arXiv · 1612.08886
Evolution of cooperation and costly incentives in the continuous snowdrift game
Abstract
Game theory research on the snowdrift game has showed that gradual evolution of the continuously varying level of cooperation in joint enterprises can demonstrate evolutionary merging as well as evolutionary branching. However, little is known about the consequences of changes in diversity at the cooperation level. In the present study I consider effects of costly rewards on the continuous snowdrift game. I show that not evolutionary merging but evolutionary branching can promote the emergence of pool reward, which can then enhance social welfare.
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Tatsuya Sasaki. 2016-12-28. Evolution of cooperation and costly incentives in the continuous snowdrift game. https://arxiv.org/abs/1612.08886
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