A Game of Drones: Cyber-Physical Security of Time-Critical UAV Applications with Cumulative Prospect Theory Perceptions and Valuations

Abstract

In this paper, a novel mathematical framework is introduced for modeling and analyzing the cyber-physical security of time-critical UAV applications. A general UAV security network interdiction game is formulated to model interactions between a UAV operator and an interdictor, each of which can be benign or malicious. In this game, the interdictor chooses the optimal location(s) from which to target the drone system by interdicting the potential paths of the UAVs. Meanwhile, the UAV operator responds by finding an optimal path selection policy that enables its UAVs to evade attacks and minimize their mission completion time. New notions from cumulative prospect theory (PT) are incorporated into the game to capture the operator's and interdictor's subjective valuations of mission completion times and perceptions of the risk levels facing the UAVs. The equilibrium of the game, with and without PT, is then analytically characterized and studied. Novel algorithms are then proposed to reach the game's equilibria under both PT and classical game theory. Simulation results show the properties of the equilibrium for both the rational and PT cases. The results show that the operator's and interdictor's bounded rationality is more likely to be disadvantageous to the UAV operator.