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arXiv · 1707.03700

The exact strength of the class forcing theorem

Abstract

The class forcing theorem, which asserts that every class forcing notion $\mathbb{P}$ admits a forcing relation $\Vdash_{\mathbb{P}}$, that is, a relation satisfying the forcing relation recursion -- it follows that statements true in the corresponding forcing extensions are forced and forced statements are true -- is equivalent over G\"odel-Bernays set theory GBC to the principle of elementary transfinite recursion $\text{ETR}_{\text{Ord}}$ for class recursions of length $\text{Ord}$. It is also equivalent to the existence of truth predicates for the infinitary languages $\mathcal{L}_{\text{Ord},\omega}(\in,A)$, allowing any class parameter $A$; to the existence of truth predicates for the language $\mathcal{L}_{\text{Ord},\text{Ord}}(\in,A)$; to the existence of $\text{Ord}$-iterated truth predicates for first-order set theory $\mathcal{L}_{\omega,\omega}(\in,A)$; to the assertion that every separative class partial order $\mathbb{P}$ has a set-complete class Boolean completion; to a class-join separation principle; and to the principle of determinacy for clopen class games of rank at most $\text{Ord}+1$. Unlike set forcing, if every class forcing notion $\mathbb{P}$ has a forcing relation merely for atomic formulas, then every such $\mathbb{P}$ has a uniform forcing relation applicable simultaneously to all formulas. Our results situate the class forcing theorem in the rich hierarchy of theories between GBC and Kelley-Morse set theory KM.

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BibTeXRIS

Victoria Gitman, Joel David Hamkins, Peter Holy, Philipp Schlicht, Kameryn Williams. 2017-07-12. The exact strength of the class forcing theorem. https://doi.org/10.1017/jsl.2019.89

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