arXiv subjects

Yohei Nakajima

Publications and source records attributed to Yohei Nakajima.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

When Does Information Sharing Improve Decentralized Discovery? Aggregation, Independent Rescue, and Equilibrium Selection

Information sharing can improve a pooled estimate while eliminating independent rescue actions. This paper separates those effects in exact finite discovery models. A centralized action-budget profile shows that equal one-person accuracy can coexist with different portfolio values. Under a registered incremental-sharing protocol, a sharing step improves discovery exactly when pooled residual error contracts faster than an independent rescue attempt. Exact bounded registries exhibit compression, aggregation, neutral curves, and a bounded zero mixed class. In a two-agent Bayesian game with a hidden mixture of common and independent signal sources, the registered selected equilibrium yields a strict positive sharing interval at signal accuracy 3/5, while alternative equilibria show that the result is selection-dependent rather than universal. The models are synthetic and finite; no human or organizational data are used.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Passing Coarse Marginal Checks Can Be Cheap: Persona Mixtures and Imprecise Treatment-Response Estimates in an LLM Persona Panel

Large language models are increasingly used as synthetic research participants and are often validated by whether their marginal responses resemble human data. We study a fixed panel of sixteen lightweight persona-conditioned GPT-4.1 configurations in repeated strategic games. The panel met preregistered broad-reference condition-mean criteria in three of four repeated-game cells; the sole miss was 0.011 below the lower reference bound. Variation was strongly prompt-indexed, but its share depended on uncertainty assumptions: fixed-panel symmetric-Dirichlet sensitivities produced median between-prompt shares of 63%-71% under Jeffreys alpha=0.5 and 47%-53% under alpha=1, while finite-opportunity plug-in estimates were 85%-96%. Aggregate continuation-probability contrasts were +0.083 and +0.078, with conservative simultaneous 95% intervals [-0.171, +0.330] and [-0.181, +0.330]. The treatment jointly changed the continuation process and its textual representation. A separate wording-and-position operation shifted cooperation from 0/40 to 37/40 in the bare configuration, and a label conflict also revealed representation control. The original persona-level p13 result was not prospectively family-controlled, while a post-adjudication exact gate was structurally underpowered; p13 is therefore a replication target rather than a finding. External review exposed family-error, dependence, construct, and boundary-uncertainty defects, and zero-call reanalysis changed the interpretation without rewriting the historical record. The registered marginal criteria could be passed without precisely estimating the treatment-response object. A public capsule verifies 4,916 confirmatory Phase 3-5 runs with no live model calls. The results concern one fixed model-prompt panel and do not establish human substitutability.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

The Shared Discovery Paradox: How a One-Answer Rule Turns Better Information into Worse Search

Organizations often pool dispersed information into one ranking and then allow many agents to act on that shared view. In a discovery problem, this can improve beliefs while reducing coverage. We develop an exactly solvable benchmark with sixteen boxes, one target, eight searchers, and noisy private clues. Pooling raises the accuracy of the best single recommendation from 0.20 to 0.3835, but repeating that recommendation lowers group discovery from 0.8322 under decentralized clue-following to 0.3835. A coordinated eight-action portfolio using the same pooled reports reaches 0.8594, and seven coordinated actions recover the decentralized benchmark. The paradox is a protocol failure, not an information failure: a one-answer rule compresses a portfolio of available actions into one repeated choice. We then replace the planner with self-interested searchers who split a prize. The equal-split game is a potential game. Its anonymous symmetric equilibrium obeys a water-filling rule. In the canonical instance it achieves 0.5991: strictly above consensus, but below both private search and the planner. The exact mixed price of anarchy is 2 - 1/N. A sole-rescue reward, which pays only an agent who covers the target alone, makes every pure Nash equilibrium first-best. Finally, a latent common-cue model shows how correlated reports collapse effective discovery channels. The centralized planner gain rises strictly with copying, and in the canonical environment the symmetric market overtakes decentralized report-following at copying probability c = 0.788462. In a proportional large-market limit the five-protocol ordering survives exactly: consensus discovery vanishes while blind, market, private, and portfolio search converge to 0.500, 0.547, 0.847, and 0.874. The contribution is a compact benchmark that separates information, allocation, incentives, and dependence into exact, reusable quantities.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Regimes: An Auditable, Held-Out-Gated Improvement Loop Demonstrated on LongMemEval with ActiveGraph

Autonomous improvement loops are hard to trust because the improvement process is usually external scaffolding bolted onto the agent: failures go unlogged, diagnoses cannot be replayed, and promote-or-discard decisions land in a side database rather than the agent's own history. We show that an event-sourced agent runtime removes that friction and turns controlled improvement into a first-class workflow. When the agent's state is a deterministic projection of an append-only event log, failures are recorded, a run replays exactly from its log, candidate patches scope to typed pipeline seams, gates are auditable, and every promotion or discard is itself an event. We demonstrate this with Regimes, a loop on the ActiveGraph runtime that diagnoses failed evaluations, proposes a repair at a pipeline point, and promotes it only after static checks, sandbox execution, in-sample evaluation, and held-out validation. The loop is target-agnostic: the same control flow runs against different tasks through a common interface. On LongMemEval-S the dominant failure is not retrieval but reconciliation: the evidence is already in the assembled context, yet the reader answers incorrectly. Across five seeded held-out splits, Regimes discovers reader-prompt repairs that improve final held-out accuracy by +0.05 to +0.10 in four splits and +0.01 in one over-promotion split; two splits are individually significant (seed 5 unadjusted for its sequential promotion structure), and the pooled count is descriptive only, since the splits share one 500-question pool. The durable contributions are ActiveGraph as an auditable substrate that makes controlled improvement loops tractable, the held-out-gated loop it supports, the failure-regime taxonomy routing each failure to a pipeline location (whose marginal value over an unrouted baseline is the primary open question), and the prompt-as-discovery-probe hypothesis.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

The Log is the Agent: Event-Sourced Reactive Graphs for Auditable, Forkable Agentic Systems

Most agent frameworks are built around the language model: a conversation loop comes first, then tools, then rules, and finally a logging layer bolted on for observability, with state persisted as retrievable "memory." We describe ActiveGraph, a runtime that inverts this arrangement. The append-only event log is the source of truth; the working graph is a deterministic projection of that log; and behaviors--ordinary functions, classes, LLM-backed routines, or logic attached to typed edges--react to changes in the graph and emit new events. No component instructs another; coordination happens entirely through the shared graph. This single design decision yields three properties that retrieval-and-summarization memory systems do not provide: deterministic replay of any run from its log, cheap forking that branches a run at any event without re-executing the shared prefix, and end-to-end lineage from a high-level goal down to the individual model call that produced each artifact. We present the architecture, a determinism contract that makes replay sound, and a worked diligence example whose full causal structure is reconstructable from the log alone. We discuss--without claiming to demonstrate--why this substrate is unusually well suited to self-improving agents, and how it extends the BabyAGI lineage and prior graph-memory research.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2016

Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations with zealots

We investigate evolutionary dynamics of two-strategy matrix games with zealots in finite populations. Zealots are assumed to take either strategy regardless of the fitness. When the strategy selected by the zealots is the same, the fixation of the strategy selected by the zealots is a trivial outcome. We study fixation time in this scenario. We show that the fixation time is divided into three main regimes, in one of which the fixation time is short, and in the other two the fixation time is exponentially long in terms of the population size. Different from the case without zealots, there is a threshold selection intensity below which the fixation is fast for an arbitrary payoff matrix. We illustrate our results with examples of various social dilemma games.

q-bio.PE↗