arXiv · 1901.08815
Intrinsic, extrinsic, and the constitutive a priori
Abstract
On the basis of what I call physico-formalist philosophy of mathematics, I will develop an amended account of the Kantian--Reichenbachian conception of constitutive a priori. It will be shown that the features (attributes, qualities, properties) attributed to a real object are not possessed by the object as a "thing-in-itself"; they require a physical theory by means of which these features are constituted. It will be seen that the existence of such a physical theory implies that a physical object can possess a property only if other contingently existing physical objects exist; therefore, the intrinsic--extrinsic distinction is flawed.
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Laszlo E. Szabo. 2019-01-25. Intrinsic, extrinsic, and the constitutive a priori. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-019-00281-z
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