arXiv · 1308.2273
Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations with zealots
Abstract
We investigate evolutionary dynamics of two-strategy matrix games with zealots in finite populations. Zealots are assumed to take either strategy regardless of the fitness. When the strategy selected by the zealots is the same, the fixation of the strategy selected by the zealots is a trivial outcome. We study fixation time in this scenario. We show that the fixation time is divided into three main regimes, in one of which the fixation time is short, and in the other two the fixation time is exponentially long in terms of the population size. Different from the case without zealots, there is a threshold selection intensity below which the fixation is fast for an arbitrary payoff matrix. We illustrate our results with examples of various social dilemma games.
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Yohei Nakajima, Naoki Masuda. 2013-08-10. Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations with zealots. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00285-014-0770-2
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