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Laszlo E. Szabo

Publications and source records attributed to Laszlo E. Szabo.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources
arXiv2025

Questionable and Unquestionable in Quantum Mechanics

According to the Kolmogorovian Censorship Hypothesis, everything that quantum theory says about the world in the language of the quantum mechanical Hilbert space formalism is actually about relationships between ordinary relative frequencies expressible in operational terms using classical Kolmogorovian probability theory. In other words, a quantum theoretical description of a system should in principle be translatable into a purely operational-probabilistic description. However, our goal in this paper is different; we do not want to deal with the problem how to translate the known theory of quantum mechanics into operational terms, or to reconstruct the theory from postulates which can be interpreted in operational terms. Our aim is somewhat broader and points in the opposite direction. We start with a general scheme for the operational description of an arbitrary physical system. The description is based solely on the notion of observable events (measurement operations and measurement results) and on general, empirically established simple laws concerning their relative frequency. These laws are so simple and fundamental that they apply equally to any physical system. In the first part of the paper, we outline the basic elements of such an operational-probabilistic theory. In the second part, we discuss how this operational-probabilistic description compares to the quantum mechanical description and to what extent the standard Hilbert space quantum mechanics can be regarded as a reformulation of the general operational-probabilistic theory.

quant-ph↗
arXiv2019

Intrinsic, extrinsic, and the constitutive a priori

On the basis of what I call physico-formalist philosophy of mathematics, I will develop an amended account of the Kantian--Reichenbachian conception of constitutive a priori. It will be shown that the features (attributes, qualities, properties) attributed to a real object are not possessed by the object as a "thing-in-itself"; they require a physical theory by means of which these features are constituted. It will be seen that the existence of such a physical theory implies that a physical object can possess a property only if other contingently existing physical objects exist; therefore, the intrinsic--extrinsic distinction is flawed.

physics.hist-ph↗
arXiv2014

How to Move an Electromagnetic Field?

The special relativity principle presupposes that the states of the physical system concerned can be meaningfully characterized, at least locally, as such in which the system is at rest or in motion with some velocity relative to an arbitrary frame of reference. In the first part of the paper we show that electrodynamic systems, in general, do not satisfy this condition. In the second part of the paper we argue that exatly the same condition serves as a necessary condition for the persistence of an extended physical object. As a consequence, we argue, electromagnetic field strengths cannot be the individuating properties of electromagnetic field---contrary to the standard realistic interpretation of CED. In other words, CED is ontologically incomplete.

physics.hist-ph↗
arXiv2013

Operational understanding of the covariance of classical electrodynamics

It is common in the literature on classical electrodynamics and relativity theory that the transformation rules for the basic electrodynamic quantities are derived from the pre-assumption that the equations of electrodynamics are covariant against these---unknown---transformation rules. There are several problems to be raised concerning these derivations. This is, however, not our main concern in this paper. Even if these derivations are regarded as unquestionable, they leave open the following fundamental question: Are the so-obtained transformation rules indeed identical with the true transformation laws of the empirically ascertained electrodynamic quantities? This is of course an empirical question. In this paper, we will answer this question in a purely theoretical framework by applying what J. S. Bell calls "Lorentzian pedagogy"---according to which the laws of physics in any one reference frame account for all physical phenomena, including what a moving observer must see when performs measurement operations with moving measuring devices. We will show that the real transformation laws are indeed identical with the ones obtained by presuming the covariance of the equations of electrodynamics, and that the covariance is indeed satisfied. Beforehand, however, we need to clarify the operational definitions of the fundamental electrodynamic quantities. As we will see, these semantic issues are not as trivial as one might think.

physics.hist-ph↗
arXiv2011

On the formal statement of the special principle of relativity

The aim of the paper is to develop a proper mathematical formalism which can help to clarify the necessary conceptual plugins to the special principle of relativity and leads to a deeper understanding of the principle in its widest generality.

physics.hist-ph↗
arXiv2011

Is the relativity principle consistent with classical electrodynamics? Towards a logico-empiricist reconstruction of a physical theory

The transformation rules for the basic electrodynamical quantities are routinely derived from the hypothesis that the relativity principle (RP) applies for Maxwell's electrodynamics. These derivations leave open several questions: (1) Is the RP a true law of nature for electrodynamical phenomena? (2) Are, at least, the transformation rules of the fundamental electrodynamical quantities, derived from the RP, true? (3) Is the RP consistent with the laws of electrodynamics in one single inertial frame of reference? (4) Are, at least, the derived transformation rules consistent with the laws of electrodynamics in one single frame of reference? (1) and (2) are empirical questions; we will investigate problems (3) and (4). First we will develop a formalism of the RP. In the second part, we will deal with the operational definitions of the fundamental quantities. In the third part of the paper we will show that the proper transformation rules are indeed identical with the ones obtained by presuming the covariance, and that the covariance is indeed satisfied. Problem (3) raises conceptual problems to which there seems no satisfactory solution in electrodynamics; thus, contrary to the widespread views, the question we asked in the title has no obvious answer.

physics.gen-ph↗
arXiv2007

The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument and the Bell Inequalities

In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper in which they claimed that the whole formalism of quantum mechanics together with what they called "Reality Criterion" imply that quantum mechanics cannot be complete. That is, there must exist some elements of reality that are not described by quantum mechanics. There must be, they concluded, a more complete description of physical reality behind quantum mechanics. There must be a state, a hidden variable, characterizing the state of affairs in the world in more details than the quantum mechanical state, something that also reflects the missing elements of reality. Under some further but quite plausible assumptions, this conclusion implies that in some spin-correlation experiments the measured quantum mechanical probabilities should satisfy particular inequalities (Bell-type inequalities). The paradox consists in the fact that quantum probabilities do not satisfy these inequalities. And this paradoxical fact has been confirmed by several laboratory experiments in the last three decades. The problem is still open and hotly debated among both physicists and philosophers. It has motivated a wide range of research from the most fundamental quantum mechanical experiments through foundations of probability theory to the theory of stochastic causality as well as the metaphysics of free will.

quant-ph↗
arXiv2005

Does special relativity theory tell us anything new about space and time?

It will be shown that, in comparison with the pre-relativistic Galileo-invariant conceptions, special relativity tells us nothing new about the geometry of spacetime. It simply calls something else "spacetime", and this something else has different properties. All statements of special relativity about those features of reality that correspond to the original meaning of the terms "space" and "time" are identical with the corresponding traditional pre-relativistic statements. It will be also argued that special relativity and Lorentz theory are completely identical in both senses, as theories about spacetime and as theories about the behavior of moving physical objects.

physics.class-ph↗
arXiv2004

On the meaning of Lorentz covariance

In classical mechanics, Galilean covariance and the principle of relativity are completely equivalent and hold for all possible dynamical processes. In contrast, in relativistic physics the situation is much more complex. It will be shown that Lorentz covariance and the principle of relativity are not completely equivalent. The reason is that the principle of relativity actually only holds for the equilibrium quantities that characterize the equilibrium state of dissipative systems. In the light of this fact it will be argued that Lorentz covariance should not be regarded as a fundamental symmetry of the laws of physics.

physics.class-ph↗
arXiv2002

A local hidden variable theory for the GHZ experiment

A recent analysis by de Barros and Suppes of experimentally realizable GHZ correlations supports the conclusion that these correlations cannot be explained by introducing local hidden variables. We show, nevertheless, that their analysis does not exclude local hidden variable models in which the inefficiency in the experiment is an effect not only of random errors in the detector equipment, but is also the manifestation of a pre-set, hidden property of the particles ("prism models"). Indeed, we present an explicit prism model for the GHZ scenario; that is, a local hidden variable model entirely compatible with recent GHZ experiments.

quant-ph↗
arXiv2000

On Fine's resolution of the EPR-Bell problem

In the real spin-correlation experiments the detection/emission inefficiency is usually ascribed to independent random detection errors, and treated by the "enhancement hypothesis". In Fine's "prism model" the detection inefficiency is an effect not only of the random errors in the analyzer + detector equipment, but is also the manifestation of a pre-settled (hidden) property of the particles.

quant-ph↗
arXiv2000

On an attempt to resolve the EPR-Bell paradox via Reichenbachian concept of common cause

Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle claims that if there is correlation between two events and none of them is directly causally influenced by the other, then there must exist a third event that can, as a common cause, account for the correlation. The EPR-Bell paradox consists in the problem that we observe correlations between spatially separated events in the EPR-experiments, which do not admit common-cause-type explanation; and it must therefore be inevitably concluded, that, contrary to relativity theory, in the realm of quantum physics there exists action at a distance, or at least superluminal causal propagation is possible; that is, either relativity theory or Reichenbach's common cause principle fails. By means of closer analyses of the concept of common cause and a more precise reformulation of the EPR experimental scenario, I will sharpen the conclusion we can draw from the violation of Bell's inequalities. It will be explicitly shown that the correla-tions we encounter in the EPR experiment could have common causes; that is, Reichen-bach's Common Cause Principle does not fail in quantum mechanics. Moreover, these common causes satisfy the locality conditions usually required. In the Revised Version of the paper I added a Postscript from which it turns out that the solution such obtained is, contrary to the original title, incomplete. It turns out that a new problem arises: some combinations of the common cause events do statistically cor-relate with the measurement operations.

quant-ph↗
arXiv1996

Is there anything non-classical?

It is argued that quantum logic and quantum probability theory are fascinating mathematical theories but without any relevance to our real world.

quant-ph↗
arXiv1996

Branching Space-time analysis of the GHZ theorem

Greenberger, Horne, Shimony and Zeilinger gave a new version of the Bell theorem without using inequalities (probabilities). Mermin summarized it concisely; but Bohm and Hiley criticized Mermin's proof from contextualists' point of view. Using the Branching Space-time language, in this paper a proof will be given that is free of these difficulties. At the same time we will also clarify the limits of the validity of the theorem when it is taken as a proof that quantum mechanics is not compatible with a deterministic world nor with a world that permits correlated space-related events without a common cause.

quant-ph↗
arXiv1995

Does Quantum Mechanics Save Free Will?

According to the widely accepted opinion, classical (statistical) physics does not support objective indeterminism, since the statistical laws of classical physics allow a deterministic hidden background, while --- as Arthur Fine writes polemizing with Grünbaum --- "{\sl the antilibertarian position finds little room to breathe in a statistical world if we take laws of the quantum theory as exemplars of the statistical laws in such a world. So, it appears that, contrary to what Grünbaum claims, the libertarians' 'could have done otherwise' does indeed find support from indeterminism if we take the indeterministic laws to be of the sort found in the quantum theory.}" In this paper I will show that, quite the contrary, quantum mechanics does not save free will. For instance, the EPR experiments are compatible with a deterministic world. They admit a deterministic local hidden parameter description if the deterministic model is 'allowed' to describe not only the measurement outcomes, but also the outcomes of the 'decisions' whether this or that measurement will be performed. So, the derivation of the freedom of the will from quantum mechanics is a tautology: from the assumption that the world is indeterministic it is derived that the world cannot be deterministic.

quant-ph↗
arXiv1995

Is Quantum Mechanics Compatible with a Deterministic Universe? Two Interpretations of Quantum Probabilities

Two problems will be considered: the question of hidden parameters and the problem of Kolmogorovity of quantum probabilities. Both of them will be analyzed from the point of view of two distinct understandings of quantum mechanical probabilities. Our analysis will be focused, as a particular example, on the Aspect-type EPR experiment. It will be shown that the quantum mechanical probabilities appearing in this experiment can be consistently understood as conditional probabilities without any paradoxical consequences. Therefore, nothing implies in the Aspect experiment that quantum theory is incompatible with a deterministic universe.

gr-qc↗