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Joel David Hamkins

Publications and source records attributed to Joel David Hamkins.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources
arXiv2026

Class choice and the surprising weakness of Kelley-Morse set theory

Kelley-Morse set theory KM is weaker than generally supposed and fails to prove several principles that may be desirable in a foundational second-order set theory. Even though KM includes the global choice principle, for example, (i) KM does not prove the class choice scheme, asserting that whenever every set $x$ admits a class $X$ with $φ(x,X)$, then there is a class $Z\subseteq V\times V$ for which $φ(x,Z_x)$ on every section. This scheme can fail with KM even in low-complexity first-order instances $φ$ and even when only a set of indices $x$ are relevant. For closely related reasons, (ii) the theory KM does not prove the Łoś theorem scheme for internal second-order ultrapowers, even for large cardinal ultrapowers, such as the ultrapower by a normal measure on a measurable cardinal. Indeed, the theory KM itself is not generally preserved by internal ultrapowers. Finally, (iii) KM does not prove that the $Σ^1_n$ logical complexity is invariant under first-order quantifiers, even bounded first-order quantifiers. For example, $\forall α{<}δ ψ(α,X)$ is not always provably equivalent to a $Σ^1_1$ assertion when $ψ$ is. Nevertheless, these various weaknesses in KM are addressed by augmenting it with the class choice scheme, thereby forming the theory KM+, which we propose as a robust KM alternative for the foundations of second-order set theory.

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arXiv2025

The modal logic of arithmetic potentialism and the universal algorithm

I investigate the modal commitments of various conceptions of the philosophy of arithmetic potentialism. Specifically, I shall consider the potentialist conceptions arising from a model-theoretic view of the models of arithmetic as possible arithmetic realms of feasibility, considering them under their natural extension concepts, such as end-extensions, arbitrary extensions, conservative extensions and more, which in effect express distinct potentialist ideas. In these potentialist systems, I show, the propositional modal assertions that are valid with respect to all arithmetic assertions with parameters are exactly the assertions of S4. With respect to sentences, however, the validities of a model lie between S4 and S5, and these bounds are sharp in that there are models realizing both endpoints. For a model of arithmetic to validate S5 is precisely to fulfill the arithmetic maximality principle, which asserts that every possibly necessary statement is already true, and these models are equivalently characterized as those satisfying a maximal $Σ_1$ theory. The main S4 analysis makes fundamental use of the universal algorithm, of which this article provides a simplified, self-contained account. The main philosophical point is that fundamentally different potentialist conceptions -- linear inevitability, convergent potentialism and radical branching possibility -- are revealed by the precise modal validities of the corresponding potentialist systems in which those attitudes are expressed, and so it is important to discover them.

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arXiv2025

A potentialist conception of ultrafinitism

I shall explore various senses in which ultrafinitism can be fruitfully understood as engaging with a potentialist perspective in mathematics. First, I explain that every model $M$ of the theory of finite arithmetic -- arithmetic with a largest number, in which addition and multiplication are merely partial functions -- is bi-interpretable with a strictly taller model $M^+$, in which the arithmetic operations on objects taken from the original base model $M$ are totally defined in the extended world $M^+$. More generally, I explain how ultrafinitist ideas emerge in the modal potentialist system consisting of all models of arithmetic under end-extension.

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arXiv2025

Satisfaction is not absolute

We prove that the satisfaction relation $\mathcal{N}\modelsφ[\vec a]$ of first-order logic is not absolute between models of set theory having the structure $\mathcal{N}$ and the formulas $φ$ all in common. Two models of set theory can have the same natural numbers, for example, and the same standard model of arithmetic $\langle\mathbb{N},{+},{\cdot},0,1,{\lt}\rangle$, yet disagree on their theories of arithmetic truth; two models of set theory can have the same natural numbers and the same arithmetic truths, yet disagree on their truths-about-truth, at any desired level of the iterated truth-predicate hierarchy; two models of set theory can have the same natural numbers and the same reals, yet disagree on projective truth; two models of set theory can have the same $\langle H_{ω_2},{\in}\rangle$ or the same rank-initial segment $\langle V_δ,{\in}\rangle$, yet disagree on which assertions are true in these structures. On the basis of these mathematical results, we argue that a philosophical commitment to the determinateness of the theory of truth for a structure cannot be seen as a consequence solely of the determinateness of the structure in which that truth resides. The determinate nature of arithmetic truth, for example, is not a consequence of the determinate nature of the arithmetic structure $\mathbb{N}=\{0,1,2,\ldots\}$ itself, but rather, we argue, is an additional higher-order commitment requiring its own analysis and justification.

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arXiv2024

Every countable model of arithmetic or set theory has a pointwise-definable end extension

According to the math tea argument, there must be real numbers that we cannot describe or define, because there are uncountably many real numbers, but only countably many definitions. And yet, the existence of pointwise-definable models of set theory, in which every individual is definable without parameters, challenges this conclusion. In this article, I introduce a flexible new method for constructing pointwise-definable models of arithmetic and set theory, showing furthermore that every countable model of Zermelo-Fraenkel ZF set theory and of Peano arithmetic PA has a pointwise-definable end extension. In the arithmetic case, I use the universal algorithm and its $Σ_n$ generalizations to build a progressively elementary tower making any desired individual $a_n$ definable at each stage $n$, while preserving these definitions through to the limit model, which can thus be arranged to be pointwise definable. A similar method works in set theory, and one can moreover achieve $V=L$ in the extension or indeed any other suitable theory holding in an inner model of the original model, thereby fulfilling the resurrection phenomenon. For example, every countable model of ZF with an inner model with a measurable cardinal has an end extension to a pointwise-definable model of $\text{ZFC}+V=L[μ]$.

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arXiv2023

Forcing as a computational process

We investigate how set-theoretic forcing can be seen as a computational process on the models of set theory. Given an oracle for information about a model of set theory $\langle M,\in^M\rangle$, we explain senses in which one may compute $M$-generic filters $G\subseteq\mathbb{P}\in M$ and the corresponding forcing extensions $M[G]$. Specifically, from the atomic diagram one may compute $G$, from the $Δ_0$-diagram one may compute $M[G]$ and its $Δ_0$-diagram, and from the elementary diagram one may compute the elementary diagram of $M[G]$. We also examine the information necessary to make the process functorial, and conclude that in the general case, no such computational process will be functorial. For any such process, it will always be possible to have different isomorphic presentations of a model of set theory $M$ that lead to different non-isomorphic forcing extensions $M[G]$. Indeed, there is no Borel function providing generic filters that is functorial in this sense.

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arXiv2023

Infinite Wordle and the Mastermind numbers

I consider the natural infinitary variations of the games Wordle and Mastermind, as well as their game-theoretic variations Absurdle and Madstermind, considering these games with infinitely long words and infinite color sequences and allowing transfinite game play. For each game, a secret codeword is hidden, which the codebreaker attempts to discover by making a series of guesses and receiving feedback as to their accuracy. In Wordle with words of any size from a finite alphabet of $n$ letters, including infinite words or even uncountable words, the codebreaker can nevertheless always win in $n$ steps. Meanwhile, the mastermind number, defined as the smallest winning set of guesses in infinite Mastermind for sequences of length $ω$ over a countable set of colors without duplication, is uncountable, but the exact value turns out to be independent of ZFC, for it is provably equal to the eventually different number $\frak{d}({\neq^*})$, which is the same as the covering number of the meager ideal $\text{cov}(\mathcal{M})$. I thus place all the various mastermind numbers, defined for the natural variations of the game, into the hierarchy of cardinal characteristics of the continuum.

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arXiv2023

Infinite Hex is a draw

We introduce the game of infinite Hex, extending the familiar finite game to natural play on the infinite hexagonal lattice. Whereas the finite game is a win for the first player, we prove in contrast that infinite Hex is a draw -- both players have drawing strategies. Meanwhile, the transfinite game-value phenomenon, now abundantly exhibited in infinite chess and infinite draughts, regrettably does not arise in infinite Hex; only finite game values occur. Indeed, every game-valued position in infinite Hex is intrinsically local, meaning that winning play depends only on a fixed finite region of the board. This latter fact is proved under very general hypotheses, establishing the conclusion for all simple stone-placing games.

math.CO↗
arXiv2022

Reflection in second-order set theory with abundant urelements bi-interprets a supercompact cardinal

After reviewing various natural bi-interpretations in urelement set theory, including second-order set theories with urelements, we explore the strength of second-order reflection in these contexts. Ultimately, we prove, second-order reflection with the abundant atom axiom is bi-interpretable and hence also equiconsistent with the existence of a supercompact cardinal. The proof relies on a reflection characterization of supercompactness, namely, a cardinal $κ$ is supercompact if and only if every $Π^1_1$ sentence true in a structure $M$ (of any size) containing $κ$ in a language of size less than $κ$ is also true in a substructure $m\prec M$ of size less than $κ$ with $m\capκ\inκ$.

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arXiv2022

Pseudo-countable models

Every mathematical structure has an elementary extension to a pseudo-countable structure, one that is seen as countable inside a suitable class model of set theory, even though it may actually be uncountable. This observation, proved easily with the Boolean ultrapower theorem, enables a sweeping generalization of results concerning countable models to a rich realm of uncountable models. The Barwise extension theorem, for example, holds amongst the pseudo-countable models -- every pseudo-countable model of ZF admits an end extension to a model of ZFC+V=L. Indeed, the class of pseudo-countable models is a rich multiverse of set-theoretic worlds, containing elementary extensions of any given model of set theory and closed under forcing extensions and interpreted models, while simultaneously fulfilling the Barwise extension theorem, the Keisler-Morley theorem, the resurrection theorem, and the universal finite sequence theorem, among others.

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arXiv2022

Fregean abstraction in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory: a deflationary account

The standard treatment of sets and definable classes in first-order Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory accords in many respects with the Fregean foundational framework, such as the distinction between objects and concepts. Nevertheless, in set theory we may define an explicit association of definable classes with set objects $F\mapsto\varepsilon F$ in such a way, I shall prove, to realize Frege's Basic Law V as a ZF theorem scheme, Russell notwithstanding. A similar analysis applies to the Cantor-Hume principle and to Fregean abstraction generally. Because these extension and abstraction operators are definable, they provide a deflationary account of Fregean abstraction, one expressible in and reducible to set theory -- every assertion in the language of set theory allowing the extension and abstraction operators $\varepsilon F$, $\# G$, $αH$ is equivalent to an assertion not using them. The analysis thus sidesteps Russell's argument, which is revealed not as a refutation of Basic Law~V as such, but rather as a version of Tarski's theorem on the nondefinability of truth, showing that the proto-truth-predicate "$x$ falls under the concept of which $y$ is the extension" is not expressible.

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arXiv2022

Nonlinearity and illfoundedness in the hierarchy of large cardinal consistency strength

Many set theorists point to the linearity phenomenon in the hierarchy of consistency strength, by which natural theories tend to be linearly ordered and indeed well ordered by consistency strength. Why should it be linear? In this paper I present counterexamples, natural instances of nonlinearity and illfoundedness in the hierarchy of large cardinal consistency strength, as natural or as nearly natural as I can make them. I present diverse cautious enumerations of ZFC and large cardinal set theories, which exhibit incomparability and illfoundedness in consistency strength, and yet, I argue, are natural. I consider the philosophical role played by "natural" in the linearity phenomenon, arguing ultimately that we should abandon empty naturality talk and aim instead to make precise the mathematical and logical features we had found desirable.

math.LO↗
arXiv2022

Categorical large cardinals and the tension between categoricity and set-theoretic reflection

Inspired by Zermelo's quasi-categoricity result characterizing the models of second-order Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory $\text{ZFC}_2$, we investigate when those models are fully categorical, characterized by the addition to $\text{ZFC}_2$ either of a first-order sentence, a first-order theory, a second-order sentence or a second-order theory. Thus we mount an analysis of the categorical large cardinals. This mathematical analysis leads naturally to philosophical issues concerning structuralism and realism, including especially the tension between categoricity and reflection. Ultimately we identify grounds for the preference of noncategoricity in one's foundations.

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arXiv2021

Transfinite game values in infinite draughts

Infinite draughts, or checkers, is played just like the finite game, but on an infinite checkerboard extending without bound in all four directions. We prove that every countable ordinal arises as the game value of a position in infinite draughts. Thus, there are positions from which Red has a winning strategy enabling her to win always in finitely many moves, but the length of play can be completely controlled by Black in a manner as though counting down from a given countable ordinal.

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arXiv2021

Is the twin prime conjecture independent of Peano Arithmetic?

We show that there is an arithmetical formula F such that ZF proves that F is independent of PA and yet, unlike other arithmetical independent statements, the truth value of F cannot at present be established in ZF or in any other trusted metatheory. In fact we can choose an example of such a formula F such that ZF proves that F is equivalent to the twin prime conjecture.

math.LO↗
arXiv2021

The exact strength of the class forcing theorem

The class forcing theorem, which asserts that every class forcing notion $\mathbb{P}$ admits a forcing relation $\Vdash_{\mathbb{P}}$, that is, a relation satisfying the forcing relation recursion -- it follows that statements true in the corresponding forcing extensions are forced and forced statements are true -- is equivalent over Gödel-Bernays set theory GBC to the principle of elementary transfinite recursion $\text{ETR}_{\text{Ord}}$ for class recursions of length $\text{Ord}$. It is also equivalent to the existence of truth predicates for the infinitary languages $\mathcal{L}_{\text{Ord},ω}(\in,A)$, allowing any class parameter $A$; to the existence of truth predicates for the language $\mathcal{L}_{\text{Ord},\text{Ord}}(\in,A)$; to the existence of $\text{Ord}$-iterated truth predicates for first-order set theory $\mathcal{L}_{ω,ω}(\in,A)$; to the assertion that every separative class partial order $\mathbb{P}$ has a set-complete class Boolean completion; to a class-join separation principle; and to the principle of determinacy for clopen class games of rank at most $\text{Ord}+1$. Unlike set forcing, if every class forcing notion $\mathbb{P}$ has a forcing relation merely for atomic formulas, then every such $\mathbb{P}$ has a uniform forcing relation applicable simultaneously to all formulas. Our results situate the class forcing theorem in the rich hierarchy of theories between GBC and Kelley-Morse set theory KM.

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