its informativeness about the true model parameters, formalized using the Blackwell ordering of informativeness. Under this ordering, Blackwell's theorem ensures that more informative data yields optimal models with lower expected loss on the true underlying distribution. To measure informativeness, we show that the Blackwell order can be determined by the Shannon mutual information between the curated data and the test data. To estimate this mutual information, we introduce a novel method that trains Bayesian models on embedded datasets and computes mutual information from the posteriors of model parameters. Experiments on real-world data demonstrate that our mutual information-based evaluation assigns appropriately lower scores to data curation strategies that reduce dataset informativeness, while traditional test score-based evaluation methods may favor data curation strategies that overfit to the test set but compromise the training data's informativeness.

cs.LG↗