arXiv · 1907.10570
Infection-Curing Games over Polya Contagion Networks
Abstract
We investigate infection-curing games on a network epidemics model based on the classical Polya urn scheme that accounts for spatial contagion among neighbouring nodes. We first consider the zero-sum game between competing agents using the cost measure for the average infection in the network. Due to the complexity of this problem we define a game on a proxy measure given by the so-called expected network exposure, and prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium that can be determined numerically using gradient descent algorithms. Finally, a number of simulations are performed on small test networks to provide empirical evidence that a Nash equilibrium exists for games defined on the average network infection.
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Greg Harrington, Fady Alajaji, Bahman Gharesifard. 2019-07-24. Infection-Curing Games over Polya Contagion Networks. https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.10570
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