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Tatsuya Sasaki

Publications and source records attributed to Tatsuya Sasaki.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Bridging the Sim-to-Real Gap in Semiconductor Visual Program Synthesis via Input Binarization

Precise parametric control over circuit geometry is essential for semiconductor inspection, yet obtaining sufficient real training data remains costly. Although generative models such as diffusion models and Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) can augment training data, they cannot guarantee the nanometer-scale geometric accuracy required for metrology tasks. We propose a visual program synthesis framework in which a Vision-Language Model (VLM) converts inspection images into editable Domain-Specific Language (DSL) code describing circuit geometries, enabling controlled generation of training data with exact parameter manipulation. Because the VLM is trained solely on synthetic DSL-rendered data, a domain gap arises when processing real Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM) images. We bridge this gap with an input binarization strategy that strips SEM-specific texture and noise, letting the model focus on geometric structure. On the MIIC dataset, binarized inputs improve the mean Dice coefficient from 0.4393 to 0.5256 over the raw-input baseline, demonstrating that simple texture abstraction substantially mitigates the sim-to-real gap.

cs.AI

DetRefiner: Model-Agnostic Detection Refinement with Feature Fusion Transformer

Open-vocabulary object detection (OVOD) aims to detect both seen and unseen categories, yet existing methods often struggle to generalize to novel objects due to limited integration of global and local contextual cues. We propose DetRefiner, a simple yet effective plug-and-play framework that learns to fuse global and local features to refine open-vocabulary detection. DetRefiner processes global image features and patch-level image features from foundational models (e.g., DINOv3) through a lightweight Transformer encoder. The encoder produces a class vector capturing image-level attributes and patch vectors representing local region attributes, from which attribute reliability is inferred to recalibrate the base model's confidence. Notably, DetRefiner is trained independently of the base OVOD model, requiring neither access to its internal features nor retraining. At inference, it operates solely on the base detector's predictions, producing auxiliary calibration scores that are merged with the base detector's scores to yield the final refined confidence. Despite this simplicity, DetRefiner consistently enhances multiple OVOD models across COCO, LVIS, ODinW13, and Pascal VOC, achieving gains of up to +10.1 AP on novel categories. These results highlight that learning to fuse global and local representations offers a powerful and general mechanism for advancing open-world object detection. Our codes and models are available at https://github.com/hitachi-rd-cv/detrefiner.

cs.CV

LaSTR: Language-Driven Time-Series Segment Retrieval

Effectively searching time-series data is essential for system analysis, but existing methods often require expert-designed similarity criteria or rely on global, series-level descriptions. We study language-driven segment retrieval: given a natural language query, the goal is to retrieve relevant local segments from large time-series repositories. We build large-scale segment--caption training data by applying TV2-based segmentation to LOTSA windows and generating segment descriptions with GPT-5.2, and then train a Conformer-based contrastive retriever in a shared text--time-series embedding space. On a held-out test split, we evaluate single-positive retrieval together with caption-side consistency (SBERT and VLM-as-a-judge) under multiple candidate pool sizes. Across all settings, LaSTR outperforms random and CLIP baselines, yielding improved ranking quality and stronger semantic agreement between retrieved segments and query intent.

cs.CL

Integrated strong reciprocity enables productive punishment and protective defection

Cooperation in large groups and one-shot interactions is often hindered by freeloading. Punishment can enforce cooperation, but it is usually regarded as wasteful because the costs of punishing offset its benefits. Here, we analyze an evolutionary game model that integrates upstream and downstream reciprocity with costly punishment: integrated strong reciprocity (ISR). We demonstrate that ISR admits a stable mixed equilibrium of ISR and unconditional defection (ALLD), and that costly punishment can become productive: When sufficiently efficient, it raises collective welfare above the no-punishment baseline. ALLD players persist as evolutionary shields, preventing invasion by unconditional cooperation (ALLC) or alternative conditional strategies (e.g., antisocial punishment). At the same time, the mixed equilibrium of ISR and ALLD remains robust under modest complexity costs that destabilize other symmetric cooperative systems.

q-bio.PE

Integrating upstream and downstream reciprocity stabilizes cooperator-defector coexistence in others-only public goods games

Human cooperation persists among strangers in large, well-mixed populations despite theoretical predictions of difficulties, leaving a fundamental evolutionary puzzle. While upstream (pay-it-forward: helping others because you were helped) and downstream (rewarding-reputation: helping those with good reputations) indirect reciprocity have been independently considered as solutions, their joint dynamics in multiplayer contexts remain unexplored. We study public goods games without self-return (often called "others-only" PGGs) with benefit b and cost c and analyze evolutionary dynamics for three strategies: unconditional cooperation (ALLC), unconditional defection (ALLD), and an integrated reciprocity strategy combining unconditional forwarding with reputation-based discrimination. We show that integrating upstream and downstream reciprocity can yield a globally asymptotically stable mixed equilibrium of ALLD and integrated reciprocators when b/c > 2 in the absence of complexity costs. We analytically derive a critical threshold for complexity costs. If cognitive demands exceed this threshold, the stable equilibrium disappears via a saddle-node bifurcation. Otherwise, within the stable regime, complexity costs counterintuitively stabilize the equilibrium by preventing not only ALLC but also alternative conditional strategies from invading. Rather than requiring uniformity, our model reveals one pathway to stable cooperation through strategic diversity. ALLD serves as "evolutionary shields" preventing system collapse while integrated reciprocators flexibly combine open and discriminative responses. This framework demonstrates how pay-it-forward broadcasting and reputation systems can jointly maintain social polymorphism including cooperation despite cognitive limitations and group size challenges, offering a potential evolutionary foundation for behavioral diversity in human societies.

q-bio.PE

Hemisphere-averaged Hellings-Downs curve between pulsar pairs for a gravitational wave source

The Hellings-Downs (HD) curve plays a crucial role in search for nano-hertz gravitational waves (GWs) with pulsar timing arrays. We discuss the angular pattern of correlations for pulsar pairs within a celestial hemisphere. The hemisphere-averaged correlation curve depends upon the sky location of a GW compact source like a binary of supermassive black holes. If a single source is dominant, the variation in the hemisphere-averaged angular correlation is greatest when the hemisphere has its North Pole at the sky location of the GW source. Possible GW amplitude and source distance relevant to the current PTAs by using the hemisphere-averaged correlation are also studied.

gr-qc

Preemptive punishment and the emergence of sanctioning institutions

In explaining altruistic cooperation and punishment, the challenging riddle is how transcendental rules can emerge within the empirical world. Game-theoretical studies showed that pool punishment, particularly second-order punishment, plays a key role in understanding the evolution of cooperation. Second-order pool punishment, however, is tautological in nature; the punishment system itself is caused by its own effects. The emergence of pool punishment poses a logical conundrum that, to date, has been overlooked in the study of the evolution of social norms and institutions. Here, we tackle the issue by considering the interplay of (a) cognitive biases in reasoning and (b) Agamben's notion of homo sacer (Agamben, G. 1998, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Stanford University Press); that is, a person who may be killed without legal consequences. Based on the cognitive disposition of reversing the cause-and-effect relationship, we propose a new system: the preemptive punishment of homo sacer. This action can lead to retrospectively forming moral assessments, particularly for second-order pool punishment. This study potentially provides new insight into the evolutionary process behind the emergence of social norms and institutions.

physics.soc-ph

The evolution of cooperation and diversity by integrated indirect reciprocity

Indirect reciprocity is one of the major mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation in human societies. There are two types of indirect reciprocity: upstream and downstream. Cooperation in downstream reciprocity follows the pattern, 'You helped someone, and I will help you'. The direction of cooperation is reversed in upstream reciprocity, which instead follows the pattern, 'You helped me, and I will help someone else'. In reality, these two types of indirect reciprocity often occur in combination. However, upstream and downstream reciprocity have mostly been studied theoretically in isolation. Here, we propose a new model that integrates both types. We apply the standard giving-game framework of indirect reciprocity and analyze the model by means of evolutionary game theory. We show that the model can result in the stable coexistence of altruistic reciprocators and free riders in well-mixed populations. We also found that considering inattention in the assessment rule can strengthen the stability of this mixed equilibrium, even resulting in a global attractor. Our results indicate that the cycles of forwarding help and rewarding help need to be established for creating and maintaining diversity and inclusion in a society.

q-bio.PE

A norm knockout method on indirect reciprocity to reveal indispensable norms

Although various norms for reciprocity-based cooperation have been suggested that are evolutionarily stable against invasion from free riders, the process of alternation of norms and the role of diversified norms remain unclear in the evolution of cooperation. We clarify the co-evolutionary dynamics of norms and cooperation in indirect reciprocity and also identify the indispensable norms for the evolution of cooperation. Inspired by the gene knockout method, a genetic engineering technique, we developed the norm knockout method and clarified the norms necessary for the establishment of cooperation. The results of numerical investigations revealed that the majority of norms gradually transitioned to tolerant norms after defectors are eliminated by strict norms. Furthermore, no cooperation emerges when specific norms that are intolerant to defectors are knocked out.

physics.soc-ph

The evolution of conditional moral assessment in indirect reciprocity

Indirect reciprocity is a major mechanism in the maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals. Indirect reciprocity leads to conditional cooperation according to social norms that discriminate the good (those who deserve to be rewarded with help) and the bad (those who should be punished by refusal of help). Despite intensive research, however, there is no definitive consensus on what social norms best promote cooperation through indirect reciprocity, and it remains unclear even how those who refuse to help the bad should be assessed. Here, we propose a new simple norm called "Staying" that prescribes abstaining from assessment. Under the Staying norm, the image of the person who makes the decision to give help stays the same as in the last assessment if the person on the receiving end has a bad image. In this case, the choice about whether or not to give help to the potential receiver does not affect the image of the potential giver. We analyze the Staying norm in terms of evolutionary game theory and demonstrate that Staying is most effective in establishing cooperation compared to the prevailing social norms, which rely on constant monitoring and unconditional assessment. The application of Staying suggests that the strict application of moral judgment is limited.

q-bio.PE

The Evolution of Reputation-Based Cooperation in Regular Networks

Despite recent advances in reputation technologies, it is not clear how reputation systems can affect human cooperation in social networks. Although it is known that two of the major mechanisms in the evolution of cooperation are spatial selection and reputation-based reciprocity, theoretical study of the interplay between both mechanisms remains almost uncharted. Here, we present a new individual-based model for the evolution of reciprocal cooperation between reputation and networks. We comparatively analyze four of the leading moral assessment rules---shunning, image scoring, stern judging, and simple standing---and base the model on the giving game in regular networks for Cooperators, Defectors, and Discriminators. Discriminators rely on a proper moral assessment rule. By using individual-based models, we show that the four assessment rules are differently characterized in terms of how cooperation evolves, depending on the benefit-to-cost ratio, the network-node degree, and the observation and error conditions. Our findings show that the most tolerant rule---simple standing---is the most robust among the four assessment rules in promoting cooperation in regular networks.

physics.soc-ph

Evolution of cooperation and costly incentives in the continuous snowdrift game

Game theory research on the snowdrift game has showed that gradual evolution of the continuously varying level of cooperation in joint enterprises can demonstrate evolutionary merging as well as evolutionary branching. However, little is known about the consequences of changes in diversity at the cooperation level. In the present study I consider effects of costly rewards on the continuous snowdrift game. I show that not evolutionary merging but evolutionary branching can promote the emergence of pool reward, which can then enhance social welfare.

physics.soc-ph

Indirect reciprocity can overcome free-rider problems on costly moral assessment

Indirect reciprocity is one of the major mechanisms of the evolution of cooperation. Because constant monitoring and accurate evaluation in moral assessments tend to be costly, indirect reciprocity can be exploited by cost evaders. A recent study crucially showed that a cooperative state achieved by indirect reciprocators is easily destabilized by cost evaders in the case with no supportive mechanism. Here, we present a simple and widely applicable solution that considers pre-assessment of cost evaders. In the pre-assessment, those who fail to pay for costly assessment systems are assigned a nasty image that leads to being rejected by discriminators. We demonstrate that considering the pre-assessment can crucially stabilize reciprocal cooperation for a broad range of indirect reciprocity models. In particular for the most leading social norms we analyse the conditions under which a prosocial state becomes locally stable.

q-bio.PE

Rewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games

Properly coordinating cooperation is relevant for resolving public good problems such as clean energy and environmental protection. However, little is known about how individuals can coordinate themselves for a certain level of cooperation in large populations of strangers. In a typical situation, a consensus-building process hardly succeeds due to lack of face and standing. The evolution of cooperation in this type of situation is studied using threshold public good games in which cooperation prevails when it is initially sufficient, or otherwise, it perishes. While punishment is a powerful tool to shape human behaviours, institutional punishment is often too costly to start with only a few contributors, which is another coordination problem. Here we show that whatever the initial conditions, reward funds based on voluntary contribution can evolve. The voluntary reward paves the way for effectively overcoming the coordination problem and efficiently transforms freeloaders to cooperators with a perceived small risk of collective failure.

physics.soc-ph

Evolution of public cooperation in a monitored society with implicated punishment and within-group enforcement

Monitoring with implicated punishment is common in human societies to avert freeriding on common goods. But is it effective in promoting public cooperation? We show that the introduction of monitoring and implicated punishment is indeed effective, as it transforms the public goods game to a coordination game, thus rendering cooperation viable in infinite and finite well-mixed populations. We also show that the addition of within-group enforcement further promotes the evolution of public cooperation. However, although the group size in this context has nonlinear effects on collective action, an intermediate group size is least conductive to cooperative behaviour. This contradicts recent field observations, where an intermediate group size was declared optimal with the conjecture that group-size effects and within-group enforcement are responsible. Our theoretical research thus clarifies key aspects of monitoring with implicated punishment in human societies, and additionally, it reveals fundamental group-size effects that facilitate prosocial collective action.

q-bio.PE

Cheating is evolutionarily assimilated with cooperation in the continuous snowdrift game

It is well known that in contrast to the Prisoner's Dilemma, the snowdrift game can lead to a stable coexistence of cooperators and cheaters. Recent theoretical evidence on the snowdrift game suggests that gradual evolution for individuals choosing to contribute in continuous degrees can result in the social diversification to a 100% contribution and 0% contribution through so-called evolutionary branching. Until now, however, game-theoretical studies have shed little light on the evolutionary dynamics and consequences of the loss of diversity in strategy. Here we analyze continuous snowdrift games with quadratic payoff functions in dimorphic populations. Subsequently, conditions are clarified under which gradual evolution can lead a population consisting of those with 100% contribution and those with 0% contribution to merge into one species with an intermediate contribution level. The key finding is that the continuous snowdrift game is more likely to lead to assimilation of different cooperation levels rather than maintenance of diversity. Importantly, this implies that allowing the gradual evolution of cooperative behavior can facilitate social inequity aversion in joint ventures that otherwise could cause conflicts that are based on commonly accepted notions of fairness.

physics.soc-ph

Voluntary rewards mediate the evolution of pool punishment for maintaining public goods in large populations

Punishment is a popular tool when governing commons in situations where free riders would otherwise take over. It is well known that sanctioning systems, such as the police and courts, are costly and thus can suffer from those who free ride on other's efforts to maintain the sanctioning systems (second-order free riders). Previous game-theory studies showed that if populations are very large, pool punishment rarely emerges in public good games, even when participation is optional, because of second-order free riders. Here we show that a matching fund for rewarding cooperation leads to the emergence of pool punishment, despite the presence of second-order free riders. We demonstrate that reward funds can pave the way for a transition from a population of free riders to a population of pool punishers. A key factor in promoting the transition is also to reward those who contribute to pool punishment, yet not abstaining from participation. Reward funds eventually vanish in raising pool punishment, which is sustainable by punishing the second-order free riders. This suggests that considering the interdependence of reward and punishment may help to better understand the origins and transitions of social norms and institutions.

physics.soc-ph

Unchecked strategy diversification and collapse in continuous voluntary public good games

Cooperation or defection and participation or withdrawal are well-known options of behavior in game-like activities in free societies, yet the co-evolutionary dynamics of these behavioral traits in the individual level are not well understood. Here we investigate the continuous voluntary public good game, in which individuals have two types of continuous-valued options: a probability of joining the public good game and a level of cooperative investment in the game. Our numerical results reveal hitherto unreported phenomena: (i) The evolutionary dynamics are initially characterized by oscillations in individual cooperation and participation levels, in contrast to the population-level oscillations that have previously been reported. (ii) Eventually, the population's average cooperation and participation levels converge to and stabilize at a center. (iii) Then, a most peculiar phenomenon unfolds: The strategies present in the population diversify and give rise to a "cloud" of tinkering individuals who each tries out a different strategy, and this process continues unchecked as long as the population's cooperation and participation levels remain balanced. Over time, however, imbalances build up as a consequence of random drift and there is a sudden and abrupt collapse of the strategy-diversity cloud. The process then repeats again in a cyclic manner. To understand the three aforementioned phenomena, we investigate the system analytically using adaptive-dynamics techniques. Our analysis casts light on the mechanisms which underpin the unexpected and surprising evolutionary dynamics.

physics.soc-ph